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Abstract
The qualities of the people serving in government, the processes used, and
the policies that result have been put forth in the literature as possible
determinants of political trust (Miller and Borrelli 1991; Ulbig 2002; Erber and
Lau 1990; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Political evaluations of people, process, and
policy can be seen as determinants of political trust. While previous scholarship
hypothesizes them as such, there is no empirical work which investigates these
three variables together. This project combines people, process, and policy into
one study to examine their influence upon trust in relation to one another.
Evaluations of people, process, and policy are found, through analysis of
originally collected data, to influence both trust in government and trust in
specific politicians. A representative national sample survey combined with the
power of a randomized experiment was employed to study the effect of
perceptions of people, process, and policy on trust. Survey questions asked
participants to consider people, process, and policy on a global level, while the
experimental design tested specific attributes of people, process, and policy.
Findings from both the survey and the experiment indicate that, of these three,
perceptions of policy had the greatest impact on trust. Perceptions of people
followed closely behind policy, and the effect of process was the weakest. This
x
convergence between survey and experimental findings lends confidence to the
overall ability of evaluations of people and policy to explain trust in government.
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Chapter 1
A Consideration of Political Trust
Political trust is a concept within political science that is prolifically
studied and understood little. What explains why some individuals trust the
federal government and others do not? How do people arrive at the decision to
trust? The political science literature is replete with trust studies that isolate one
causal variable or one category of causal variables at a time. Explaining a
complex political attitude such as trust is not easy and although several alternative
reasons have been identified and studied, in fact, whole books have been devoted
to the topic (Nye, et.al. 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001), there still exists a
methodological and conceptual void in the literature. Multiple explanations of
trust have not been studied together. It would be helpful in constructing a more
comprehensive theory of political trust, which we so sorely need, to know which
indicators of the political system have an effect, either in the positive or negative
direction, and which of these exhibits a greater effect. We do not know which
political attitudes and impressions have the most effect on individuals and their
trust decisions. It is possible, indeed probable, that political trust is of parts.
What are these parts, and how do they function?
Individual level characteristics of citizens such as education, income, party
identification, etc. although long posited as affecting trust have actually been
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found to have little predictive power. Instead, my work emphasizes aspects of the
political system itself, specifically the people who serve in office, the process of
government, and the resulting policy. This spotlight on aspects of the political
process, system, and the people who serve in it allows us to look outside of
individuals for indicators of trust. All three of these have been put forth in the
literature as possible determinants of political trust (Miller and Borrelli 1991;
Ulbig 2002; Erber and Lau 1990; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). This project
combines people, process, and policy into one study to examine their influence
upon trust in relation to one another. The premise is that political trust is a result
of political evaluations made in response to these three primary components that I
am specifying here, people, process, and policy. Which of these three variables
exerts the most effect on political trust? By combining all three into one study,
the impact of each will be measured relative to the others, at least as far as they
are conceptualized here. Which of these three indicators does the best job in
explaining political trust? What influences political trust more – the qualities of
the people serving in government, the processes used, or the policies that result?
In order to construct a broad explanatory theory of trust, a national survey
experiment was conducted. I inquired about and measured trust in two different
ways. The first of these was to ask participants to respond to various statements
that ascertained their sentiments towards the qualities of the people in office, the
processes, and the policies. I then constructed variables of people, process, and
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policy based upon responses to political statements. Multivariate models were
then applied to test perceptions of people, process, and policy upon political trust.
For the experimental portion of the study, I exposed a random, nation wide
sample of Americans to experimental treatments which emphasized different
elements of people, process, and policy. Each respondent was read three separate
descriptions of a politician, one about person qualities, one about process factors,
and one focusing on policy. There was one specific attribute of people, process,
and policy presented within each treatment, and people were randomly assigned
into these groups. The responding levels of political trust were then compared
under qualities of people, process, and policy. The experimental portion of this
research design enabled me to test specific attributes of people, process, and
policy in order to find out if they affect levels of trust. The magnitude of the
effect of each of the three indicators of trust was then compared to each other in
bivariate statistical models.
This research design has much to offer. Empirically, it has the combined
power of a randomized experiment together with a large and representative
national sample. This will provide good substantiation to answer causal
hypotheses. My findings will theoretically add to and refine the existing literature
on political trust. Can the elements of people, process, and policy help us to
explain trust? If so, are they capable of composing a broader theory than
currently exists regarding this complex political attitude? Additionally, there may
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be an important substantive contribution to be made. If I can explain the
characteristics of people, process, and policy that people either trust or distrust,
then this information is very relevant to real world politics. This information will
be useful to those people already serving in public office or potential political
candidates. Americans do not currently have a great deal of trust in the federal
government, but my research may reveal which parts of people, process, or policy
have the capability to affect trust in government.
Why is Political Trust Important?
Political trust has largely been studied in the aggregate, as a political
attitude of the collective through time. The reason for this is apparent. There has
been a fairly steady decline identified in aggregate levels of trust in American
politics since the 1960s. Research has therefore sought to explain this decline.
Does the decline in political trust matter? In the American political
system, a certain amount of skepticism has historically been considered healthy so
perhaps there is no need to sound the alarm over declines in trust. This has not
prevented scholars from trying to explain the decline and its possible
consequences. Although trust has long been thought to influence political
behavior, participation specifically, there exists no definitive proof of this. Trust
does not appear to have a direct effect upon voter turnout, the most commonly
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utilized measure of participation (Miller 1980; Caldeira, et.al. 1985; Uhlaner
1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).
Political trust has often been posited as an important indicator of the health
of a democracy. Without trust the political system may be doomed, or so the
thinking goes. Effects of declining political trust, however, have not been shown
to have any lasting effect on government legitimacy or the continued existence of
the American political system. If anything, Americans continue to show
unwavering support for their form of government, even as trust declines
(Farnsworth 2003b, 28).
Some important scholarship, though, has shown that trust has some
important implications in policy preferences and election outcomes. Trust,
Hetherington argues, benefits the government and the politicians in it because
“More trust translates into warmer feelings for both, which in turn provides more
leeway to govern effectively and institutions a larger store of support regardless of
the performance of those running the government” (1998, 803). This is due to the
fact that decreases in trust cause people to evaluate the president and the Congress
more harshly (791). “Greater support for government spending and activity is, at
least in part, a positive function of public trust in government…” Chanley,
Rudolph, and Rahn concur (2000, 252). Trust, then, has the potential to influence
policy preferences held on the part of the citizenry.
6
Some scholars posit that political trust serves as a simple and quick
heuristic by which people evaluate government (Hetherington 1999, 2004;
Chanley, et.al. 2000). Hetherington makes an interesting case that trust in
government serves as a simple heuristic that citizens use in deciding whether to
support governmental action. As such, political trust has importance in its
influence on both the policy mood of the country and how much people generally
approve of their government.
Trust also has the capacity to influence election outcomes. It has been
argued that trust influences evaluations of incumbent officeholders. This
relationship is also reciprocal, as evaluations of incumbent officials also influence
trust (Hetherington 1998). These evaluations, then, can affect the vote choices
people make. Hetherington (1999) shows that high trust is associated with voting
for the incumbent. People who lack trust in the government are more likely to
vote for the non-incumbent or third party candidates (Hetherington 1999). On the
other end of electoral considerations, Anderson and LoTempio found that those
who vote for a winning presidential candidate have higher levels of trust in
government than those who vote for the losing candidate (2002). In this way,
electoral outcomes also influence political trust.
Previous analysis of public opinion data does indicate that there is
some variety in the explanatory variables which explain confidence in leaders
(Richardson, et.al. 2001, 97). Simultaneously, though, political science has not
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yet been able to explain variation in levels of trust over time (Alford 2001). There
exists some variation in explaining political trust but we cannot yet explain that
variation. Obviously, political trust is not a constant but is an ever-changing
political attitude. Other scholars have pointed this out, calling trust highly
malleable (Mutz and Reeves 2005) and a multidimensional concept (Ulbig 2002).
I expect that the explanatory variables constructed here, people, process,
and policy, will contribute to a deeper understanding of what does affect political
trust. This spotlight on aspects of the political process, policy, and the people
who serve in it will allow us to look outside of individuals for causes of trust. It is
not possible that people, process, and policy will completely explain the variation
in political trust. Political attitudes such as trust are incredibly complex and
nuanced. It does not seem feasible that an attitude such as trust could be fully
captured with a single methodological tool. However, this research will be useful
in that it will measure trust on the diffuse, systems level and at the specific level.
It will test generic ideas of people, process, and policy on trust in government.
Moreover, specific attributes of people, process, and policy, as they are
conceptualized here, will be tested for their effect on specific trust in a politician.
Ultimately, trust is an interesting and timely political topic because it is
what Americans claim that they want out of government and their political
system. Americans may not trust government but they want to. Hibbing and
Thiess-Morse's most recent work, Stealth Democracy (2002), asserts that
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Americans want a political system that they can trust to do the right thing, so that
their required involvement is very little to none. If they can elect politicians
whom they trust and who are in touch with real American problems, citizens
figure the system will serve them well. The question then becomes what begets
trust? If the populace wants to trust their government, what is it that would bring
that about? Specifically, what characteristics of individual politicians and the
political system that they operate in affect trust? Is political trust more responsive
to the people in government, the process of government, or the policy of
government? This project will help determine which factors make people trust
the government and individual politicians. This information could enable us to
identify which characteristics might increase individuals’ level of trust in
government.
Defining Political Trust
So what is political trust? Different scholars have defined trust differently.
Generally, it is the belief, held on the part of individuals, that the government is
conducting itself according to the way citizens expect it to operate (Miller 1974b).
Trust is also the feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable
outcomes and do as the people would want it to (Gamson 1968). Trust is a belief
that public officials have the capacity to perform their given tasks effectively
under the ethical standards that people find acceptable (Kornberg and Clarke
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1992, 97). Trust is often equated with other attitudinal variables such as political
efficacy, political support, legitimacy, confidence, and satisfaction. All of these
attitudinal variables have long been considered interrelated and for that reason,
the literature which speaks to one will be considered to speak to them all.
It is obvious in the few definitions of political trust mentioned that
although scholars have defined it differently it is commonly thought of as a belief
or a feeling. Trust is an evaluative decision that citizens make that is based upon
affect and feeling. Some scholars posit that political trust serves as a simple and
quick heuristic by which people evaluate government (Hetherington 1999, 2004,
Chanley, et.al. 2000). The assumption here is that trust is an evaluation of
government that is based upon feelings that are put together in piece meal fashion,
like an online model of information processing. This model of information
processing, first described by Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989), suggests that
people process information when they receive it, use it to update their opinions,
and then discard the actual information while retaining the updated opinion or
judgment. The question then becomes which information or opinions or feelings
have the most effect upon political trust. When asking about trust, the
presumption is that people will make an affective choice as to how they feel about
the government writ large, and let that guide their subsequent decision about trust.
Political trust is not easily measured because there is some disagreement
as to what it is. The political science literature dealing with trust has not had an
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easy time defining what trust is or in deciding how to measure it. It should be
noted that political support and political trust are often equated with one another,
as are confidence, legitimacy, or efficacy. These terms shall be considered very
similar ideas for the purpose of this research, especially in trying to define and
explain what trust is. The literature which specifies political support lends itself
to understanding political trust.
David Easton’s (1965) investigation of political support set the tone for
this debate, as he was the first to conceptualize political support as having two
parts. Specific support, according to Easton, is that which is directed at
components of the political system and it originates with the evaluation of
satisfaction with what the system, and its parts, is doing. This type of support is
premised upon the outputs and performance of the system. Diffuse support, on
the other hand, is the idea of support based on how one feels about the political
system in general. In other words, you may not like the parts of the government,
but you approve of it as an entity overall.
Interestingly enough, Easton has since reassessed the concepts of political
support and political trust (1975). Easton here maintains that support and trust are
conceptually different. He points out that political trust is not political support,
but it would be closer to specific support than diffuse support if it were (450).
Specific support, he says, is a response to the authorities in charge of government
and a response to the decisions and policies of the incumbent authorities (437),
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while trust is a “symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which the country is
run” (447). This makes specific support and trust somewhat similar but not
entirely. The debate in the literature, however, rages on.
Trust then stems from evaluations regarding certain performance of the
political system and its parts (specific support) and from generalized feelings of
satisfaction and support directed at the entire political regime (diffuse support).
So when we ask people to evaluate the government and to formulate political
attitudes like trust, are people accessing their opinions of particular officials, the
incumbent political authorities, or opinions about the entire system? Is trust that
which is directed at the specific officials in political office, or trust given to the
political system as a whole?
Following upon Easton’s theory, Miller and Citrin engaged in a
meaningful debate in the 1970s that has also helped to define the academic
approach to studying trust. Miller (1974a) initially argued that levels of trust were
a response to the policy alternatives presented by the entire governmental system,
meaning that people who were pleased with the policy direction offered by the
government were more trusting of government and vice-versa. Citrin’s (1974)
rebuttal to Miller was based upon the idea that trust was measuring satisfaction
with incumbents in office, rather than with the system as a whole. This conflict
has never been resolved with any satisfaction and continues to be a part of the
literature.
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Still, the conceptual distinction between diffuse and specific trust and
where political trust is directed may be important. Does this distinction matter,
and are these types of trust indeed separate? Hetherington (2005) argues that trust
in specific individuals is but one small component of the larger measure of trust in
government as a whole. He finds a correlation between trust in individual
political figures and the government as a whole but he notes that that correlation
is “far from perfect” (11). Other evidence more clearly indicates that system trust
and trust in individuals is linked. Kornberg and Clarke’s investigation of political
support in Canada indicates that the level of support for the larger political system
is “virtually a linear function of levels of trust in public officials” (1992, 138).
These scholars conclude that political support flows upward, meaning that
specific trust and diffuse trust are linked (30). The Pew Center also reports a
correlation between trust in government and trust in individual politicians (PEW
1998). People who trust the government are likely to say that they trust elected
officials, and people who distrust the government are more likely, by the same
margins, to not find elected officials trustworthy. Additionally, survey research in
American politics reveals that along with the general decline in trust in the
American federal government, there has also been a sharp decline of confidence
in political leaders (Blendon, et.al. 1997, 212-13). The available evidence
certainly does not prove that specific trust in individuals and trust in government
as a whole are measuring the same thing. Trust in the system and trust in
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individual politicians are measures that move together however. This does not
necessarily establish causation between these two but indicates some relationship.
As such, political trust has been studied and measured both as a response
to the larger political system and as an evaluation of particular political officials.
There exists evidence that supports either manifestation. For instance, Citrin,
et.al. (1975) found that citizens who disapproved of political officeholders were
more likely to be alienated from the system (12). Low trust in individual
politicians caused low trust in the government as a whole. Luke Keele (2005)
argues that citizens do evaluate government according to the authorities,
measured as the political party in charge, and his evidence shows this to be true
especially among partisans. Using political party control as a measure of an
individual political figure is a blunt way to do this, but Keele’s research indicates
that evaluations of political incumbents are capable of affecting trust. On the
other side of things, political trust directed at the entire government has been
extensively investigated as well. Specifically, the NES trust questions which have
been in existence in survey research since the 1950s get at this. These are the
general measures of trust most often referred to and or used in research dealing
with political trust.
This work does not aim to resolve the conceptual debate over what
political trust is measuring but to be careful and specific in measuring trust on the
diffuse, general level and the specific level, as directed at incumbent
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officeholders, so as to head off any possible source of confusion. Perceptions of
trust will be measured both through evaluations of trust in government as a whole
and through evaluations of individual politicians. As previously mentioned, the
idea of trust in the political regime and trust in the individual politicians are
measures that generally move together. We cannot establish for sure that one
causes another, but that is not crucially important for to this research question
here. Clearly these differing ideas of trust are tapping into similar attitudes and
opinions held on the part of the American people regarding government and
politics. For the purposes of this research, trust will be measured as both general
and specific. In order to measure broad trust in the government as a whole, trust
will first be operationalized as the standard NES battery of questions that refer to
government in general. Then, I will employ a trust measure that focuses on trust
in an individual politician, thus measuring specific trust.
A Brief Empirical Test of Trust
Before beginning this project, I conducted a pretest of my survey
instrument using college undergraduates (N = 179). This enabled me to have
some empirical reference as to how this specific group of people conceptualizes
of political trust. In this pretest, one of the questions specifically inquires about
what political trust is. Respondents are provided five options to choose from:
Political trust is
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1. when the government passes laws that I agree with
2. when I like the people who run the government
3. when I agree with the way things are done in government
4. trusting government to do what is right without me having to watch
over them
5. expecting elected officials to do their jobs effectively under ethical
standards that I find acceptable.
The fourth and fifth options are definitions that come straight out of the literature
whereas the first three options are ideas of trust which emphasize people (option
2), process (option 3), or policy (option 1).
A simple frequency distribution indicates that the two most often chosen
definitions of political trust are the ones that originate from the literature, options
4 and 5. It shows that 49% (n = 88) of the sample think of political trust as being
the expectation that politicians do their jobs effectively and under prevailing
ethical standards. This is the most popular choice, while 37% (n = 67) believe
that political trust is trusting government to do what is right without having to
police them. Almost 90% of the sample surveyed, then, thinks of political trust as
expecting or trusting the government to do what is right. This includes doing it
effectively and doing it under some ethical guidelines so that people do not have
to constantly keep watch. This idea of political trust, then, shall be the one used
here. It puts together the two most often chosen definitions of political trust
which appears to comport with how people themselves would define trust. This
provides some empirical reference as to what political trust is. Also, this
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definition is very much inline with the first question of the NES trust battery of
questions, which will be utilized in this study as a dependent variable.
Another note of interest is that of the other three definitions offered as
choices, intended to represent people, process, and policy, only the process idea of
trust, as I am putting forth here, had any takers. Only 12% of the sample (n = 21)
identified political trust as “when I agree with the way things are done in
government”. The fact that an overwhelming percentage of this sample chose two
widely used definitions of political trust provides some support for my
supposition that people, process, and policy are determinants of trust and not trust
writ large and proof that people generally do have similar definitions of political
trust.
How Do People Make Political Evaluations?
There is a subtle trend present in the literature that the perspective by
which people think about government does influence evaluations made of it. The
perspectives that people use in evaluating government and politics, as examined
by previous scholarship, can be classified into three categories: the personality of
incumbent officeholders, the people; the process that shapes the business of
politics and government; and the outputs of government and politics in the way of
policy and performance. Trust is, of course, an evaluative judgment so these
different perspectives should have some effect on political trust.
17
According to Erber and Lau (1990), people have what they refer to as
either an issue-oriented perspective to politics or a person-oriented perspective to
politics. They test whether or not these orientations affect individual levels of
trust in government. This whole premise is based upon the theoretical
disagreement between Miller and Citrin in 1974 as to what political trust
measures. It should be noted that this debate has not been fully resolved. Miller
(1974a) argued that dissatisfaction with the policy choices offered by the two
political parties causes distrust, while Citrin (1974) claimed that trust is
influenced by dissatisfaction with the incumbent politicians and their job
performance. Erber and Lau, utilizing some of the only panel data available (the
NES surveys from 1972, 74, and 76), find that an information processing effect,
based upon a person’s orientation to politics, does influence corresponding levels
of political trust. This means that how a person perceives of politics affects her
corresponding levels of political trust.
In their 1995 work Congress as Public Enemy, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
examine dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole but with an emphasis
on Congress. To get at what people like or dislike about political institutions,
they used open-ended survey questions. These answers were then categorized and
coded according to three orientations: people, policy, and process (47). Hibbing
and Thiess-Morse argue that a person’s satisfaction with parts of the political
system will be affected by the orientation that he uses.
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These three categories of variables, people, process, and policy indicate
what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call a “propensity” towards politics. In this way,
each category is considered a heuristic of sorts which works to help individuals
interpret and process information through a “dominant attitude structure” or
“framework” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 127). Erber and Lau (1990) use
propensities in the same way as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, although they call
it“chronicity” and offer only two, a people orientation and an issue orientation.
(Note: I will be using the words framework, propensity, schema, and orientation
interchangeably hereafter. They will all refer to the same thing.)
This research design builds upon the ideas and findings of these scholars.
It borrows the three categories of people, policy, and process in order to explain
political trust. Based on this previous evidence that people do use these
orientations in the formulation of political attitudes and that these orientations can
influence political trust, I presented participants in my project with one of these
three orientations. This was done, without the participant’s knowledge, by
manipulating treatments to emphasize people, process, or policy. In this way, by
virtue of the information shared with him, a participant is gently forced into
thinking about politics and the political information of the treatment according to
one of these three frameworks. We know that they matter; I can then ascertain the
predictive power of people, process, and policy on political trust, especially in
relation to each other. This represents a unique usage of previous scholarship.
19
Additionally, although these three variables have been previously identified as
playing a role in trust, no attempt has been made to study all three of these
determinants simultaneously. I am on the forefront of the study of political trust
in empirically investigating this conceptual repertoire of variables affecting trust.
In the use of a schema in evaluating politics, it has generally been argued that
people have a dominant one. Some people are more likely to be influenced by the
people in office and others by policy. There is some evidence that political
information which is in line with the schema a person employs will more strongly
influence political evaluations than information which is not in line with one’s
schema (Lau 1989, 7). No matter which framework a person predominantly uses
the proximity of the framework presented to her would dominate because of the
idea of priming. Priming is the idea that activating certain types of knowledge in
a person’s memory causes that knowledge to have a greater influence upon
subsequent evaluations (Krosnick 2002, 202). There is, however, some evidence
to the contrary, as Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) assert that priming effects
differ among people based upon the dominant schema that they rely upon (55).
The treatments that people encountered in this research design can be seen
as a priming affect, calling to mind either details of people, process, or policy, and
then asking for their consequent trust judgment of the politician in question.
Participants were randomly assigned into these priming conditions and should
then be capable of evaluating an individual member of Congress with the
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information at hand, without having to rely upon their usual orientation to politics.
Richard Lau postulates:
…if the individual holds no strong political schema or if available
information does not allow categorization of the politician into a well-
developed schema, then affective evaluation will be piecemeal. The
overall evaluation of the politician will be a ‘running total’ of all the affect
associated with every individual bit of information known about that
politician (1986, 97-8)
Lau’s statement supports my reasoning. Decisions about trust are affective
evaluations. These decisions, according to Lau, can be made by putting together
all of the information one has at her disposal, whether or not the information is in
line with a particular schema. Moreover, if we consider that citizens are
“cognitive misers”, meaning that they try to make decisions with the least amount
of information possible, then the default information-processing objective should
naturally be to form an opinion based on readily available information. As such,
it is perfectly reasonable to expect that the nature of the information presented
within the treatments will affect the political decision-making process that takes
place afterwards.
Why People, Process, and Policy?
The idea that people, process, and policy are components of trust and
therefore elements which may explain trust comes straight out of the literature.
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There is ample support in the political science literature that each of these three
factors (people, process, and policy) influences political trust to some degree.
Miller and Borrelli (1991) conducted a study of trends in political trust
through the 1980s. In their conclusion, they say, “…it is becoming increasingly
evident that public cognitions and evaluative responses to political phenomena
involve a focus on three conceptually distinct factors: policy, performance, and
the attributes of political leaders” (169). This statement acknowledges that these
three factors influence ideas and evaluations that people form about politics,
similar to Erber and Lau (1990).
Most recently, Rahn and Rudolph (2005), in an exploration of local
political trust, summarize that in the literature an integrated model of political
trust has four recurring criteria for determining political trust: quality of policy
outcomes, policy congruence, procedural considerations, and attributes of
officeholders (532). They come up with four criteria, while I am proffering three.
Policy congruence, although long believed to be an element of good
representation (Miller and Stokes 1963), has proven to be too great of a burden
for the citizenry to truly evaluate. Policy congruence simply means that the
represented and the representative have the same, or very similar, positions on
policy issues. This requires, of course, that the average citizen have enough
political information to formulate and express a policy opinion as well as that
citizen being aware enough to categorize her representative’s position on the same
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issue. As such, I believe that a more general version of policy and performance is
the best way in which to conceptualize of policy. This shall be hereafter referred
to as policy outcomes. However it is conceptualized, as policy congruence or
satisfaction with policy outcomes and performance, the idea of policy matters in
decisions regarding political trust. These scholars’ work provides the basis for
conceptualizing trust as being of three parts, or at least being influenced by the
three categories of people, process, and policy. Although it is apparent in the
literature that these three determinants of political trust have been heretofore
identified, people, process, and policy have not been studied together in their
impact on trust.
This work builds upon the ideas and findings of these scholars. It will
borrow the three categories of people, policy, and process in order to explain
political trust. These perspectives will then be tested simultaneously for their
impact on political trust. There is a plethora of evidence to show that all three of
these orientations towards politics, primarily studied singularly, have the
capability to affect political trust. Most often, these three factors have been
disaggregated and studied one at a time. Even the work of Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, which attempts to integrate policy concerns and process concerns in
political attitudes, gives primary attention to process. This work will attempt to
study people, process, and policy in conjunction with one another. Most previous
work has not been able to speak with much clarity to the entire litany of causes
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and explanations of political trust as it has tackled smaller, but not
inconsequential, pieces of the puzzle. By investigating these three factors
together, I should be able to weigh their relative importance in political trust.
The Determinants of Trust
People
The attributes of officeholders affect political trust because citizens can
easily reference the individual politicians when making evaluations of
government. There exists plenty of evidence that assessments of political officials
help predict trust. Citrin (1974) posited that political trust is affected by the
citizen’s perceptions of what incumbent political authorities are doing. Research
also indicates that trust is influenced by evaluations of the president and approval
of Congress (Miller and Borrelli 1991; Citrin and Luks 2001). Although
congressional and presidential approval ratings are not direct evaluations of just
the people who hold these offices, research shows that when people like and
approve of these politicians, they tend to trust government more.
Moreover, additional research indicates that when voters evaluate political
candidates they predominantly use personality characteristics of the politicians
(Miller, et.al. 1986, 525). These scholars proffer that what affects candidate
assessments should also influence the way in which people evaluate the
government (533). People are, at least in part, thinking about the personal
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characteristics of the people in government when forming political opinions. For
instance, when people are asked to evaluate the performance of their member of
Congress, personal characteristics of that congressman are one of the major
criteria used (Parker and Davidson 1979).
Previous literature has found that people who obtain their political
information through television are more likely to find personal characteristics of
politicians important (Keeter 1987). Television, perhaps, primes its viewers to
notice personal characteristics of politicians (Druckman 2003). This is an
important consideration in that most American people depend upon broadcast
media for their political news and information. This means that the great majority
of people are primed to think about politicians in terms of personal characteristics,
making a people orientation to political evaluations more likely.
As such, this research design will conceptualize that citizens judge politics
and government by the people who serve in it. The people variable will then
represent personal qualities and attributes of elected officeholders that might
influence evaluative political decisions such as trust. These personal qualities
might be honesty, integrity, or something having to do with an individual’s
morality. We know, for instance, that the populace expects politicians to have
certain attributes. Competence, for instance, is thought to inspire trust (Wright
1976; Hart 1978; Barber 1983).
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Process
The newest perspective of evaluating government performance is process.
Americans pay attention to the way in which their political system functions and
the processes that it uses. The work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse looms large
because their 1995 work Congress as Public Enemy focused predominantly on
process, as does their follow up work on political attitudes (2001, 2002). People,
they find, like procedural justice more than specific policy outcomes. As long as
the process is fair, Americans feel better about government, and this should then
affect political trust. Both Owen and Dennis (2001, 220-1) and Farnsworth
(2003a, 73) find that perceptions of fairness do, in fact, influence political trust.
Fairness, in this sense, refers to the nature of representation (Hibbing 1999, 47).
Does government represent the interests of its people or is it more responsive to
special interests and lobbyists?
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) discern that people are more affected by
processes than policies. When evaluating government, people’s dissatisfaction is
related to perceptions of how government does its job, not what it does (34-5).
Especially for citizens with minimal political interest and knowledge, process
concerns are most important (80-1). If we consider that a great deal of the
American electorate lacks political interest and knowledge, then the role of
process in evaluating the government and its actors should play a substantial role.
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This research design postulates that people will then evaluate government
by the processes used and by the way government does its job, more specifically
how politicians do their jobs. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s work convincingly
demonstrates that Americans have a propensity to evaluate government by
impressions of process.
Policy
It has long been believed that citizens evaluate their political system
according to the outputs and performance of that system, most often
conceptualized as public policy. The thinking about policy’s effect on trust is that
citizens will evaluate the government based on what it is doing and how it is
performing. People who are pleased with the policy direction and policy outputs
of the government are expected to trust government more because it is producing
desired outputs (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; Easton 1975).
Policy entails general governmental performance as well as specific policy
outputs. Historically, there is evidence of a correlation between feelings of
political trust and perceptions of governmental performance on broad policy
issues, even when controlling for other factors like ideology, income, and
economic satisfaction (Citrin, et. al. 1975, 19). It should be noted, however, that
evidence to the contrary has been found as well (Hibbing 1999, 48). Moreover,
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scholars note that the evidence on the affect of policy on trust has been
underwhelming (Ulbig 2002).
Although the empirical evidence is mixed, there is an intuitive appeal to
believing that people who like what the government produces should be more
likely to trust it. This, along with the fact that policy has long been considered a
factor which affects political evaluations, merits its inclusion into this research
design.
Dissertation Layout
Chapter Two discusses the research design and methodology used in this
research project. This includes how the dependent variable of political trust was
measured as well as the primary independent variables of people, process, and
policy. The survey experiment instrument will be fully explained.
Chapter Three addresses my survey evidence on political trust. In order to
construct a broad explanatory theory of trust, a national survey experiment was
conducted. I address trust in two different ways. The first of these asked
participants to respond to various statements that ascertained their sentiments
towards the qualities of the people in office, the processes, and the policies.
Respondents reacted to statements like “Politicians generally have good
intentions”, “The political process is fair and open”, and “All in all, the
government does a good job of running its programs”. I constructed variables of
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people, process, and policy based upon responses to these political statements.
Multivariate models were applied to test perceptions of people, process, and
policy upon trust in government. This tested how people perceive of people,
process, policy, and what affect they have upon political trust. These indexed
variables were considered along with all relevant control variables in order to
form as complete a picture of political trust as possible.
Chapter Four considers the experimental portion of the research design.
For the experimental portion of the study, a national sample of Americans was
exposed to treatments that emphasized different elements of people, process, and
policy. Each respondent was read three separate descriptions of a politician, one
about person qualities, one about process factors, and one focusing on policy.
Within the person category, there were two conditions to be tested, whether a
politician is experienced and how principled he is. The process conditions
contained within the treatments included how a politician runs his campaign and
how he engages in debate. As far as policy is concerned, the conditions of the
treatments were whether a politician has a national or a local focus and whether or
not he accepts pork barrel project monies for his district. There was one specific
attribute of people, process, and policy presented within each treatment, and
people were randomly assigned into these groups. Randomization assures that
what participants will be responding to can be attributed to the treatments and not
other factors. The experimental portion of this research design enabled me to test
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which attributes of people, process, and policy most influence specific trust in that
politician. Because the treatments were conceived of in pairs, the magnitude of
the effect of each treatment can be compared to its pair. Moreover, the magnitude
of the effect of people, process, and policy treatments can be compared to one
another within each of their same categories.
Chapter Five of this dissertation puts together the pieces of the trust puzzle
as investigated here. Applying the findings here, I address which characteristics
of people, process, and policy affect trust in government. This will be done
through analysis of the generalized statements that people were asked to respond
to (the survey) and analysis of the reactions to each of the experimental
treatments. This enables me to compare which of these three components have
the most effect on trust in government as well as how they perform as predictors
of trust in relation to each other. In conclusion, I address the relevance of my
research and what we might do with these findings. Moreover, I discuss how




Measuring the Dependent Variable – Trust
In the last chapter, I discussed the conflict in the literature over diffuse
trust and specific trust. This presents a problem of measurement because it is not
possible to ensure that when a person is asked to evaluate trust that he will use
either specific trust, the incumbents running the political system, or diffuse trust,
feelings about the larger government, in a mutually exclusive manner. As Citrin
and Muste (1999) point out, however, political trust has a specific object, whether
it is a politician, a process, or an institution, and Easton (1975) would concur. A
person does not simply trust (Citrin and Muste 1999, 467). She trust something,
someone, an entity. There is certain logic to this. As such, these scholars
recommend that when measuring political attitudes we carefully specify which
aspect of government is being judged.
One of the recommendations that Citrin and Muste (1999) make regarding
measuring trust is to “specify the attitude object as unambiguously as possible”
(480). This piece of advice was carefully implemented into the research design.
The first time that survey respondents were asked about trust was following a
battery of political statements they were asked to respond to. The prompt for
these trust questions referenced government in general, getting more at diffuse
trust. Then, because the treatments in my survey experiment are all focused on
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elected officials, it should be very clear that any assessments of trust, post
treatment, would be made about individual politicians. When asking citizens
about trust, it must be made relevant and to make it relevant, the object of
political trust should be a political actor (Levi and Stoker 2000, 497). As such,
the experimental portion of the research design asked respondents to answer the
questions following the treatment with the incumbent officeholder presented in
the treatment in mind.
Another recommendation from Citrin and Muste is that in order to ensure
that we are measuring true political attitudes, rather than just emotional responses,
we should test trust more than once (1999, 480). This suggestion was also
implemented within this research design. The NES trust battery of questions was
first asked of respondents after they responded to various political statements but
before they received any of the experimental treatments. These NES questions
have been utilized for decades and their validity has been well established. There
are four questions in this battery that get at the trustworthiness, honesty,
wastefulness, and responsiveness of the federal government. These four questions
together are often employed in the literature as a scaled variable of trust. I also
used the NES trust battery as a scaled dependent variable, which will be called
Trust Scale. Furthermore, I also used the first question of the NES trust battery as
its own dependent variable (How much do you trust the government in
Washington to do what is right?); this shall be referred to as Trust.
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Both of these methods of conceptualizing of trust have been utilized in
creating dependent variables. It appears that a type of trust scale formulated from
the NES trust battery is most often used in this literature. Several scholars make
the argument, though, that the first question of the battery stands alone as a good
measure of trust (Alford 2001; Owen and Dennis 2001, 211). Alford (2001)
specifically states that this single question is a better indicator of trust in
government than an indexed variable (29). As such, I utilize both of these
dependent variables throughout the analysis. This will enable me to investigate
how perceptions of people, process, and policy perform in explaining one pointed
question about generalized trust in government and a trust scale formed with four
separate questions about both generalized trust and more specific elements of trust
as well.
Political trust was measured a second time to detect the effect of the
treatments. The second time political trust was measured with a new question
borrowed from previous literature, in particular a measure created by Cook and
Gronke (2005). This question inquired about the level of trust felt towards the
one particular politician introduced in the treatment. For instance, “How much do
you trust this person as an elected official to do what is right?” measure specific
trust in the individual and originated with the work of Cook and Gronke (2005).
Why use the Cook and Gronke measure of trust? As they have pointed
out, a potential conflict in measuring political trust is in the interpretation of trust
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survey responses. More specifically, does a lack of trust signify cynicism or
skepticism or outright and active distrust? Cook and Gronke (2005) argue that the
current survey measures appear to truncate the full diversity of responses to
questions regarding trust, making a person appear either trustful or distrustful.
These scholars have developed their own measure of political trust which
indicates that healthy skepticism is more the norm than are either absolute trust or
distrust.
The Cook and Gronke trust variable asks respondents to place themselves
on a scale from 0 - 10, where 0 indicated very strong distrust of government with
the expectation that government would do the wrong thing, 10 meant strong trust
of government to do the right thing, and 5 indicated neither trust, nor distrust
(787). Their findings reveal very few people (23%) were actively distrustful,
providing responses below the score of 5 (789). Moreover, they find a correlation
of .34 between their measure of trust and the primary NES trust battery question
(How much do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?). The
nature of the relationship between the Cook and Gronke measure and the NES
measure is positive, meaning that these two variables increase together. A
correlation coefficient of .34 indicates that these two different measures of trust
are analogous enough to be measuring something similar but the correlation is not
strong enough to signify that these measures are the same. It seems that Cook and
Gronke’s measure is indeed capturing something a little different than the
34
standard NES trust question. Perhaps the difference with this measure is that it
gets at intensity of feeling in measuring trust, distrust, and anything in between,
which is where a lot of people would fall. As a result, Cook and Gronke’s
measure, instead of the NES trust questions, will be utilized to ask about trust post
treatment.
It is important to note that I did not repeat the standard NES battery of
trust questions after the experimental portion of the survey. Doing this would
have provided a second measure of the exact same trust question and enabled me
to get at more stable political attitudes. However, the survey experiment ran
under ten minutes, and I felt that repeating the same four NES trust questions
would be far too repetitive and noticeable given the short length of the instrument.
Measuring the Primary Independent Variables of People, Process, and Policy
These three variables of people, process, and policy represent the primary
independent or explanatory variables of interest in explaining political trust. As
such, these three ideas, though introduced above, must be elaborated upon. What
exactly is meant by the personal attributes of politicians, the processes of
government and politics, or the resulting government policy? People, process,
and policy will be explained beginning with their origins in previous literature and
then building upon it to explicate my definitions. Additionally, their usage for
explaining trust will be justified. The evidence to indicate that these three
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variables of people, process, and policy influence trust was reviewed above, so we
have established that these three components matter. The scholarship of Erber
and Lau (1990), for instance, shows that people do use these orientations to
politics to make decisions regarding trust. In order to build a model that explains
trust, it must be established that individuals are able to differentiate among these
three components posited as predictors of trust. That task shall be taken up in this
section as well.
The work of a few choice scholars colors my conceptualization of people,
process, and policy and it is their scholarship which will be described and
elaborated upon. The first of these are John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
and their ideas come out of Congress as Public Enemy (1995). Although there
are other instances in the literature that belie the potential importance of people,
process, and policy, I adapted these terms specifically from the work of Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse. In Congress as Public Enemy (1995), Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse examine dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole but with an
emphasis on Congress. To get at what people like or dislike about political
institutions, they use open-ended survey questions. These answers were then
categorized and coded according to three orientations: people, policy, and process
(47). Hibbing and Thiess-Morse argue that a person’s satisfaction with parts of
the political system will be affected by the orientation that he brings to politics.
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My work is premised upon this idea. Political trust should be influenced by a
person’s perception of people, process, and policy.
The second piece is an article from Ralph Erber and Richard R. Lau
published in the American Journal of Political Science. The article entitled
“Political Cynicism Revisited: An Information-Processing Reconciliation of
Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of Changes in Trust in
Government” (1990) posits that how people think about politics, here defined as
either a person chronicity or an issues chronicity, affects levels of political trust.
These would loosely connect with my ideas of people and policy, and so their
work also influences my approach. The argument that how people think about
politics affects their political attitudes formulates the bedrock of my research
question here.
The third work comes from Stacy G. Ulbig (2002). The title of her work
“Policies, Procedures, and People: Sources of Support for Government?” shows
exactly why her work informs my own. Ulbig’s work is a study of policy,
procedure, and people as explanations of political trust, not completely unlike my
work here. Ulbig’s article is not commonly cited in the political trust literature,
however, and there are also critically important differences between Ulbig’s work
and my own. The way I conceptualize of people, process, and policies does not
coincide with her definitions or measures whatsoever. Noting that trust is
multidimensional, she uses items from the NES trust battery to explain trust itself.
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Her analysis, therefore, is limited and rather weak. My data will be original and
very specific to my question. I am also positing certain ways to conceptualize and
test ideas of people, process, and policy which have not been done before. As a
result, I feel that I have something original and illustrative to contribute to the
discussion of political trust.
People
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse classified individuals with a person orientation
if they answered their open-ended question “in terms of the members of the
institution, the job performance of people in government, specific public officials,
or generalizations about politicians” (1995, 129). Erber and Lau posit that an
individual with a person chronicity will interpret political events in relation to
politicians and in terms of the “personality characteristics” of politicians (1990,
238). Ulbig (2002) operationalizes person by using standard NES questions that
inquire about public officials, basically politicians in the aggregate.
Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk’s (1986) conceptualization of
personality characteristics most comports with how I perceive of a people
component of trust. These scholars did not subjectively categorize evaluative
statements made by voters about candidates but performed a factor analysis to
find out which characteristics about candidates most clump together. The five
characteristics they categorize as person-oriented are competence, integrity,
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reliability, charisma, and personal factors. The average correlation across the five
characteristics was .10, indicating that these five factors are measuring different
personal characteristics (527-28).
This previous scholarship will have some overlap with my definition of
people orientation. My research design conceptualizes a people framework as
judging individual politicians by their individual characteristics, not in the
aggregate or as a collective. A people orientation, as conceptualized here, will be
focused on the individual politician as a person and his individual characteristics
that speak to his ability to perform well as a politician. For instance, honesty,
integrity, and character issues would be classified as people factors. This is
important in that people will use a politician’s character as an indicator of how
they will perform in office.
Process
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse define a process orientation as one which
focuses on these characteristics: institutions of government, reform of certain
political processes, relations between institutions, the ideas of efficiency and
organization, or references to specific processes which are associated with the
structure of government and its parts (1995, 129). In fact, Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse are the first to postulate that people judge politics and government
primarily by the processes used. Erber and Lau (1990) do not include process as
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one of their chronicities. Ulbig (2002) does include process in her study, although
she calls it “procedures”. Additionally, she conceptualizes procedure as being of
two parts, institutional and individual, because people evaluate the process of
government by ideas of efficiency and neutrality and evaluate the individuals who
make up government by honesty and competency (793-4). Basically, she
collapses evaluations of process and people into one category, procedure, while I
isolate people and process into separate variables.
As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse point out, when evaluating government,
people’s dissatisfaction is related to perceptions of how government does its job,
not what it does (2002, 34-5). People want a process that is fair and open instead
of catering to special interest groups and monies. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
(2002) claim that indicators of bad process, so to speak, are running nasty and
negative campaigns, making promises that one has no intention of keeping, and
being heavily invested in special interests (45). In this way, flawed political
process is dominated by elected officials and special interests and institutions (48)
and conflict and intense debate (122). Since Hibbing and Theiss-Morse make the
convincing argument that people are concerned about the process of government,
the process qualities that their research identifies as problematic will most dictate
how process will be operationalized here.
My measures of process will be more specified. For my purposes here, a
process framework will be operationalized as how a specific politician goes about
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doing his job. His job here is that of representation and making laws. How well
does a politician represent the interests of his constituents and get the business of
law-making done? A process framework will be operationalized as how a
specific politician goes about doing his job within the institutional context,
particularly the decisions that he makes in carrying out his job as congressman.
Process factors might then include things like negative campaigning, political
debate, compromising, and relationships with special interest groups.
Policy
Finally, the framework of policy has been conceptualized in previous
literature as meaning that people will make political evaluations based upon the
government’s handling of a specific policy problem. This originated with
Miller’s research on trust in 1974 and has continued unabated. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse conceptualize a policy propensity in terms of explicit references to
specific policies of the government, no matter what the type (1995, 129). Erber
and Lau’s (1990) issue chronicity is operationalized in the same way (238). Ulbig
(2002) measures policy as satisfaction with specific policies (796). This also
represents the idea of policy congruence, that one’s elected representative pursues
policies that one wants.
People will judge the government by how it produces the most desired
policies. The most desired policy will naturally vary among individuals. Policy
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satisfaction should enhance trust while policy dissatisfaction should decrease
trust. As noted previously, the evidence on policy’s effect on political trust has
not been very strong.
Almost all of the scholarship which posits a relationship between policy
and trust, measures policy satisfaction by first asking people what they think the
most important problem facing the United States is and then inquiring how good
of a job the government is doing in handling that problem. The conceptualization
that I am putting forth here will not measure policy as such because this method
of measurement requires that individuals are paying attention to policy and
performance outputs. The literature on the ability of the masses proves that the
demands of paying attention to politics and government enough to follow specific
policy are too great a burden for the average citizen to shoulder (Campbell, et. al.
1960; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). As such, individuals are much more likely
to evaluate politicians and government with an eye towards the performance and
general policy produced by government and numerous scholars have found this to
be true (Hetherington 1998; Owen and Dennis 2001; Keele 2007).
I will then operationalize policy as very general policy considerations
along with general governmental performance. A policy framework, in this sense,
will concentrate on the outputs of government and politicians; exactly what is
being done that can be measured and felt without requiring intensive knowledge
on the part of citizens. Ideas of policy as conceptualized here would include
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macro economic performance, deficit spending, pork projects, and the focus of
representation, being national or local.
Potential Problems in Separating People, Process, and Policy
There is potential difficulty in separating people and process in the way
that I have decided to conceptualize them. Other scholars have encountered the
same problem. In reality, there may be some interplay between these two
orientations because, as Ulbig (2002, 794) points out, these ideas may not be
distinct dimensions of trust in the minds of people. Other scholars have also
found that it is empirically hard to sort out the marginal effects of both process
and people (Steele 2005, 884).
For instance, when citizens were asked whether the wrong kind of people
were running for Congress in the first place, or if Congress has a bad effect upon
people once elected, people are torn but seem to be capable of differentiating
between people and process. 21% of Americans believe that bad people are
running for Congress, 51% think Congress has a corrupting effect upon people,
and 26% think that it is a combination of the wrong people and something being
wrong with the system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 63). People seem to be
capable of distinguishing between people and process as a full 72% of the public
was able to identify either one or the other as the cause of some of the ills present
in Congress.
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People may have a difficult time differentiating between the people and
the process, but this evidence does not show it to be impossible. Once again,
breaking out people and process has been hard for previous scholars to do. I am
under no presumption that it is simple, but I still aim to conceptualize of people
and process as different elements of trust. Here, people and process will be
considered distinct. Two features affect the political, decision-making process,
the individuals involved, the people, and the institutional aspects involved the
process (Ulbig 2002, 794). Ulbig sees the individuals and the institutions as
nested within what she calls process. I would argue that people and process are
distinct because institutions would fall under process, not the other way around.
For instance, I have characterized campaigning as a process factor
because it is within the institutional framework of running for and holding
political office. Someone else might argue that making the decision to run a
positive or a negative campaign is a function of that person’s personality.
Campaigns and elections, though, are parts of the institutional apparatus, and for
the purposes here, are conceived of as process. A people orientation will hone in
on the character and personal attributes of a politician, which, although they may
be influenced by the institution, are fundamentally external to the institution. The
process orientation will focus on how a politician does his job within his
institutional constraints or considerations.
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A Brief Study of People, Process, and Policy Variables
A pretest of my survey instrument was conducted using college
undergraduates. This was done in order to test potential measurements of people,
process, and policy to ensure that they are appropriately operationalized. Using
an undergraduate introductory course, American Federal Government, at the
University of Oklahoma, 179 college students completed this pretest survey
during the Fall 2005 semester. The survey asked respondents to rate the
importance of twenty-nine different aspects in deciding whether or not a politician
should be trusted. These twenty-nine factors were all hypothesized qualities of
people, process, and policy. I wanted some empirical justification for these three
primary independent variables of people, process, and policy. I also used the
identified people, process, and policy variables to create experimental treatments.
Factor Analysis of Pretest
My work is premised upon the idea that people, process, and policy are
separate determinants of political trust that people are able to differentiate. In
order to support this, I ran a factor analysis of these twenty-nine variables to see
which of these variables group together. (A list of these twenty-nine potential
variables of people, process, and policy is included in the Appendix as Table 2.1.)
This analysis should reveal whether or not compartmentalizing people, process,
and policy is statistically justifiable. The results show that it is. I found variables
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that cluster together and represent these three determinants of trust. I was able to
pare down twenty-nine variables into twelve, and these twelve variables separated
into three distinct factors – people, process, and policy.
The process of paring down twenty-nine variables started with eliminating
any variable which, on average, was not ranked as somewhat or very important.
If the sample surveyed did not find a particular quality to be at least somewhat
important in deciding whether or not a politician is trusted, I dropped it. This
resulted in six variables falling out of the model. Left with twenty-three potential
variables, I then made the choice to remove any variables which did not correlate
with any factor at .5 or above.
Next, I considered how the remaining variables could be operationalized.
Because these variables were to be ultimately turned into experimental treatments,
I needed to be able to operationalize them as clearly and succinctly as possible.
For instance, “whether or not you believe that he is honest” was identified as very
important in trust decisions. Though it correlated with the person factor, as I
would have hypothesized, I ultimately removed it from consideration because it is
hard to measure honesty in a manner objective enough to create an experimental
treatment. Besides that, it is simply unexciting to explore. We would expect that
if you find a politician honest, you are more likely to trust that politician and
likely, by extension, the government as a whole. After removing the variables,
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such as honesty, which would be too difficult to operationalize into treatments, I
settled on twelve.
Interestingly enough, most all of the removed variables did factor with the
element of people, process, or policy that I hypothesized it would. Although these
variables correlated with the factors at different rates, meaning some more
strongly than others, this analysis indicates that the explanatory variables of
people, process, and policy that I have created here are accurately specified.
In order to conduct an effective factor analysis, the variables must be
linearly related to each other. The measure used to test this is called the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin. Smaller values of KMO indicate that factor analysis with the given
variables is not a good idea. This model of twelve variables has a Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of .75. .75 seems very acceptable given that it is the halfway point
between .5, which indicates a sample is not appropriate for factor analysis, and
1.0, meaning that the variables in the sample are perfectly related in a linear
manner.
A good factor analysis tries to explain as much as possible with as few
factors as possible. With these twelve variables which cluster around three
factors, 49% of the variance in the model is explained. Of these twelve variables,
four fall under each of the three factors. Each variable correlates with a factor
with scores over .6, so these three factors seem very reasonable. The people
factor that emerges includes the variables of having held previous office, being
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principled, having charisma, and supporting his political party. The process factor
includes the variables of willingness to compromise, a willingness to work with
the president regardless of party, conducting a clean campaign, and engaging in
civil and friendly debate. The policy factor includes the variables of working to
limit the influence of special interests, deficit spending, bringing money and
projects to his district, and placing the focus on the good of the nation over
specific localities. All three of these factors represent the people, process, and
policy factors as I have conceptualized them here. The variables that load onto
each of these three factors are very much in line with the characteristics that I
expected would fall under people, process, and policy.
(Table 2.1, Factor Analysis of 12 People, Process, and Policy Variables
from Pretest , Here)
Next, I took the results of the factor analysis and used them to create
experimental treatments of people, process, and policy. All twelve variables
representing people, process, and policy which resulted from this factor analysis
could not be included in the survey experiment for very important reasons. First,
twelve variables would require a very lengthy survey. The longer a telephone
survey gets, the more the response rate goes down. It is simply harder to keep
people on the phone long enough to complete the survey. Second, a longer survey
also costs more money to complete. Every research project has its budget, and I
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had to identify only a couple variables of each people, process, and policy that
could be utilized.
I identified two variables within each category which were highly loaded
onto the factors and created experimental treatments. For people, I chose to use
whether or not he has held previous office (.62) and being principled, defined here
as “standing up for what he believes in” (.66). For process, whether or not he
engages in civil and friendly debate (.75) and whether or not he conducts clean
campaigns, free of mudslinging and negativity (.74) were the chosen variables.
For the policy treatments, I chose pork, whether or not he brings money and
projects to his district (.70) and national versus local focus (.66)
These six variables were all strongly correlated with the three factors but
were also chosen with an eye toward practicability in formulating experimental
treatments. Additionally, I believe that these variables best represent an
opportunity for interesting and valuable findings. These six variables then
represent how people, process, and policy will be operationalized and measured
for the experimental portion of this research.
Melding Together Survey and Experiment
The traditional methodology utilized in the study of political trust has been
survey research. Most research on trust has been performed using individual
level, cross-sectional survey data (Chanley, et.al. 2000, 241). Because surveys
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are very useful for measuring and studying political attitudes, which is the goal of
this research, it is one of the methods that was used in this study (Weisberg, et.al.
1996, 13).
This work will also study political trust using a method not common in
political science, the experiment. The experiment itself was embedded in a
telephone survey. Telephone surveys make “inserting experiments into naturally-
occurring environments” possible (Druckman, et.al. 2006, 629). There is a
natural symbiosis, then, between these two methodologies. This gives this
research great explanatory power in that it combines the power of a randomized
trial experiment with the larger and representative survey sample. In fact, one of
the “principal breakthroughs” in public opinion surveying has been the combining
of “distinctive external validity advantages of the representative public opinion
survey with the decisive internal validity strengths of a fully randomized,
multifaceted experiment” (Sniderman and Grob 1996, 378).
The experimental design was nested within a survey instrument. This
multi-method approach melds together a method often used in the study of
political trust, the survey, with a method not usually employed in studying trust,
the experiment. A survey is well suited for the goal of this research design as
surveys are very useful for measuring and studying political attitudes, which is
exactly the goal of this research design (Weisberg, et.al. 1996, 13). Experimental
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research is well suited for any research design because it represents the scientific
ideal (Bositis 1990, 85).
Experimental Methodology
The experimental method allows the systematic variation of variables in a
controlled environment with randomly assigned subjects. Because the
investigator controls the production of the setting, the creation of treatments, and
the observation, it is possible to eliminate threats to valid inference (Kinder and
Palfrey 1993, 7). The outcomes in an experimental setting differ based on the
variables being systematically manipulated, thus offering very high internal
validity. As a methodology, experiments offer the strongest support for causal
inferences to be made (McDermott 2002, 38). As a result, experimental research
has become important in the political science discipline as we have moved
towards emphasizing causal inference (Druckman, et.al. 2006, 627).
Experimental research aimed at understanding political opinions, both
measuring them and explaining their formation, has been successfully completed
(Bositis 1990, 71). As pointed out in a recent American Political Science Review
issue on the evolution of the discipline, the range in usage of experiments in
political science remains narrowly focused on three subfields, one of them being
political psychology (Druckman, et.al. 2006, 627). My research fits comfortably
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within this subfield. Even then, very few studies of political trust using
experimental methods have been employed (Levi and Stoker 2000, 501).
Most political science experiments involve changing the content of the
experimental treatment, and this experiment did just that (Bositis 1990, 75). An
experimental design is inherently useful in that it allows for more than one
treatment to be introduced. More specifically, this research design altered the
decision-making environment by providing differing information to randomized
groups of survey participants (Gilens 2002, 240). Because the research question
of interest here involves the explanatory power of three determinants of trust, all
three indicators, people, process, and policy, served as their own treatment.
Utilizing a survey experiment has advantages in that it can better get at the
responses that people have to survey questions. Martin Gilens says, “…the
randomized experiment can tease out the nuances of public opinion or uncover
aspects of the public’s thinking that may otherwise remain hidden” (2002, 233).
In asking survey questions, the researcher is putting values and definitions upon
the possible responses. For instance, the concept of interest here is political trust.
Surveys have consistently asked about trust since the late 1950s, but this does not
mean that we know what people are thinking about when they are making these
political evaluations. Survey evidence alone can never tell us what people are
considering when they are asked about trust. An experimental survey, however,
allowed me to present information in the context of treatments in order to see if
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these qualities of people, process, and policy influenced people in making
decisions about political trust.
Survey Methodology
Political science literature indicates that survey methodology is the
preferred method to study a political attitude like trust. I am very comfortable
with the survey process as a methodology and feel that I can usefully interpret and
use the data to address my research question about political trust.
The survey instrument allows two models of political trust to be tested,
one based upon survey responses and one based upon experimental manipulation.
First, I describe the nuts and bolts of what the survey portion looks like and what
questions it enables me to answer. Then, I demonstrate the work that has gone
into creating a good survey instrument.
At the very beginning of the survey, participants responded to statements
about politics. These statements represented all three of the primary independent
variables, people, process, and policy. There were three statements for each of
the three categories. These are detailed in Chapter Three. Each statement
represents a single variable to be included as an independent variable in statistical
analysis. Also, the responses to each of these three statements for each category
will then be added together to create a scaled variable for each people, process,
and policy. These variables will indicate the degree to which an individual is
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satisfied with the people in office, the process of government and politics, and the
general performance and policy. These independent variables will then be
statistically tested in a multivariate regression model, along with some pertinent
control variables, for their influence on trust in government. Political trust, here,
will be operationalized as the NES trust battery. Variables of people, process, and
policy will be tested in separate models and then again altogether in a
simultaneous model with all three. This will enable me to ascertain which
attitudes, as measured through self-proclaimed survey responses, most affect
political trust. Additionally, by combining all three of these variables into one
model, I can see how people, process, and policy perform relative to each other, at
least as they are conceptualized here.
Good survey design is qualified by three methodological elements:
sampling, designing questions, and data collection (Fowler 2002, 4). Each of
these will be considered in turn.
Sampling
The first consideration is that of sampling. A sample, of course, is only an
approximation, as we cannot get to the entire population (Weisberg, et.al. 1996,
67). As such, the sample of people under study needs to be identified and
explained. The population of interest here is the entire United States citizenry, so
a good sample should be representative of this. A random sample will be needed
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so that the results of this study can be generalized onto the population of interest.
The best way to achieve a random national sample is a random digit dialing
telephone survey. This is a probability sampling procedure that is used to draw a
random sample of housing units in order to sample people in those households
(Fowler 2002, 23). The value of random digit dialing depends upon the fact that
most American households have a telephone so that everyone has the opportunity
to be a part of the sample. This is generally true, as only 5% of the population
does not have telephone service (Fowler 2002, 25).
The fact that I utilized a random sample of Americans nation-wide sets my
work apart. In a recent review article on the use of experimental research in
political science, the authors note that 64% of the “laboratory experiments” in
political science articles used “exclusively students” (Druckman, et.al. 2006, 633,
n7). This research could have been completed using a college student population.
Because I am interested in conducting generalizable research about the entire
American population, I pushed the normal boundaries of dissertation research in
my department to include a national sample.
Choosing Questions
Next, the nature of the questions used in a survey needs to be examined.
The major concerns in survey questions revolve around the idea of validity,
meaning are the questions accurate in measuring the phenomena of interest. The
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first place to look for good questions is in previous research. Using previous
measures indicates that a study has good face validity, meaning that it is
measuring what it claims to be measuring. What I am trying to measure is
political trust, so the questions used must comport with that concept. Most all of
the political statements that participants were asked to react to in the survey
portion came straight out of previous scholarship on political attitudes.
Additionally, the wording of the demographic questions and some of the control
variables came from previous and well-respected work, particularly the National
Election Studies, Gallup, and the Pew Center.
All of the questions in the survey were closed-ended ones. Closed-ended
questions provide ease of comparison among participants especially as compared
to open-ended questions. The other advantage to them is that having answers to
choose from makes questions clearer to some participants in a survey (Rea and
Parker 1992, 39). A potential negative is that there is very little thinking involved
on the behalf of participants because they may choose one of the answers
provided (Rea and Parker 1992, 42). It is of the utmost importance to make
comparisons across survey participants easier, however; so closed-ended
questions serve this purpose best.
Data Collection
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The final component of good survey design is data collection. As already
mentioned, the method of data collection here is telephone surveys, specifically
computer assisted telephone interviews (often referred to as CATI). The use of
experiments in political science scholarship has been aided by the increase in
technology, especially the rise of computer assisted telephone interviews
(Druckman, et.al. 2006, 629). There are certain advantages with telephone
surveys. These include rapid data collection, lower cost, the ability to conduct
surveys at all levels (local, state, or national), and the advantage of anonymity
(Rea and Parker 1992, 11-12; Fowler 2002, 71-72).
Some of the disadvantages of telephone surveys are the limits to potential
respondents and the lack of visual materials that are normally used in face-to-face
interviews (Rea and Parker 1992, 11-12). Other disadvantages that could become
important in telephone surveys are the problems of response rates and sampling
limitations (Fowler 2002, 64-66). The rate of nonresponse is higher with random
digit dialing than it is with personal interviews. Additionally, there is an inherent
nonreponse bias associated with age and education (Fowler 2002, 66). Using the
telephone and random digit dialing does make it easier to get in touch with some
populations and also more difficult to get in touch with others. This is also
referred to as the noncoverage error. Ideally, the noncoverage error should be
kept to a minimum in trying to get a random national sample, but these problems
with telephone surveys remain. People without phone service, homeless people,
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soldiers, prisoners, and people in the hospital are typically excluded from surveys
(Weisberg, et.al. 1996, 65). In this instance, the advantages of this methodology
outweigh these potential shortcomings, as achieving a random sample of the
nation is the preeminent concern.
Completion of Survey and Summary
The OU POLL on the University of Oklahoma’s campus was employed to
conduct the survey experiment. The data was collected between October 2006
and February of 2007. The completed project resulted in 600 complete and 4
incomplete interviews obtained among residents of the 48 contiguous states. For
the population of interest, the 600 interviews represent a margin of error of +/-
4.0% at a 95% confidence level. (The 95% confidence level means that if the
survey were to be conducted 100 times with 100 different random samples, the
actual results obtained would fall within the limits of error at least 95 times). OU
POLL reported that the 600 completed and 4 partially completed interviews
represent a 26% response rate of known, eligible households.
Experimental Design within the Survey
Special care has been taken to circumvent the potential shortcomings of
experiments. A potential disadvantage in experimentation is in generalizability.
External validity, generalizing results from one specific population onto another
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larger and more general population, is typically problematic in experimental
research. External validity is generally of great concern in political science
(McDermott 2002, 35), so it is important to ensure that this research provides the
greatest extent of external validity possible. The population of interest is normal
American citizens and the population utilized was a national random sample of
American citizens, so there should be no concerns about generalizability. The
population of interest, American citizens, is the population that was sampled
from, which should ease generalizability, because the sample is representative of
the population of interest.
Another concern with generalizability for my research is in generalizing
about people, process, and policy. While people, process, and policy are broad
ideas, I tested only a few specific elements of each of these three primary
independent variables. In the survey, I inquired about three statements of people,
process, and policy, while in the experimental portion of the design, I tested the
effect of two aspects of each people, process, and policy, which resulted in four
treatments for each category. When I report my results here, and refer to people,
process, and policy, I can only speak with certainty about the aspects specifically
tested here. Beyond that, any conclusions that I come to regarding these three
broad categories of people, process, and policy may not be generalizable to all
ideas of people, process, and policy.
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Experiments are capable of altering the regular behavior of people because
they are fully aware that they are participating in one. As such, generalizing
across settings also presents a concern because an experimenter may capture
behavior in an experiment that may not otherwise occur (Kinder and Palfrey
1993, 27). This does not present an obstacle in this research design because
people were exposed to an experiment within a survey. When participants agreed
to participate in this research, it was described as a survey, which it was.
Telephone surveys make “inserting experiments into naturally-occurring
environments” possible (Druckman, et.al. 2006, 629). As such, there are no overt
concerns that the behavior and attitudes of people was altered. Because this
research design exposed all participants to just three treatments, there is also little
risk of carryover effects from one treatment to another, as can sometimes be a
problem in experimental designs (Sniderman and Grob 1996, 382).
As a result, this research design exhibits strong internal validity and
external validity. Internal validity means that what is done in the study, the
treatments for instance, causes what is observed, here trust scores. Because of the
experimental design, I can ensure that the manipulation of the independent
variables, through the treatments, will be causing the difference (if one is to be
perceived) in the dependent variable of trust. As mentioned above, by using a
random sample of people, I am able to tentatively generalize to the entire
collective of people, so external validity is strong. Any threat to external validity
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would originate with the way in which I have decided to operationalize and
measure my explanatory variables.
For the experimental portion of the research design, survey participants
were exposed to different treatments on particular attributes of people, process,
and policy. Each person was exposed to three treatments which described an
individual politician; each treatment emphasized one attribute of each people,
process, and policy. After each of these treatments, respondents were asked about
their level of trust in this politician. The second part of this methodology, then,
allows me to test the affect of two variations of the same attribute of people,
process, and policy upon trust.
This simple experimental design was first divided into three groups which
represented each of the three primary explanations of trust to be examined,
people, process, and policy. There were two specific attributes to be tested within
each component of people, process, and policy, and each attribute had two
treatments. This resulted in four possible treatments within each category of
people, process, and policy. Survey respondents were randomly assigned to
experience one of the four treatments for each component. The dependent
variable, political trust, was measured for each of these groups. Because of
randomization, the subgroups of the sample should be identical. Any differences
between these groups on the dependent variable can then be attributed to the
difference in the treatment.
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The Treatments
The treatment was a description of an individual politician. The object of
trust to be asked about here, then, was a political actor. This should make it fairly
easy for people to make a trust decision, as there is a specific object. An
individual politician is a concrete entity whereas the federal government is an
obscure and unclear political object.
Each attribute of people, process, and policy to be tested had two
treatments. These treatments were both stated in a positive direction but they
presented different scenarios. People, process, and policy attributes were not to
be portrayed as zero sum games, where a politician can only be one way or the
complete opposite. For instance, the variables of people, process, and policy used
in this study were discussed above and now an example of the way in which these
treatments will be operationalized can be given. The process variable of clean
campaigning was presented in treatments this way. The first treatment read
“Congressman Frank Smith, in his campaign, promised to keep the focus of the
election on the issues and not the people running for office. He publicly promised
not to run any negative campaign ads or to attack his opponent on a personal
level.” The second treatment read “Congressman Frank Smith, in his campaign,
vowed to point out the differences between himself and his opponent. He
publicly pledged to make sure that voters had all the important information on the
62
candidates and the issues.” In this way, these treatments allowed me to tease out
the subtle differences we expect to see in politicians and gauge individuals’
reactions to reality, rather than a simple dichotomy. The assumption is that each
treatment had differing effects on political trust, both pair-wise and also in
comparison with other treatments within each of the three categories of people,
process, and policy.
The experimental treatment was a description of an incumbent
officeholder, specifically a member of Congress. Congress is the institution that
representative government is premised upon as it was the only institution in the
original American constitution which called for direct elections by the people (at
least the House of Representatives anyways). Its position in the political system
is of the utmost importance. Congress is also the least liked of all American
institutions (Cooper 1999). In using a member of Congress, this research design
used the hardest case to test aspects of political trust.
Additionally, the frame of reference for this research question about
political trust, though aimed at specific trust in individuals, places the decisions
about trust within the larger federal government. I felt that the politician, the
object of political trust in this experimental design, should be representative of the
federal government. Citizens generally trust state and local governments more
than the federal government (Uslaner 2001, 133). We would expect that if the
politician used in the treatment were a state official, that no matter what the
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treatments, levels of trust might be higher. Congress is the best federal institution
to place a hypothetical politician in, as Congress is the institution most commonly
thought of when asked about the federal government. Feelings about Congress
have already been found to affect trust (Williams 1985). Some research has found
a strong causal link between trust in Congress as a political institution and trust in
government in a general sense (Feldman 1983, 351). It follows accordingly then
that Congress is the most natural referent for our politician to be used in the
treatment.
Another distinction to be explained is that the individual office holder in
each treatment was male. Gender considerations may complicate the analysis
unnecessarily and water down the potential effect of the variables of interest,
people, process, and policy. Previous research indicates that gender does matter.
Voters view male and female candidates differently. Male and female candidates
are thought to excel in different areas of policy (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a,
1993b). Male traits are generally associated with being a more effective legislator
(Rosenwasser and Dean 1989). Most importantly, though, there is evidence that
judgments made about male and female candidates differ in regards to trust.
There is evidence that female political candidates are trusted more than men
(Matland and King 2002). Women candidates are seen as more honest than
similar male candidates (Kahn 1992, 504; Leeper 1991, 255).
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As such, varying the gender of the politicians in the treatments would
presumably affect political trust. While the experimental treatments here did not
describe candidates, it was presumed that the differences detected in how male
and female candidates are evaluated would also apply to politicians, without
reference to their status as candidates. Because trust is the concept of interest to
be tested here, it was reasonable to not include gender as an issue. I wanted to
keep conditions, in this case gender, constant, and simultaneously minimize all
extraneous variables. Moreover, male politicians are more common than are
females. Admittedly, this decision to use only male politicians may limit the
findings and interpretation of my research, but given the conditions just discussed,
I am comfortable with this. The issue of gender and trust in politicians remains
open for future research.
The issue of partisan identification is also a concern in asking people to
evaluate politicians. We know that people’s political judgments including vote
choice will be affected by the party identification of both the politician in question
and their own partisan persuasion (Campbell, et.al 1960). Of greatest concern for
this research design is how to either include party identification or control for it.
People evaluate politics according to their partisanship, so in introducing survey
respondents to members of Congress, partisanship is an automatic element of any
subsequent evaluations made. The expectation is that people will be more likely
to trust politicians that share their party identification. There does not, however,
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exist any substantive evidence that party identification or ideology affects overall
levels of political trust (Alford 2001, 41; Owen and Dennis 2001, 222). In order
to neutralize the effect of party identification upon trust, the prompt before the
treatments did not reference ideology or partisanship of the politician in question
at all. This decision to not include party identification also has its consequences
as I will not be able to speak to the effect of partisanship on the elements of
people, process, and policy or the resulting levels of political trust that will be
tested. This question would be an appealing one for future research along these
lines to consider.
In conclusion, special attention went into ensuring that there were no
symbolic or ideological cues in these treatments. The treatments were very brief
and free of any extraneous information. After the treatment, when respondents
were asked about trust in that individual politician, their opinions will not have
been influenced by any confusion over the level of government, gender concerns,





The purpose of this research design is to find if the ideas of people,
process, and policy are determinants of political trust. The first part of the
research design attempts to answer this question through a survey. As previously
mentioned, respondents were asked to respond to nine different political
statements: three each for people, process, and policy.
This survey experiment (N = 600) was conducted by the OU POLL
beginning in October of 2006 and ending in February of 2007. It is important to
understand the political climate of this time, since the questions asked here tapped
into people’s feelings about people, process, and policy. The country was
entering the fourth year of the war in Iraq and the country was growing
continually weary of this war. President George W. Bush’s popularity was also
on the wane. The sample surveyed here were much more likely to disapprove of
the job he was doing, than to approve (62%, n =361 to 30%, n = 177). The survey
also spanned a congressional election in November 2006 which saw control of
Congress switch from the Republican to the Democratic party. This has been
attributed to the dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, that party control in Congress
switched hands. As such, the political context within which this survey
experiment was conducted was one of dissatisfaction and increasing cynicism.
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The statements intended to measure how people feel about qualities of
elected officials were 1. Politicians generally have good intentions. 2. I have a
great deal of confidence in the men and women in this country that either hold or
are running for public office. 3. Politicians in the U.S. deserve respect.
In order to measure feelings about process with political trust, the
following three statements were tested. 1. Most politicians do a lot of talking but
they do little to solve the really important issues facing the country. 2. The
political process is fair and open. 3. Fighting between political parties in
Washington prevents our elected officials from getting anything done.
In order to test the idea that policy, as conceptualized here, is a
determinant of political trust, three statements were included in the survey portion
of this research design. 1. I am generally satisfied with the public policies the
government has produced lately. 2. All in all, the government does a good job of
running its programs. 3. Things in this country are generally headed in the right
direction.
Table 3.1 – Summary of People, Process, and Policy Statements
People 1. Politicians generally have good intentions.
2. I have a great deal of confidence in the men and women in this country that
either hold or are running for public office.
3. Politicians in the U.S. deserve respect.
Process 1. Most politicians do a lot of talking but they do little to solve the really
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important issues facing the country.
2. The political process is fair and open.
3. Fighting between political parties in Washington prevents our elected
officials from getting anything done.
Policy 1. I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced
lately.
2. All in all, the government does a good job of running its programs.
3. Things in this country are generally headed in the right direction.
Survey participants were asked to evaluate these nine political statements
on a 5 point scale, where 5 is strongly agree, 4 is agree, 3 is neither agree nor
disagree, 2 is disagree, and 1 is strongly disagree. The nine statements were
randomly rotated in the order in which they were read to participants. In all,
participants had no problem providing their opinion on these ideas, as the sample
size for each question ranges between 591 and 596 (out of a possible 600),
meaning that there are at the least 4 missing values and at most 9.
Descriptive Analysis
In order to analyze this data, I must first summarize and describe it. First,
measures of central tendency should be considered. These nine variables of
people, process, and policy are ordinal variables which use a Likert scale, as
explained above, to ascertain people’s reactions to them. Ordinal variables have
numerical value between each possible response but we cannot know if the
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intervals on the scale are all equal. Social science literature often treats these
types of variables as true interval variables and calculates a mean for them (Cohen
and Lea 2004, 3), I shall do the same here. The mean and the standard deviation
will be reported for each of these nine variables.
Additionally, frequency distributions and percentages can be reported with
an ordinal variable (Cohen and Lea 2004, 6). I will be reporting the valid
percents in these cases, which do not take into account the missing values.
Because there are so few missing values with these variables, as mentioned above,
there is no problem in reporting the valid percents. These frequency tables are
included in the Appendix as Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in order to save space.
Means and Frequency Distribution of People Variables
(Table 3.2 Here)
As far as respondent’s perceptions of whether or not politicians generally
have good intentions, the mean is 3.10 and the standard deviation 1.01, meaning
that the sample of people surveyed generally neither agrees nor disagree that
politicians have good intentions. A look at the frequencies reveals that 40% of
the sample either strongly agrees or agrees that politicians generally have good
intentions (n = 238), although the percentage of those who strongly agree is small
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(5%, n = 28). A full third of people (33%, n = 195) remains squarely in the
middle, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The amount of people who agree that
politicians have good intentions is greater than those who don’t (27% either
disagree or strongly disagree, n = 162). On the issue of politicians having good
intentions, the greatest percentage belongs to those who agree (35%, n = 210) and
the second greatest is the neither agree nor disagree response (33%, n = 195). As
a whole, these individuals either agree that politicians have good intentions or
they have no definite opinion.
The second people question asks respondents about their confidence in the
people that are either running for or holding elective office. The sample appears
to be neutral on this question (M = 2.71, SD = 1.01), as the mean indicates neither
agrees nor disagree that they have confidence in politicians. The sample here is
ambivalent about this question with a third of the sample (33%, n = 196) claiming
they neither agree nor disagree. A frequency distribution reveals that people are
more likely to disagree (32%, n = 189) that they have confidence in political
leaders than agree (20%, n = 120), with only very small percentages who feel
strongly either way on this idea. The two most often occurring responses are
neither agree nor disagree and disagree, indicating that this group of people do not
have a great deal of confidence in their political leaders.
The third people statement asks if “Politicians in the U.S deserve respect”.
It appears that the sample neither agrees nor disagrees with this statement as well
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(M = 3.29, SD = 1.18). Out of all three of the people statements, this one has the
highest mean, meaning that, as a whole, people are more likely to agree that
politicians deserve respect than agree that politicians have good intentions or they
have a great deal of confidence in them. More revealing, however, is the
frequency distribution, as almost half (49%, n = 293) of these people agree or
strongly agree that politicians deserve respect.
As a whole, then, on matters related to the people serving in political
office, this sample has a rather neutral impression of politicians. On average, they
are most likely to neither agree nor disagree that politicians do have good
intentions, that they have a great deal of confidence in them, and that politicians
deserve respect. A majority of those surveyed do think that politicians deserve
respect.
Means and Frequency Distribution of Process Variables
(Table 3.3 Here)
The three statements of process were chosen to represent two specific
process qualities that Americans seem to complain about and one more general
statement about the political process. People’s reactions to these process
statements are much more extreme than those associated with people. The first of
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these (Most politicians do a lot of talking but they do little to solve the really
important issues facing the country) asks people to gauge whether they agree or
disagree with the idea that politicians talk but do not get anything done. The
mean of 3.88 indicates that most people agree with this statement (SD = 1.14). A
great majority, 71%, either agree or strongly agree that most politicians do a lot of
talking but get little done (n = 418).
The next process statement that responses were measured for is “The
political process is fair and open”. It appears that the majority of people neither
agree nor disagree with this sentiment of process (M = 2.84, SD = 1.16). 41% of
this group of people either strongly disagree or disagree that the political process
is fair and open (n = 244). The tendency as a whole is negative, as there are twice
as many individuals who strongly disagree (14%, n = 83) than strongly agree (7%,
n = 41).
The last process sentiment tested was “Fighting between political parties
in Washington prevents out elected officials from getting anything done”. This
statement garnered the highest average score of all nine statements with a mean of
3.96 (SD = 1.22). A full 74% (n = 437) of the sample agreed or strongly agreed
that fighting between political parties prevents politicians from getting things
accomplished. This statement resulted in the lowest percentage (for all nine of
these statements) of those who neither agreed nor disagreed with only 10% (n =
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59) of the sample falling into that category. This indicates that this idea evokes a
very strong reaction from the people surveyed.
Overall, responses to process statements show more extreme variation
than responses to people statements. Frequency distributions show there were far
fewer individual who chose the neither agree nor disagree option on the questions
of process than the questions concerning people. Two of the process statements,
“lots of talking” and “fighting between parties”, had means that hovered near 4,
indicating that most people agreed. The mean response to “fair and open”
indicates neutrality. On average, this sample of people does not have very
favorable opinions of the elements of process asked about here.
Means and Frequency Distribution of Policy Variables
(Table 3.4 Here)
The three statements of policy were intended to represent policy as a
general idea about the state of the nation and its policies. These statements were
all worded in the positive direction. As a whole, the numbers show that people
are generally not pleased with the state of things. These three policy statements
garnered the lowest mean scores of all nine statements. The first statement asked
participants to respond to “I am generally satisfied with the public policies the
74
government has produced lately”. The mean of 2.37 indicates that people were
most likely to disagree with this statement (SD = 1.13) and 58% (n = 347) of the
respondents overall disagreed or strongly disagreed with this sentiment. In fact,
almost as many people strongly disagreed (n = 162) that they were satisfied with
public policies, as those that just disagreed (n = 185). Moreover, a smaller
percentage of the sample agreed (20%, n = 103) than had no opinion (22%, n =
130).
The second policy idea inquired about how people felt about the
government’s performance in running its programs. The mode here was 2.53,
meaning that on average most people disagreed or neither agreed nor disagreed.
A frequency distribution shows that 53% (n = 314) of people, a majority, either
disagree or strongly disagree that the government is doing a good job running its
programs. Furthermore, 28% of the sample neither agrees nor disagrees (n =
166), which overshadows the 19% that do agree (n = 113). Much like the first
policy statement, respondents definitely had a negative opinion of the how well
the government does in running its programs.
The third policy idea was represented by a question utilized often in
survey research. Participants were asked to respond to “Things in this country are
generally headed in the right direction”. The mean here was 2.46, meaning that
people generally disagree with this statement as well (SD = 1.16). 55% of the
sample disagrees or strongly disagrees that things are headed in the right direction
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(n = 325). The majority, then, does not seem happy with the direction that the
country is headed in. Equal numbers of people had a positive response here
(22%, n = 135) as a neutral opinion (23%, n = 135).
The means across responses to policy ideas, as a whole, are the lowest out
of the three ideas of people, process, and policy. This intimates that this group of
people is likely to disagree with positive statements about the policy, programs,
and general direction of the country. In each case, majorities of the sample
disagreed with any positive sentiment here. It can be safely said that this sample
of people does not generally seem happy with these broad elements of policy.
As a whole, this random, nationwide sample of people have neutral
feelings about the people in office, are much more likely to have an extreme
response to the process of politics, and are generally dissatisfied with elements of
policy in this country. The next question then becomes, do these sentiments of
people, process, and policy influence political trust?
People, Process, and Policy as Determinants of Trust – Regression Analysis
What effect do citizens’ evaluations of people, process, and policy, as
conceptualized here, have on political trust? Are they determinative of trust, as I
have postulated? In order to answer this answer this question, linear regression
analysis was performed. Regression is performed to examine a relationship
between one or more independent variables and a single dependent variable. The
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purpose is to create a regression equation to predict a dependent variable from a
group of independent variables. There are two important outcomes to be had
from regression analysis. The first of these is to help determine which
independent variables are good predictors of the dependent variable, and the
second purpose is to obtain estimates of the individual coefficients in the model in
order to understand their predictive value (Elliott and Woodward 2007, 95). OLS
regression can speak to the magnitude of the variables in the model. This will
enable me to compare the effects of people, process, and policy variables to each
other to compare how they perform in explaining trust without performing any
further models. The hypothesized relationship in all of the subsequent regression
analyses is that as a person’s impression of these particular ideas of people,
process, and policy becomes more positive, trust in government should increase.
As a side note to these methodological considerations, I considered using
another type of regression, logit. This type is often employed when analyzing a
limited dependent variable. The Trust dependent variable, especially, could be
conceived of as such with five response options. I did perform a logit regression
analysis and found that the variables of primary interest, people, process, and
policy performed similarly as they had using OLS regression. Because of the ease
in interpreting OLS regression, I chose to stay with OLS.
First, people, process, and policy variables will be considered separately in
regression models. This will indicate which of the variables within each category
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have the most predictive power over trust and which ones are statistically
significant. Then, all nine variables of people, process, and policy will be
regressed onto trust in one model. This will enable me to see how these variables
compare across categories in their effect on trust. Then, scaled variables of
people, process, and policy are regressed onto trust. Creating scaled variables
will be done to find out if the effect of people, process, and policy are different as
amalgamated concepts versus single variables. Finally, the effect of people,
process, and policy on trust is considered in tandem with other pertinent control
and demographic variables. The political trust literature is rich with other
variables which have been tested for their effect on trust, and those will be
considered here as well. This is done in order to see how people, process, and
policy stack up against other hypothesized explanations of political trust.
How Will Trust be Measured?
Since regression models depend upon the dependent variable that is being
predicted, the dependent variable should be explained. The dependent variable of
trust shall be considered in two ways for the remaining analyses in this chapter.
The first of these is what shall hereafter be referred to as the Trust Scale. As
previously mentioned, this appears to be the most common way of
conceptualizing of trust as a dependent variable. This Trust Scale adds up the
values of all four questions included in the NES trust battery. All four of these
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questions are coded so that the greater the numerical value for each question, it
indicates an increasing amount of trust. The higher the number on the Trust Scale
indicates more trust. The range for this version of trust is a minimum of 4 and a
maximum of 11, and the mean is 7.06.
The second version of trust will be a more truncated version of the Trust
Scale and will be called Trust. It will use only the first question of the NES trust
battery (How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in
Washington to do what is right?). Several scholars make the argument that this
question alone stands as a good measure of trust (Owen and Dennis 2001, 211).
As such, this Trust dependent variable will utilize only this question. The
possible responses include never, rarely, some of the time, most of the time, and
always, and are coded from 1 (never) to 5 (always). The mean of this variable of
trust is 2.91, and the majority of this nationwide sample of people (56%, n = 335)
chose the response option “some of the time”.
It is important to point out that the traditional “How much of the time do
you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?”
question generally has only three response categories: just about always, most of
the time, or only some of the time. I altered the response categories to include
five: always, most of the time, some of the time, rarely, and never. These
response categories were adopted from the work of Gershtenson and Plane
(2006). These scholars argue that the difference between these response options
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is unclear, especially the distinction between just about always and most of the
time. They suggest the use of “always” as a response option because it is more
absolute. Moreover, offering respondents more response choices should make for
finer distinctions. The response option of “never” is also offered here while it is
not in the standard NES trust battery.
Looking at the descriptive statistics for this trust question, it is evident that
the distribution of trust across this sample with these response options
approximates a normal curve. Only two people claimed that they “always”
trusted the government which accounts for less than 1% of the sample. On the
other extreme, 5% of the sample chose “never” (n = 28). As indicated above, a
full 56% (n = 335) of the sample says they trust the government some of the time.
Approximately equal percentages say they “rarely” trust the government (19%,
n=115) as “most of the time” (20%, n=116).
People, Process, and Policy Separately
In order to see how variables of people, process, and policy perform as
predictors of political trust, three different models will be computed. One model
will use only the three people variables as independent variables, another with
only the process variables, and the final one only with policy variables. This will
allow us to see what effect these concepts of people, process, and policy have on
trust separately. All three of these models will be performed using two separate
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dependent variables. None of the following regression models has any indication
of multicollinearity as evidenced by the Tolerance and VIF statistics.
Multicollinearity refers to explanatory or independent variables being highly
correlated with one another. For the purposes of prediction, which is the goal of a
regression model, the explanatory variables should be only weakly correlated with
one another and strongly correlated with the dependent variable. The fact that
these models have no evidence of multicollinearity means that these independent
variables, even within the same categories of people, process, and policy, are
measuring different things.
People
This initial models using just the three people variables as independent
variables and the Trust Scale as the dependent variable has an R-squared of .25 in
the Trust Scale and a .21 for Trust, meaning that these three people variables
explain 25% of the variation in the Trust Scale and 21% of the variation in Trust.
All three people variables are positive and statistically significant in both models
(p < .000) and in the hypothesized directions. This means that the more likely a
person is to think that politicians have “good intentions”, politicians deserve
“respect”, and that they have a great deal of “confidence in politicians”, the
greater their trust will be. The strongest independent variable, in examining their
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The models with process variables as independent variables do not explain
as much of the variation in the dependent variables of trust as the model with
people characteristics. The R-squared for the model with Trust Scale as the
dependent variable is .14, and the R-squared for the model with Trust as the
dependent variable is .11. Two of the process variables (“lots of talking” and
“fighting between parties”) were expressed in the negative direction and were
recoded to be stated in the positive direction along with “fair and open”. One of
the process variables, fighting between parties, fails to achieve statistical
significance. This is probably due to the fact that there is not enough variation to
find a relationship. A large percentage of the sample (73%) either agrees or
strongly agrees that fighting between the political parties prevents elected officials
from getting anything done. “The political process is fair and open” is
statistically significant in both models (p < .000). In models with either of the
dependent variables, the beta for this variable reveals that it has the greatest effect
of all three process variables. The other variable “lots of talking” is statistically
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significant in each of the models and has a positive relationship with both Trust
and Trust Scale. This means that the more likely a person is to think that the
political process is fair and open the more trusting they are. Also, the more likely
one is to disagree with “Most politicians do a lot of talking but they do little to
solve the really important issues facing the country”, the more trusting they are.
Put simply, the more likely a person is to disagree with the negative process
statement “lots of talking”, the more trusting she is.
(Table 3.6 Here)
Policy
The R-squared statistic shows that the regression model with policy
variables has about as much predictive power over trust as the model with people
variables only. In the two models here, the R-squared of .25 for both indicates
that policy variables alone account for about 25% of the variation in both versions
of trust. All three variables are positive and statistically significant at at least the
p < .01 level. How a person feels about the government’s performance in
“running its programs” has the greatest predictive power in both models, as
indicated by the betas of these variables.
(Table 3.7 Here)
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All Nine Variables of People, Process, and Policy
These next regression models will utilize all nine variables of people,
process, and policy that were tested. This will show how they all work in concert
with one another. Because these nine variables of people, process, and policy
have the same units, it will be possible to compare the size of the betas, or
standardized coefficients, in the regression models to compare the relative effects
of different explanatory variables.
Dependent Variable – Trust Scale
The first regression model included all nine of the people, process
variables as independent variables. According the ANOVA F-test, the model is a
strong fit (p < .000) and can be considered statistically significant. Missing
values were excluded list wise, resulting in a sample size of 515.
The dependent variable utilized here was the created Trust Scale. This
trust scale adds up the values of all four questions included in the NES trust
battery. All four of these questions have responses that are coded so that the
greater the numerical value for each question, it indicates an increasing amount of
trust. The higher the number on the Trust Scale indicates more trust. The range
for this version of trust is a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11.
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The purpose of a scaled variable is to summarize and quantify some
underlying dimension. The Trust Scale here adds up the values of all four trust
questions of the NES battery to form a more complete picture of political trust.
When using a scale, its reliability must be tested to ensure that all of the items in
the scale are measuring the same thing. Cronbach’s alpha for Trust Scale was .62
(M = 7.06, SD = 1.63). Although good scales tend to have values larger than .8,
this is an acceptable reliability coefficient. All four questions of the Trust Scale,
although long considered measuring one component, are not measuring the exact
same component. Trust Scale will continue to be used as a dependent variable for
now and its usage will be continued until otherwise stated.
(Table 3.8 Here, Model 1)
The R-squared is a measure that evaluates the performance of a regression
model. This statistic measures the strength of the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. It indicates how much of the variation in
the dependent variable can be explained by the regression. It ranges from 0,
indicating no linear relationship, and 1, indicating a perfect linear relationship.
This first regression model, then, has an R-squared of .36. The nine variables
included explain 36% of the variation in the dependent variable Trust Scale.
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There is no evidence of multicollinearity present in the model. There is no
strong correlation among the independent variables. The Tolerance levels are all
well above zero, the lowest variable at .561. Likewise, the VIF statistics show no
evidence of multicollinearity, ranging from 1.118 to 1.783.
Six of these nine independent variables are statistically significant at the
p < .05 level or better. These are “good intentions”, “confidence in politicians”,
“respect”, “lots of talking”, “running its programs”, and “headed in the right
direction”. The political process is “fair and open”, “fighting between political
parties”, and “satisfaction with public policy” are not statistically significant. All
six of these significant variables have positive relationships with the Trust Scale,
meaning that as a person’s impressions become more positive, their trust
increases.
The only process variable that achieves significance (“lots of talking”) has
a positive relationship with trust. This variable was recoded in the positive
direction, meaning that the more likely a person is to disagree that politicians do a
lot of talking but get little done, the higher their score on the Trust Scale. The
more likely one is to disagree with a negative statement about process, the higher
their trust is. While all three of the people variables achieve statistical
significance in this model, only one of the three process variables does. All six
variables that are significant should then be interpreted as when a person’s
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impression becomes more positive on that specific element; their level of trust
should increase.
Overall, the predictive power of policy variables appears to be the
greatest. A look at the betas shows that the “running programs” (β = .194) and
“headed in the right direction” (β = .151) variables have the greatest predictive
power in this regression model with all nine people, process, and policy variables.
The process variable “lots of talking” (β =.139) exerts the next greatest predictive
power and is the only process variable that is statistically significant. Following
closely behind, however, are the people variables, “good intentions” and “respect”
with (β = .130)
Dependent Variable – Trust
The second regression model is similar to the first model in all respects
except one, the dependent variable. Several scholars have made the argument that
the first question of the trust battery is the best measure of trust (How much of the
time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is
right?) (Alford 2001; Owen and Dennis 2001). Alford (2001) specifically states
that this single question is a better indicator of trust in government than an
indexed variable (29). Using this variable, which I will call Trust, as the
dependent variable results in an N of 555.
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Once again, this regression model exhibits a strong fit (p < .000)
according to the ANOVA F-test and can be considered statistically significant.
Missing values were excluded list wise here as they were in the first model.
There is no evidence of multicollinearity in this model either. The
Tolerance and VIF statistics look very similar to those in the previous model.
(Table 3.8 Here, Model 2)
This regression model results in an R-squared of .32. This model explains
less variance in the dependent variable of Trust than the other model did in
explaining Trust Scale. These models have differing dependent variables though,
so really cannot be compared on that.
In this model, two of three people variables are statistically significant
(“good intentions” and “respect”). One process variable is significant (“lots of
talking”). Two of three policy variables are significant (“running programs” and
“headed in right direction”). All of these statistically significant variables have a
positive relationship with Trust, meaning that as they increase, so does trust.
Overall, the independent variables perform similarly in both of these
regression models, even though they have different dependent variables. In
neither of these two models do the process variables of “fair and open” and
“fighting between parties” achieve statistical significance. Two other variables
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indicate differently in each regression model. With Trust Scale as the dependent
variable, “confidence in politicians” achieves significance but it does not in the
model with Trust as the dependent variable. In the Trust model, the policy
variable of “satisfied with public policy” achieves statistical significance although
it does not in the model based on Trust Scale.
Scaled Independent Variables of People, Process, and Policy
All nine variables of people, process, and policy were included separately
in the previous regression models. This was done in order to see which of these
variables were significant predictors of trust. That being accomplished, I will
now use these nine political statements to form scale variables for the ideas of
people, process, and policy. Can these singular sentiments of people, process, and
policy be amalgamated into scales which adequately represent the ideas of people,
process, and policy?
To create these scaled variables, the responses to all alike statements were
added together. The People Scale adds together “good intentions” + “confidence
in politicians” + politicians deserve “respect”. The Process Scale adds “lots of
talking” + process “fair and open” + “fighting between political parties”. The
Policy Scale is formed by adding “satisfied with public policy” + “headed in right
direction” + “running programs”. This was easily done as all nine variables were
worded in the same direction or were recoded to do so (the two process variables
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“lots of talking” and “fighting between parties”). As a result, three indexed
variables were created, each ranging from 3 to 15. In the case of all three scales,
the higher the value indicates greater satisfaction with that element.
These indexed variables will be utilized as independent variables in
regression models which use Trust and Trust Scale as dependent variables. All
three of these variables will be entered into each of these two models. This will
be done in order to ascertain the effect of each of the three ideas of people,
process, and policy in relation to each other. Because these scaled variables of
people, process, and policy all have the same units, it will be possible to compare
the size of the coefficients in the regression models to compare the relative effects
of these different explanatory variables.
Once again, the purpose of a scaled variable is to summarize and quantify
some underlying dimension. The people, process, and policy scales add up the
values of the three questions from the survey in order to form a more complete
picture of how a person feels about that dimension of politics. When using a
scale, its reliability must be tested to ensure that all of the items in the scale are
measuring the same thing. If the items of a scale are not measuring the same
component, then it does no good to form a scale in the first place. As such,
reliability analysis of these three scaled variables must be performed first.
Cronbach’s alpha is the measure of internal consistency of scales and will be
utilized for this analysis. This analysis will also reveal if the ideas of people,
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process, and policy that I have tested here are measuring the three elements that I
have proffered here.
People Scale
Cronbach’s alpha for the People Scale was .68 (α= .68, M = 9.09, SD =
2.51). Although good scales tend to have values larger than .8, this is an
acceptable reliability coefficient. These three questions about perceptions of
people in politics are similar but not the same. Obviously, there is an underlying
dimension that holds these three ideas of people together, although it may not be
as statistically strong as is normally desired.
Process Scale
Reliability for the Process Scale (α = .37, M = 7.00, SD = 2.35) was
unacceptable. The observed reliability coefficient indicates that there is no
underlying dimension present in this scale. Although I have posited these three
variables as measuring process, this analysis shows that the variables are not
measuring the same thing. This scale will, therefore, not be utilized as a scaled
variable of process, as this analysis shows that there is no real uniformity here.
In the initial discussion of these three dimensions of people, process, and
policy, I shared that people and process were probably the hardest to differentiate.
Other scholars have had the same problem and would concur (Ulbig 2002; Steele
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2005). This reliability analysis of the Process Scale indicates that I have not
conceptualized of process in such a way that there is uniformity amongst the
measurements (at least in the survey portion of the design). Although not
completely surprised, as I knew that this was going to be particularly difficult, I
am disappointed.
Policy Scale
Cronbach’s alpha for the Policy scale was a very respectable .76 (α = .76,
M = 7.36, SD = 2.76). The policy variables have a nicely uniformity to them,
measuring a similar construct of policy, and therefore the Policy Scale performs
very well as a scaled variable. This finding makes it usage justifiable.
Reliability of Scaled Variables
Analysis of the scaled variables of people, process, and policy provides
evidence regarding the uniformity of the concepts as they have been
conceptualized and measured here in the survey part of the research design. The
observed reliability coefficients for the People and Policy Scales indicate that
reliability for these two scales is acceptable. This means that these scales are
internally consistent, measuring the same idea. The Process Scale, however,
performed poorly and cannot be used in any analysis as the three variables are not
internally consistent with each other and cannot be used as a scale.
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Dependent Variable – Trust Scale
First, the People Scale and the Policy Scale variables will be entered into a
regression model, along with the three separate process variables, with Trust
Scale as the dependent variable. According to the ANOVA F-test, this model is a
strong fit (p < .000). Missing values were excluded list wise for this analysis,
which results in an N of 515. The R-squared of this model with this dependent
variable is .35. There is also no multicollinearity apparent in this model.
(Table 3.9 Here, Model 1)
With Trust Scale as a dependent variable, both the People and Policy
Scales are statistically significant and both at p < .000 levels. The only process
variable that is significant is “lots of talking”. These three variables all have
positive relationships with Trust Scale meaning that as the perceptions of each
become more positive, trust increases.
In looking at the betas of these coefficients, the People (β = .285) and
Policy Scales (β = .313) have similar magnitude effects on Trust Scale. The
strength of “lots of talking” (β = .133) follows. This is very much in line with
previous findings here as people and policy variables have had a greater impact
than process variables in all regression models performed thus far. It does not
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appear that the effect of people or policy variables changes significantly with the
usage of the scaled variables. Although the Process Scale had to be abandoned,
one of the process variables plays an important predictive role in this model.
Dependent Variable – Trust
Next, the People and Policy scales will be entered as independent
variables, along with the separate process variables, in an attempt to explain
Trust. According to the ANOVA F-test, this model is a strong fit (p < .000).
Missing values were excluded list wise for this analysis, which results in an N of
555. There is no evidence of multicollinearity in this model indicating that there
is no collinearity among independent variables. The Tolerance statistics are all
well above 0, the lowest being .678, and the VIF statistics indicate no
multicollinearity present. The R-squared of this model is .32.
(Table 3.9 Here, Model 2)
The People Scale and the Policy Scale are both statistically significant at
the p < .000 level. Similar to the model with Trust Scale as the dependent
variable, “lots of talking” is the only process variable that has a statistically
significant and positive relationship with Trust. The betas in this model with
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Trust as the dependent variable reveal that Policy Scale (β = .348) has the greatest
predictive power over Trust, followed by the People Scale (β = .247).
Choosing Among Dependent Variables
It appears from the analysis of these regression models that these
dependent variables perform similarly. In models using nine separate individual
people, process, and policy variables, the R-squared statistics are very similar, .36
(Trust Scale) and .32 (Trust), meaning that they are similar in how much of the
variance in the dependent variable the independent variables are capable of
explaining. In the regression models using the indexed variables of People Scale
and Policy Scale, along with three separate process variables, the R-squared
statistics were .35 (Trust Scale) and .32 (Trust). In comparison, the same
independent variables are capable of explaining slightly more of the variation in
Trust Scale versus Trust. Since the independent variables are exactly the same,
the difference in R-squared statistics can be understood as an artifact of the
dependent variable. Why might this be? First of all, the Trust Scale has more
variation to explain because it has a greater range, from 4 to 11, versus the Trust
variable that has a range from 1 to 5.
In order to determine if these two dependent variables are related,
correlation analysis can be used. The coefficient for linear correlation is referred
to as Pearson’s r and measures the strength of a linear relationship between two
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variables. For testing the statistical significance of a Pearson’s correlation
coefficient, the null hypothesis would be that there is no linear relationship
between two variables. If the p-value for the test is small, then the null hypothesis
can be rejected. A correlation measure between Trust and Trust Scale shows a
positive and statistically significant correlation of r = .81, n = 550, p < .01 (two
tailed). The null hypothesis can be rejected, indicating that there may be a linear
relationship between these two variables. Due to the strength of the correlation, it
appears that there is a linear relationship between Trust and Trust Scale. A scatter
plot formulated with these two variables shows the relationship to be very linear.
As such, it would appear that both of these dependent variables are measuring
similar ideas of trust.
There is a slight difference in the sample size of each dependent variable,
Trust Scale n = 550 and Trust n = 596. The difference between these two
represents 10%, give or take, of the total sample size. Trust Scale, while it has the
lower sample size, is better predicted by the independent variables of interest,
people, process, and policy. Overall, the fact that both models perform similarly,
regardless of sample size, and that there is a significant linear relationship
between Trust and Trust Scale indicates a need to continue to utilize both
dependent variables, at least for the time being.
Performance of Independent Variables
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How do the ideas of people, process, and policy perform when entered
separately and when used as indexed variables? Is there a significant difference?
As discussed above, the independent variables, when entered separately, perform
similarly in their ability to explain the dependent variables of interest. It appears
that the overall predictive power of process ideas on trust is the weakest, as both
process “fair and open” and “fighting between parties” are not significant in either
model.
The same independent variables appear to be significant in both models,
with two exceptions. One exception is that confidence in politicians is not
significant in explaining Trust, but it is for Trust Scale. Similarly, satisfaction
with public policy is not significant in predicting Trust Scale, but it is with Trust.
Perhaps an assessment of public policy has a more direct relationship with simple
trust. After all, this dependent variable simply asks “How often do you trust the
government in Washington to do what is right?” How satisfied a person is with
the policies produced by the government should affect trust. The Trust Scale
dependent variable adds responses together from four separate questions. One of
these inquires directly about politicians “Do you think that quite a few of the
people running government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you
think that hardly any of them are crooked at all?” Confidence in politicians
should matter in how people would answer this particular question alone, which
would then affect Trust Scale as a dependent variable but not necessarily Trust.
97
As the reliability analysis revealed, the three process variables were not
consistent enough to form a scaled variable. When entered separately, “lots of
talking” is the only process variable that achieves statistical significance. This is
also the case when all nine people, process, and policy variables are regressed
onto trust, both versions of it. It appears that this variable is a powerful idea of
process. Basically, the less likely a person is to think that politicians do a lot of
talking but little to solve problems, the more she trusts the government. The
perception of inactivity and tongue wagging has a strong negative effect on trust.
The indexed variables of people and policy also perform well in predicting
trust. People Scale and Policy Scale reach statistical significance (p < .000) in
both models. Looking at the size of the betas, it appears that in predicting both
dependent measures of trust that the Policy Scale has the larger effect of the two.
Differentiating People, Process, and Policy
One of the goals of this work was to compare the effects of people,
process, and policy upon political trust. The standardized coefficients, or betas, of
the regression equations with indexed variables of people and policy, process
variables entered separately indicate that policy has the greatest impact on trust of
the three. The People Scale is also significant and trails just behind the Policy
Scale in its power. The primary process variable “lots of talking” plays an
important predictive role in all of these regression models, but the size of its beta
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relative to the others shows it to be the less influential than people and policy. In
the regression models where all variables of people, process, and policy were
entered singularly, a policy variable (“running programs”) came out as the most
important predictor of trust, with both dependent variables. More of the people
and policy variables were influential in predicting trust than were process
variables. People and policy variables were more likely to reach statistical
significance and in the hypothesized direction. Only one process variable (“lots
of talking”) achieved significance when all variables were entered separately. It
also indicated in the hypothesized direction, meaning that as a person’s feeling
about this statement becomes more positive, her trust increases. This one is tricky
to interpret as it was recoded in the positive direction. As a person becomes more
likely to disagree that politicians do lots of talking but get little done, the more
trusting she becomes.
These first nine political statements of the instrument were asking survey
participants to respond to general ideas of government, politics, and politicians.
Although these statements asked about specific elements of people, process, and
policy, we have no way of knowing how each respondent interpreted these
statements. For instance, in considering whether or not politicians deserve
respect, we have no idea what information a respondent called upon to make this
assessment. These nine statements should then be interpreted in a broad manner.
As such, sentiments about the people in office are consistently capable of
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influencing trust across all of these regression models. Ideas about the general
policy direction of the country are also statistically significant in their predictive
power over trust.
Although other scholars have found that people care a great deal about the
process, I find only one process idea that influence political trust (“lots of
talking”). In comparison to the people and policy variables (their betas), the
process ones do not perform as well in predicting trust. Based upon the statistical
evidence that the process variables were not consistent enough to form a uniform
scale of process, though, the process variables were clearly not as accurately
conceptualized as were people and policy. That process variables do not perform
well in these analyses may be indicative of this researcher’s difficulty in
operationalizing process.
Other Explanatory Variables of Political Trust
Perceptions of people, process, and policy are the primary independent
variables of interest here in explaining trust in government. It cannot be possible,
however, for people, process, and policy to explain all of political trust. There are
a plethora of other variables that have been proffered in the literature as having
the capability to affect trust. Most of these are personal individual level indicators
such as social, economic, or psychological variables. Although these variables
have had limited and mixed success in helping scholars to understand or explain
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trust in government, they are included for analysis. Having other possible
explanations or predictors of political trust will enable me to create as robust an
explanatory model of trust as possible, thus their inclusion.
These other variables, what I shall refer to as demographic and control
variables for now, will be first explicated and justified for inclusion based on
theoretical or exploratory reasons. Then, these variables will be used in
regression models along with the primary explanatory variables of people,
process, and policy to predict political trust. The regression models will then be
analyzed. These other explanatory variables have not been consistent in
explaining political trust, but their inclusion here allows me to test their affect
along with people, process, and policy.
Economic Expectations
The first control variable to be explicated is economic expectations. There
is evidence in the literature that this matters for political trust (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002, 70), although economic conditions are not considered a
powerful explanation for changes in trust over time (Orren 1997, 293). Lipset and
Schneider (1987) found that those people who perceive of their own financial
situation as getting better were above average in confidence in government, while
those who thought their financial status was getting worse lad the lowest levels of
confidence (118). Citrin and Luks (2001) also find that in the 1990s those who
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say their financial conditions are improving express more political trust than those
whose conditions are worsening (17). In an analysis of trust in local government,
Rahn and Rudolph (2005) also find that as people’s perceptions of their own
financial condition become more favorable, so too does their trust in local
government (545). Economic conditions also affect trust in different parts of
government. There has been a tendency for financial conditions to affect
confidence in the president much more so than the Congress (Richardson, et.al.
2001, 93).
The general rule of thumb is that those whose finances are looking up are
likely to be higher in political trust and that those whose finances are not looking
up are likely to be lower in trust. Other scholarship has also included a question
about the expectations of the national economy as a whole. However, Mutz and
Flemming (1999) find that people are more likely to see their own economic
situation in a more positive light than the national economic status (82).
Egocentric economic conditions are most often found to be more important than
sociotropic economic conditions (Lockerbie 2002, 399). Since the variable of
interest here is one’s political trust, it makes more sense to use an economic
variable which applies to a person’s own economic condition.
The specific question used for economic expectations reads, “We are
interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say
that you are better off financially, worse off, or just the same as you were a year
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ago?” Responses were coded -1 for those who say they are worse off financially,
0 for those who say their finances are just the same as they were a year ago, and 1
for those who claim to be better off financially. The hypothesis regarding
financial condition is that those who claim that their personal economic situation
is improving would be more likely to express more political trust than those who
say their economic situation is worsening. I do expect that this economic
condition variable will play a significant role in predicting political trust given
that it has been found to be significant across a great deal of the literature.
Education, Income, Gender, Race, and Age
The next five variables to be considered are standard demographic control
variables in most statistical models of politics: education, income, gender, race,
and age. These are normally included in models which seek to explain political
trust or satisfaction (Abramson 1983; Hetherington 1998, 794; Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002, 67-8). These five demographic variables are included in
these regression models as exploratory variables to see if they have any predictive
power. There is also some theoretical reason to expect that they may influence
trust as all of them have had mixed success in helping explain or predict political
trust. Even back in 1973, these types of variables were used to explain political
trust and found to have, at best, an indirect effect and to account for only a small
portion of the variation in trust (Cole 1973). In order to make the effects of the
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true explanatory variables of people, process, and policy more substantive, I will
control for these factors.
Education is a socioeconomic variable often included in any models which
explain political behavior and/or participation. It has long been used in the study
of political trust (Cole 1973). It has been argued that increasing education might
decrease trust, specifically the college educated, who are trained to be more
critical of government (Alford 2001, 34-5). However, it has also been posited that
increasing education should have a positive relationship with trust because better
educated people have a better understanding of political institutions and processes
(Richardson, et.al. 2001, 86). It has also been discovered, however, that political
knowledge itself has no significant effect on political trust (Damico, et.al. 2000,
397).
Confidence in government and in the political system has been found to
rise with education levels (Lipset and Schneider 1987, 311-12). Although Alford
(2001) finds no difference in levels of trust based on education levels (35),
Patterson does (1999). His analysis of General Social Survey data over the time
period of 1972 until 1994 indicates that the more educated are more trusting than
the less educated (173). Previous scholarship has found mixed results regarding
trust and education, but education is included as a demographic variable
nonetheless.
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The question asks participants about the highest level of education
completed. There are eight possible choices, the lowest (1) being less than high
school and the highest (8) representing post graduate or professional degree. This
variable was not recoded but left in its original ordinal form. The hypothesized
relationship between trust and education would be that the higher one’s education
level, the greater one’s political trust.
Closely related to the idea of education is income. Do those at the lower
end of the income scale trust government more or less? Does income play any
role in political trust? Lipset and Schneider’s 1987 study found that confidence in
government and the political system was higher among middle class respondents,
which they classified as white collar workers, and below average in working
class, which they categorized as blue collar workers (315). Clearly, the implicit
assumption is that white collar, middle class people had higher levels of income
and more trust than working class, blue collar workers, so income must matter.
Income has been found most recently to have the opposite affect noted by Lipset
and Schneider. In a 1997 study, people at the lowest end of the income ladder
were found to have higher trust than the average person (Blendon, et al. 1997,
208). Currently, the poor are more trusting than the rich (Alford 2001, 37).
The income question asked people to indicate the category which best
represents their total household income. This ordinal variable begins with 20,000
dollars or less and tops out with 100,000 dollars or more, with a range from 1 to 6.
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This question resulted in the highest number of missing values (168), as people do
not generally feel comfortable disclosing their income. The hypothesized
relationship would be that those people at the lower levels of income would have
greater political trust than those at higher levels of income.
Is there a gender gap in political trust? It does not appear that a
relationship between gender and trust has been found through time. Some
scholars claim to have found a slight tendency for men to be more trusting than
women but not by a great deal (Patterson 1999, 173; Alford 2001, 38). Women
may be less likely to trust government because it is generally run by men and may
feel that their needs will not be fairly addressed (Richardson, et.al 2001, 85-6).
Alford specifically concludes, though, that a gender gap does not appear in
political trust. The hypothesized relationship between gender and trust is that
men will be more trusting than women. Gender is included in the survey
experiment instrument, so it is possible to find if a relationship does indeed exist
among gender and trust. Gender was determined by the interviewer and coded 0
for male and 1 for female.
Race is a demographic variable which has often been studied in tandem
with political trust and often it has a statistically significant relationship with trust.
Whites have more often been found to trust the federal government more as
compared to people of color (Abramson 1983). It has often been postulated that
race might affect political trust because the federal government was instrumental
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in advancing racial equality (Alford 2001, 33-4). This may result in increased
trust on the part of nonwhites or a white backlash against the federal government
for their activism on racial equality. Alford (2001) finds no difference in trust
levels across race (33-4). Other scholarship, however, has found that Hispanics
and African Americans exhibit higher than average trust in the federal
government (Blendon, et.al. 1997, 207-8; Patterson 1999, 175). When
investigating levels of trust in local government, Rahn and Rudolph (2005)
discovered that African-Americans and Native Americans were less trustful (547).
Because there exists evidence that race may affect trust, it was included in this
analysis as a control or demographic variable.
Race was inquired about with an open ended question, asking what race
do you consider yourself. The first mention was taken as that which a person
most identified themselves as. Eventually, this variable was recoded 1 for white
respondents and 0 for people of color. The hypothesized relationship would be
that people of color are less trusting of government than are whites.
Age is another variable which appears to affect a person’s level of
political trust. As people age, their identification with political institutions and
processes should increase, which may cause age to be positively related to trust in
government. Alternately, as people grow older they may become less trusting of
government because they are less idealistic and learn to lack confidence in
political leaders (Richardson, et.al. 2001, 87). Young adults, often defined as
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those under the age of 30, express more trust than other Americans (Blendon, et al
1997, 208; Alford 2001, 36). Moreover, adults between the ages of 50 and 64
trust government less on average (Blendon, et.al. 1997, 208). It has also been
pointed out that since 1964; the oldest cohort has been the least trusting and the
youngest age cohort the most trusting of government (Orren 1997, 84). The
relationship between age and trust is murky at best.
Participants were asked to please share their age. The numeric age was
then entered and this variable was not recoded. The hypothesized relationship
between age and political trust, as such, is that younger people would tend to be
more trusting than older people, although there is not much confidence in this
relationship.
Party Identification, Attachment, and Ideology
Another variable always included in regression models of political
participation and behavior would be political party identification. Does party
identification have an impact on a person’s political trust? It has been found that
Republicans are less trusting on average (Blendon, et.al. 1997, 208). These
scholars hypothesize that this is because Republicans disagree with expansion of
federal government post New Deal and are therefore less trusting. Alford (2001)
asserts that identifiers of the political party that holds the presidency tends to be
the more trusting at that time (40), and Citrin and Luks concur (2001, 18-9). This
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makes sense in that a person would be more likely to trust a government run by
politicians who are like them. For every piece of literature that has discovered
party identification matters for trust, though, there is one that has not (Owen and
Dennis 2001). The standard question regarding party identification (Generally
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?) was used to measure this. Party identification was then
recoded into a series of dummy variables for Republicans, Democrats, and
Independents. I specifically excluded the Independent variable from these models
as I thought it would increase multicollinearity among the party id variables. In
fact, SPSS excluded the Republican variable as well.
Furthermore, the strength of a person’s attachment to a political party has
been found to affect political trust. This argument was first posited by Miller
(1974) who found that the highest levels of discontent were found in those at the
extreme ends of the ideological scale. Lipset and Schnieder (1987) report that
“strong party supporters are relatively high in confidence no matter what their
ideological inclination” (107). The strength of attachment to a party was asked
about in separate follow-up questions after general party identification. Those
people who claimed to be a Democrat or Republican in the party identification
question and then said they were either a strong Democrat or Republican were
coded as Strong Partisans, measured as a dummy variable. Those people who
claimed to be either a Republican or Democrat and then said they were a weak
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Republican or Democrat were coded as a Weak Partisan, measured as a dummy
variable. I also coded people who called themselves independents and said they
were close to neither the Republican nor Democrat party as True Independents,
another dummy variable. This variable was not used in the regression models
here as there is no evidence that being an independent would affect one’s political
trust. According to previous findings, I would hypothesize a positive relationship
between being a strong partisan and political trust. In order to examine the
interaction between party identification and attachment, an interaction variable
was created. These variables are entitled Strong Dem and Strong Repub.
A third variable of political ideology, whether a person considers herself
conservative, liberal, or moderate, is also included. It is important to note,
however, that some scholarship has found no important differences in levels of
trust by ideology (Alford 2001, 42). This question asked people to describe their
political views with the choices being very conservative, conservative, moderate,
liberal, and very liberal. Responses to this question were coded as -1 for
conservatives, 0 for moderates, and 1 for liberals. I do not expect to find a
relationship between ideologies and trust here either.
Presidential and Congressional Approval
Two important variables of political evaluation, presidential approval and
congressional approval, are also included in this study. Feelings about Congress
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(Feldman 1983; Williams 1985) and the president (Citrin 1974; Citrin and Green
1986) have long been linked to political trust. Citrin and Luks (2001) posit that
political trust taps into feelings towards government that are based on evaluations
of the people in political office (18). They, in fact, found that both of these
variables were statistically significant predictors of political trust. Other scholars
have also noted that people who feel positively towards the president are more
likely to trust the government (Damico, et.al. 2000, 397). Hetherington (1998)
was the first to point out that there may be a reciprocal relationship between
presidential and congressional approval and political trust. It is expected that how
people feel about the president and Congress will influence their corresponding
levels of political trust, but Hetherington says that those with higher levels of trust
are also more likely to have more favorable approval ratings of the president and
Congress.
These questions are worded exactly the same as they are in most other
studies, i.e. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush (Congress)
is handling his job as president (its job)? Reponses to this question are coded
with a -1 for disapprove, 0 for neither, and 1 for approve. The hypothesized
relationship between presidential and congressional approval and trust is that as
an individual’s approval levels increase in either the president and/or Congress,
their level of trust should as well.
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Political Interest
As far as identifying other variables which might influence political trust, I
have a couple unique contributions. I include a political interest question. I found
only one previous study of political trust which tested the effect of political
interest on trust. Newton and Norris (1999) found a statistically significant,
although weak relationship between political interest and trust (64-5). Although I
am not suggesting a particular relationship between political interest and trust, its
inclusion in the models is purely exploratory. It might be that as a person’s
political interest increases their level of trust increases as well due to the fact that
that person is paying attention and it politically aware. On the other hand, it may
be possible that as a person pays closer attention to politics they are less likely to
trust government because paying more attention activates cynicism towards
government.
The measure of political interest comes straight out of the NES text.
Answers were then coded so that as the value goes up it indicates more political
interest. This is an ordinal variable which ranges from 1 (hardly at all) to 4 (most
of the time).
Can Government Increase Trust?
There is one final question that has the potential, as an independent
variable, to explain political trust. The question is this “Do you think that most
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people will mistrust the government no matter what, or do you think there are
things the government could do to increase the public’s trust?” I pulled this
question from a Pew Center Poll on political trust that was reported in 1998. This
variable is coded so that a 0 represents the idea that people will mistrust no matter
what and a 1 represents the idea that there are things the government could do to
increase trust. Do those people who think that people will mistrust no matter
what have lower levels of trust than those who believe that there are things the
government could do to increase trust? This variable is included for exploratory
purposes, as I have no preconceived notion as to what effect it might have.
Religion
Another idea that may help explain political trust may be religion, in many
aspects. I have included three different variables that measure religious attitudes
and behaviors. The first asks what a person’s religious preference is and the
given responses include Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no
religion. Responses to this question were based upon what one claimed their
religious preference to be and then used to form dummy variables for Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, and No Religion. I can then ascertain whether a person’s
religious identification influences political trust. There is some evidence that
indicates that Jews may be the most trusting of government, as compared to
Protestants and Catholics (Patterson 1999, 174-5). Moreover, because the option
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of no religion is present, I can also analyze whether a person’s lack of religion
influences trust. The idea of religious affiliation influencing trust is not common
in the literature. I, in fact, found only the one piece cited above which included it
as a factor. As such, I am not positing a specific relationship between religious
affiliation and trust.
The second religion variable inquires about religious service attendance,
how often do you attend religious services? Does the frequency of a person’s
attendance at religious services have any effect on political trust? Because
participation in voluntary associations such as a church increases social cohesion
and builds social capital, it may be that increased church attendance results in
increased levels of trust (Richardson, et.al. 2001, 87-8). In analyzing confidence
in political leaders across different branches of government, Richardson, et.al.
(2001) find that people who attend church are more likely to exhibit confidence in
executive leaders (93), although this relationship is not evident in confidence in
the legislature and the Supreme Court. This measure is a straightforward question
which asks how often do you attend religious services. This is an ordinal variable
and has a range from 1 (never) to 7 (more than once a week). As the value
increases, attendance at religious services gets higher. Although only one piece of
literature sets forth and tests a relationship between religious service attendance
and trust, I will hypothesize that as people’s attendance increases, so too should
their trust in government as a whole.
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The third question asks participants about their beliefs on biblical
literalism. Participants are asked to choose a statement which best describes their
feelings about the Bible. The three options are: the Bible is the actual word of
God and should be taken literally (1), the Bible is the word of God but should not
be taken literally (2), and the Bible is a book written by men and not the word of
God (3). This question had the second highest amount of missing values (74).
Due to the sensitive nature of talking about religion in the United States, it makes
sense that people might be unwilling to answer questions regarding how they feel
about the Bible. These three response categories were not recoded but left as is,
as their ordinal scale represents that the higher the value, the less likely a person is
to believe in strict biblical literalism. Again, this variable is included for
exploratory purposes. I am not positing specific relationships among these three
religious variables and political trust.
Analysis
To begin the exploration of whether or not any of these variables
represents a viable explanation of political trust, several regression models were
conducted. These models included all of the explanatory variables discussed
above, unless SPSS did not allow them or there was some evidence of
multicollinearity. Some were entered for theoretical reasons because there is
previous evidence that they may help explain political trust and some were
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entered for exploratory reasons, to see if they help explain any of the variance in
the dependent variable of trust. I will conduct separate models with Trust Scale
as the dependent variable in one, and Trust as the other.
After this initial analysis, it will be determined which of these variables
shall be retained in the regression. Those variables that have theoretical
importance shall remain and a final model will be formulated that has good
predictive power. Another consideration is keeping the model simple so any
unnecessary or redundant variables will be deleted.
Regression Models with other Control/Demographic Variables
Dependent Variable – Trust Scale
The first regression model will utilize all of the variables explicated above,
unless they cause too much multicollinearity in the model. I will enter these
control/demographic variables in stages. The first model will use only the
socioeconomic status type of variables (age, gender, race, income, education, and
financial condition) to explain trust. The second includes the variables of party
identification, attachment and ideology. The third model will add in what I refer
to as the political variables (congressional and presidential approval, political
interest, and can trust be increased?). The fourth model pulls in the religious
variables, affiliation, religious service attendance, and biblical literalism. The
final model adds the primary independent variables of interest here – people,
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process, and policy. Since the people and policy scales were internally consistent
and performed well, they will be used. The only process variable that I will
include in this model will be “lots of talking” as it is the only one which
performed well in the previous regression models.
This final model includes twenty independent variables. Adding variables
to the models in this way allows me to see if the addition of variables causes a
significant difference in the R-squared statistic. Generally, any time more
independent variables are added into a regression model, the R-squared increases,
but the F change statistic reveals whether the addition of variables is statistically
significant. Missing values for these regression models were excluded pair wise,
as list wise deletion significantly reduced the sample size. Variables which were
not allowed to enter into these regression models due to multicollinearity were
Republican, Protestant, and No religion.
(Table 3.10 Here)
The first model with demographic variables has the lowest R –squared
(.05). The only statistically significant variable here is a person’s financial
condition. There is a positive relationship between a person claiming that their
financial condition is better and trust. Two of the basic demographic variables of
gender, age, race, education, or income are statistically important in predicting a
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person’s score on the Trust Scale. The first of these is education. As a person
becomes more educated, her trust increases. The second variable that achieves
significance is financial condition. This variable indicates that the more likely a
person is to say their financial condition is better now than a year ago, the higher
their trust will be.
The second model which brings in the party variables achieves a higher R-
squared of .10. The F change statistic reveals that the addition of these variables
to the model is significant (p < .01). None of these added variables regarding
party ideology, party attachment, or party identification achieve statistical
significance at all.
The third model includes political variables. This model has an R –
squared of .19. The F change statistic shows that these variables had a significant
effect on the R-squared (p < .000). The only statistically significant relationship
between any of these variables and political trust is congressional approval, and
the relationship is in the hypothesized direction. The more likely a person is to
approve of Congress, their trust increases.
The fourth model brings the religion variables into the analysis. The R-
squared does not change at all with the addition of these variables, maintaining at
.19, although the F change statistic indicates that these variables significantly
change the R-squared statistic for this model (p < .000). With all of these
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potential explanatory variables of political trust included, congressional approval
continues to have a positive and significant relationship with trust.
The fifth and final model adds in the variables of interest, people, process,
and policy. The R-squared goes up significantly to .40, and the F change statistic
shows that this addition of variables is highly significant in increasing the R-
squared (p < .000). Interestingly enough, the income variable becomes significant
here, meaning that as income goes up, so does the Trust Scale. Congressional
approval continued to be positive and significant. The other political variable
which becomes a significant predictor of the Trust Scale is can trust be increased?
This can be interpreted to mean that those individuals who think that there are
things that the government could do to increase trust have significantly lower
levels of trust than those who do not. Individuals who think that the government
could take action to increase political trust tend to have lower levels of trust as
measured through the Trust Scale. This may be due to the frustration of thinking
the government could increase it and yet doesn’t. This is an interesting finding in
that this question has not been applied to predict trust before. People who feel
that people will mistrust the government no matter what have statistically higher
levels of trust than those who think the government could increase trust.
Dependent Variable – Trust
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The second regression model has the dependent variable of Trust and the
same independent variables as the previous regression model using control and
other explanatory variables. The analysis was conducted through five separate
regression models as above, and the final model utilized twenty one independent
variables. Adding variables to the models in this way allows me to see if the
addition of variables causes a significant difference in the R-squared statistic.
Generally, any time more independent variables are added into a regression
model, the R-squared increases, but the F change statistic reveals whether the
addition of variables is statistically significant. Missing values for these
regression models were excluded pair wise, as list wise deletion significantly
reduced the sample size. Variables which were not allowed to enter into these
regression models due to multicollinearity were Republican, Protestant, and No
religion.
(Table 3.11 Here)
The first model with demographic variables as predictors of trust had an
R-squared of .03, meaning that is was capable of explaining only 3% of the
variation present in the variable of Trust. Race is the only variable to achieve
statistical significance here, and it is in the hypothesized direction. White people
are more trusting of government than people of color.
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The second model which adds in party variables appears to do a little
better in predicting trust than the last model. The R –squared does increase to .09,
and the F change statistic indicates that this change is significant (p < .01). There
are no variables which are statistically significant in this model. One variable
falls just outside of being significant, that is being a Democrat (p > .10).
Democrats are less trusting of government. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the
party that was holding the presidency at the time this survey experiment was
conducted was the Republican Party. This would provide some confirmation of
previous scholarship which has found that the members of the party that hold the
presidency tend to have higher trust (Alford 2001; Citrin and Luks 2001).
Moreover, this may serve as further evidence as to what Anderson and LoTempio
(2002) found. Those who vote for the losing presidential candidate tend to show
lower trust in government that those who voted for the winning one. Assuming
that Democrats most likely did not vote for President Bush, it would then make
sense that Democrats here were less trusting of government.
The third model includes political variables. The R-squared here is .16,
and the F change statistic reveals that this these variables add a statistically
significant difference (p < .000) Congressional approval is the only statistically
significant variable and its relationship is in the hypothesized direction, meaning
that the more likely a person is to approve of Congress, the larger their trust score.
The fourth model includes all previous variables and the religion ones as well.
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Although the R-squared increases only slightly, to .17, the F change statistic
indicates that this is a significant difference between the last model and this one (p
< .000). Congressional approval continues to be the only significant predictor of
trust.
The fifth and final model takes into consideration people, process, and
policy. The R-squared here is .36, meaning that the addition of the people,
process, and policy variables doubles the explanatory power of the model as
compared to the previous one. The F change statistic shows the addition of these
variables adds a significant difference to the R-squared (p < .000). Congressional
approval maintains its positive and statistically significant relationship with Trust.
The more positively one feels towards Congress, the more likely they are to think
that the government can be trusted to do what is right. The People and Policy
Scales have a positive and significant relationship with Trust, as expected. The
one process variable, although significant in the models with Trust Scale as the
dependent variable, is not significant here.
This means that most of these explanatory variables of trust do not
perform well in predicting the dependent variable Trust. In fact, the biggest
difference between the explanatory variables’ ability to predict Trust and Trust
Scale is that very few variables achieve significance with Trust as the dependent
variable. Besides race, which is significant in the first model, none of the
demographic variables appear to be good predictors of trust. Personal financial
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conditions, which have generally been found to have a relationship with trust, do
not help predict trust, nor do any of the religion variables. None of the party
identification, attachment, or ideology variables are significant either.
Presidential approval doesn’t matter, nor do the other political variables of
political interest and can trust be increased.
Assessment of Control or Demographic Explanations of Political Trust
Overall, almost none of the other potential explanations of trust which
have been posited and tested by other scholars have performed very well here.
Both of these models (3.10 and 3.11) look quite similar although they have
different dependent variables. What is noteworthy, in fact, is that of so many
possible variables, very few achieve any statistical significance at all. Although
the addition of more variables into each model increases the ability of the model
to explain the variation in political trust (as is indicated with the F change
statistics), few of these variables achieve or maintain significance in their
predictive power. The norm has generally been that the differences in trust due to
gender, race, age, education, and income are insignificant (Hetherington 2005,
17). That appears to be the finding here as well. In the Trust Scale model, both
education and financial status were initially significant, but both dropped out
when other variables were added into the model. With Trust as the dependent
variable, race was statistically significant in the model with only SES variables. It
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had a statistically significant relationship with Trust, meaning that whites here
were more trusting of government than people of color. This is as hypothesized.
Once again, with the addition of other variables, race was no longer significant.
These potential explanations perform differently for each of the two
dependent variables. A person’s financial status also plays a significant role in
predicting Trust Scale whereas it does not in predicting Trust. In predicting Trust,
only race and congressional approval are statistically significant. The reasons
why this might be the case is discussed below in again assessing these two ways
of measuring trust.
Comparing Dependent Variables Again
The four NES questions that form the scaled variable called Trust Scale
ask how often can you trust the federal government to do what is right, how much
tax money is wasted, how crooked the people running government are, and
whether the government is run by a few interests or for all of the people. There
are, obviously, a few components involved here, not just trust. A person’s
financial status plays a role in predicting Trust Scale whereas it does not in
predicting Trust. This may indicate that financial status affects how people
evaluate how tax money is used, how crooked politicians are, and whether the
government is run by a few interests or for all of the people. Financial status
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alone, though, does not play a role in predicting straight trust in the federal
government.
The Trust variable is the one that simply measures the response to the
question of trusting the federal government to do what is right. It is strictly
measuring trust and not any potential correlates of trust. In predicting Trust, only
race and congressional approval are statistically significant. These variables
signify that whites are more trusting than are people of color and that those who
are more likely to approve of Congress are more likely to trust. This finding
supports that previous research which found that how people evaluate Congress
affects their trust in the federal government (Feldman 1983; Williams 1985;
Hetherington 1998; Citrin and Luks 2001). Considering that presidential approval
did not have any predictive power over Trust but congressional approval did
implies that Congress is fundamentally important in people’s perceptions of the
federal government.
In predicting Trust Scale, more of these explanatory variables play a
statistically significant role (five in predicting Trust Scale and two in predicting
Trust), and I believe that this may be because the Trust Scale contains four
questions which ask people to evaluate parts of the government, rather than just
the government as a whole, as the Trust dependent variable does. As such, it
seems very possible that there would be a greater number of variables that would
be significant predictors of the Trust Scale versus Trust. Moreover, this might
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help explain why the R-squared statistics are always higher in models which have
Trust Scale as their dependent variable. There is simply more variance to explain
in this dependent variable, as there are four distinct components of trust.
Another consideration is in the previous criticism of the NES trust battery
of questions. Here is a succinct explanation of its problems:
Much of the criticism aimed at the NES trust in government measure has
been with the combination of several different value judgments into a
single index. The suggestion has been that the index obscures the impact
that different judgments have on political trust and that using the
components separately might provide more valuable insight (Ulbig 2002,
797)
Other scholars have come to similar conclusions about the NES trust battery
(Craig 1993, 24-35; Owen and Dennis 2001, 209). Ulbig’s research, moreover,
indicates that these three other questions of the NES measure can be used as
explanations of trust itself, measured only as the very first question of this NES
index (800). In a regression model with trust as the dependent variable, Ulbig
uses all three of the other questions of the NES battery as independent variables.
(As a reminder, these are “Would you say that government is pretty much run by
a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all
the people?” and “Do you think that quite a few of the people running government
are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are
crooked at all?” and “”Do you think that people in government waste a lot of
money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?”) She
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finds that all three of these variables are statistically significant and have a
positive relationship with trust (802). So there is some evidence that the other
three questions of the NES trust battery are explanatory pieces of trust.
The simple trust question “How much do you trust the government in
Washington to do what is right?” is the closest thing we have to a universal
measure of political trust. It is also, as my analysis so far has indicated, a little
more difficult to explain than the Trust Scale with its four questions. This has
tended to be the case throughout the analysis in this chapter. Here, the R-squared
statistics show that the final regression models with demographic variables and
people, process, and policy are capable of explaining up to 40% of the variation in
Trust Scale and 36% of the variation in Trust. The dependent variables Trust
Scale and Trust seem to be conceptually distinct from one another.
Assessment of People, Process, and Policy
These two final regression models in this chapter tested the ability of
previously identified variables in explaining political trust. Some of these had
theoretical reasons to be included while a couple variables were purely
explanatory (political interest, Biblical literalism, can trust be increased?). The
evidence indicates that all of these variables are capable of explaining less than
20% of the variation in political trust, measured either as the Trust Scale (R-
squared = 19%) or Trust (R-squared = 17%).
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In the final model, I added in people, process, and policy variables to
ascertain their predictive power in relation to all other potential explanatory
variables. The people and policy scales were highly significant in predicting
Trust Scale and Trust, while the one process variable entered (“lots of talking”)
was statistically significant in predicting Trust Scale but not Trust. This is not
surprising in light of the discussion above about these two measures. What is
interesting is that the addition of people, process, and policy variables doubles the
amount of explanatory power present in these regression models. The F change
statistic shows that these variables significantly increase the explanatory power of
the models. Even with the inclusion of lots of other possible explanations of
political trust, perceptions of people, process, and policy still perform very well.
This is rather convincing evidence that perceptions of people, process, and policy




In a recent review article on political trust, Margaret Levi and Laura
Stokes emphatically state:
We urge scholars to expand their inquiries beyond the traditional focus on
citizens’ trust in ‘government’ in general, by studying the causes and
consequences of citizen’s trust in specific political actors, organizations,
or institutions (2000, 495-6)
The goal of the experimental portion of this research design is to move beyond
generalizations and test the effect of specific attributes on political trust. Survey
research in political trust has tended to focus on these generalizations, trust in the
government as a whole. How do we know, though, which qualities or
characteristics of government a person uses to make the trust decision? Although
we may never know that for sure, experimental research enables me to posit
specific attributes that may affect trust and then test them. Levi and Stokes assert
that micro-level research on trust should put forward characteristics that make an
actor trustworthy and then measure people’s perceptions of these characteristics
(2000, 500). In this way, we can then know if these attributes play a role in the
trust decision. What Levi and Stokes recommend is exactly what I am doing here.
For the experimental portion of the research design, survey participants
were exposed to different treatments on particular attributes of people, process,
and policy. Each person was exposed to three treatments which describe an
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individual politician, each treatment emphasizing one attribute of each people,
process, and policy. After each of these treatments, respondents were asked about
their level of trust in this politician. The second part of this methodology, then,
allows me to test the effect of two variations of the same attribute of people,
process, and policy upon trust. These treatments will serve as independent
variables in the analysis and the trust score will be the dependent variable.
Description of the Treatments
The treatment is a description of an individual politician. Each treatment
focuses on one aspect of the three variables of interest, people, process, or policy.
After each of these treatments, respondents were asked about their level of trust in
this politician. The assumption is that the nature of the treatment a person is
presented with will affect the level of trust felt for that politician. Each attribute
of people, process, and policy tested had two treatments. These treatments were
both stated in a positive direction but they presented different scenarios. People,
process, and policy attributes are not to be portrayed as zero sum games, where a
politician can only be one way or the complete opposite. In this way, these
treatments will allow me to tease out the subtle differences we expect to see in
politicians and gauge individuals’ reactions to reality, rather than a simple
dichotomy. What is important is that people were expected to react to the
treatments differently and they did.
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The experimental treatments comprise descriptions of an incumbent
officeholder, specifically a member of Congress. Congress is the institution that
representative government is premised upon. Its position in the political system is
of the utmost importance. Congress is also the least liked of all American
governmental institutions (Cooper 1999). Citizens generally trust state and local
governments more than the federal government (Uslaner 2001, 133). We would
expect that if the politician used in the treatment were a state official, that no
matter what the treatments, levels of corresponding trust might be higher. This is
why I chose not to use a state or local political official in creating these
treatments. In using a member of Congress, this research design used the hardest
case to test aspects of political trust. If I can explain the characteristics about
members of Congress that people either trust and/or distrust, then this information
is very relevant to real world politics.
Additionally, the frame of reference for this research question about
political trust, though aimed at specific trust in individuals, places the decisions
about trust within the larger federal government. This also makes Congress the
best institution to place a hypothetical politician in, as Congress is the institution
most commonly thought of when asked about the federal government. Feelings
about Congress have already been found to affect trust (Williams 1985). Some
research has found a strong causal link between trust in Congress as a political
institution and trust in government in a general sense (Feldman 1983, 351). It
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follows accordingly then that Congress is the most natural referent for our
politician to be used in the treatment.
The individual office holder in each treatment was a male congressperson.
Gender considerations may complicate the analysis and water down the potential
affect of the variables of interest, people, process, and policy. Previous research
indicates that gender does matter in politics. Voters view male and female
candidates differently. Male and female candidates are thought to excel in
different areas of policy (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b). Male traits are
generally associated with being a more effective legislator (Rosenwasser and
Dean 1989). Most importantly, though, there is evidence that judgments made
about male and female candidates differ in regards to trust. There is evidence that
female political candidates are trusted more than men (Matland and King 2002).
Women candidates are seen as more honest than similar male candidates (Kahn
1992, 504; Leeper 1991, 255). Making the politician in the treatments a female
would definitely, then, change the dynamics in the way people evaluated her.
As such, varying the gender of the politicians in the treatments would
presumably affect political trust. While the experimental treatments here did not
describe candidates, it was presumed that the differences detected in how male
and female candidates are evaluated would also apply to politicians, without
reference to their status as candidates. Because trust is the concept of interest to
be tested here, it was reasonable to not include gender as an issue. I wanted to
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keep conditions, in this case gender, constant, and simultaneously minimize all
extraneous variables. Moreover, male politicians are more common than are
females.
The issue of partisan identification is also a concern in asking people to
evaluate politicians. We know that people’s political judgments will be affected
by the party identification of both the politician in question and the person. Of
greatest concern for this research design was how to include party identification
or how to control for it. People evaluate politics according to their partisanship,
so in introducing survey respondents to members of Congress, partisanship is an
automatic element of any subsequent evaluations made. The expectation is that
people will be more likely to trust politicians that share their party identification.
There is not, however, any substantive evidence that party identification or
ideology affects overall levels of political trust (Alford 2001, 41; Owen and
Dennis 2001, 222). In order to neutralize the affect of party identification upon
trust, the prompt before the treatments did not reference ideology or partisanship
of the politician in question at all.
In conclusion, special attention went into ensuring that there were no
symbolic or ideological cues in these treatments. The treatments were very brief
and free of any extraneous information. Survey respondents should be reacting,
then, to the actual content of the treatments. Because the dependent variables all
specifically reference the politician in the treatment, there also should not be any
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measurement concerns. The text of each individual treatment will be presented in
the forthcoming text.
Which Attributes of Trust are Tested?
Where do these specific attributes of trust that are to be tested come from?
From the pretest of my survey instrument, a factor analysis was conducted, the
details of which were explained in Chapter Two, which resulted in twelve
identified variables across the people, process, and policy categories. For the sake
of parsimony and an eye towards the cost involved, I identified two variables
within each category which were highly loaded onto their respective factors and
created experimental treatments. For people, I chose to use whether or not a
politician has held previous office (.62) and whose opinions he most considers in
taking positions on issues, his own or his constituents. In the original pretest, this
variable was defined as “being principled”, essentially meaning that he stood up
for what he believed in, which correlated with this people factor at .66. Because
of the word principled, I decided against using this variable, as initially tested, in
a treatment. There was no way to use the word principled and not bias people’s
evaluation of that politician. Moreover, the opposite of being principled would be
being unprincipled, and that dichotomy seems too simplistic. By focusing this
idea on whose feelings he most considers in taking positions, I can test a specific
component of what might be considered “being principled”. For process, whether
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or not he engages in civil and friendly debate (.75) and whether or not he conducts
clean campaigns, free of mudslinging and negativity (.74) were the chosen
variables. For the policy treatments, I chose pork, whether or not he brings
money and projects to his district (.70) and national versus local focus (.66).
These six variables were all strongly correlated with the three factors but
were also chosen with an eye toward practicability in formulating experimental
treatments. Additionally, I believe that these variables best represent an
opportunity for interesting and valuable findings. These six variables then
represent how people, process, and policy will be operationalized and measured.
People Treatments
The attributes of officeholders affect political trust because citizens can
easily reference the individual politicians when making evaluations of
government. There exists plenty of evidence that assessments of political officials
help predict trust. Citrin (1974) posited that political trust is affected by the
citizen’s perceptions of what incumbent political authorities are doing. Research
also indicates that trust is influenced by evaluations of the president and approval
of Congress (Miller and Borrelli 1991; Citrin and Luks 2001). Although
congressional and presidential approval ratings are not direct evaluations of just
the people who hold these offices, research shows that when people like and
approve of these politicians, they tend to trust government more.
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Moreover, additional research indicates that when voters evaluate political
candidates they predominantly use personality characteristics of the politicians
(Miller, et.al. 1986, 525). Miller and his colleagues proffer that what affects
candidate assessments should also influence the way in which people evaluate the
government (533). People are, at least in part, thinking about the personal
characteristics of the people in government when forming political opinions. For
instance, when people are asked to evaluate the performance of their member of
Congress, personal characteristics of that congressman are one of the major
criteria used (Parker and Davidson 1979).
Previous literature has found that people who obtain their political
information through television are more likely to find personal characteristics of
politicians important (Keeter 1987). Television, perhaps, primes its viewers to
notice personal characteristics of politicians (Druckman 2003). This is an
important consideration in that most American people depend upon broadcast
media for their political news and information. This means that the great majority
of people may be primed to think about politicians in terms of personal
characteristics, making a people orientation to political evaluations more likely.
Competence
The first people treatments include whether or not a politician has held
previous office. Previous elective experience is interpreted as a sign of
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competence. If a politician has held previous office, then he has already
established competence with voters. The idea of competence has long been hailed
as a quality of politicians which is worthy of trust (Wright 1976, Hart 1978,
Barber 1983, Levi and Stoker 2000). The work of Miller, Wattenberg, and
Malanchuk (1986) identified five characteristics about political candidates which
people use to evaluate them, competence being the first of these. If these
characteristics are capable of affecting how people feel about candidates, then
they should be potentially useful in explaining political trust. In evaluating the
qualities of politicians as people, it is expected that competence and experience
would play a role. A politician who is seen as competent, as measured through
previous political experience, will be trusted more than a politician who is less
experienced.
The specific text of the competence treatments is presented here. They are
exceedingly straightforward with no other extraneous information contained to
skew people’s reaction to them.
Treatment 1: Congressman Tom Ward served as a state legislator before
being elected to Congress.
Treatment 2: Congressman Tom Ward did not have any previous political




The second people treatments focus on how a legislator comes to take
positions on issues. What do Americans expect of their political leaders? Whose
opinions become most important when taking positions and making choices? Do
they think that they should behave as delegates and accurately reflect what their
constituents want, or should they behave as trustees, using their own good
judgment to make choices on political issues? Generally, previous research has
been unclear, although much evidence suggests that people prefer elected officials
to take on a delegate role (Sigelman, et.al. 1992, 369). Sigelman, et.al. (1992)
conducted a very interesting experimental study which sought to explain how
people want to be represented by politicians. They found that a politician who
followed what his constituents wanted was evaluated more favorably than one
who followed his own sentiments (376). Another interesting finding was that
people had a preference for a politician to take on a delegate role when that
politician was a legislator versus an executive official (377). Furthermore, if a
politician is perceived of as principled in his position-taking, it is assumed that he
would be respected and therefore trusted. This is also a variable that Sigelman,
et.al. tested and found that principled decisions were evaluated more favorably
than self serving ones (376-77).
For the experimental vignettes created here, I would have liked to have
included the idea of principled position-taking. Because of the desire to make the
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treatments as value neutral as possible, I took out the references to principled
position-taking as well as politically expedient position-taking. As such, the
treatments utilized here only reference whether a politician takes positions on
issues based upon his own personal feelings or how his constituents feel about
those issues. The expectation is that a politician who takes positions on issues
based upon how his constituents feel will be more trusted than one who follows
his own personal feelings.
The specific text of these treatments is included here.
Treatment 1: Congressman Tom Ward is a politician who takes positions
on issues based upon his own personal feelings about those issues.
Treatment 2: Congressman Tom Ward is a politician who takes positions
on issues based on his constituents’ feelings about those issues.
Process Treatments
The newest perspective of evaluating government performance is process.
Americans pay attention to the way in which their political system functions and
the processes that it uses. The work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse looms large
because their 1995 work Congress as Public Enemy focused predominantly on
process, as does their follow up work on political attitudes (2001, 2002). People,
they find, like procedural justice more than specific policy outcomes. As long as
the process is fair, Americans feel better about government, and this should then
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affect political trust. Both Owen and Dennis (2001, 220-1) and Farnsworth
(2003a, 73) find that perceptions of fairness do, in fact, influence political trust.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s 2002 study discerns that people are more
affected by processes than policies. When evaluating government, people’s
dissatisfaction is related to perceptions of how government does its job, not what
it does (34-5). Especially for citizens with minimal political interest and
knowledge, process concerns are most important (80-1). If we consider that a
great deal of the American electorate lacks political interest and knowledge, then
the role of process in evaluating the government and its actors should play a
substantial role.
Clean Campaigns
The first element of process will be running clean a clean campaign versus
a negative and nasty one. Campaigning is the process a politician uses to gain his
job. As such, it is an institutionalized process of the job of office holding.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) claim that an indicator of bad process, so to
speak, is running nasty and negative campaigns. Some politicians engage in nasty
campaigns to win elections. This can include negative ads on television and
attacks on political opponents. Brady and Theriault (2001) posit that the public
has a strong negative reaction to these practices. They find that public approval
of Congress, as an institution, is reactive to the proximity of an election. This
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means that as elections near, public approval decreases, and as elections fade into
the past, approval increases (185-7). These scholars argue that approval of
Congress being negatively correlated with the closeness of an election is evidence
of the public’s negative response to campaign techniques. Although causation is
not firmly established here, these scholars make an interesting case. It is expected
that a politician who runs a clean campaign by refusing to run negative ads will be
trusted more than a politician who does not make such a pledge.
The text of these treatments follows here. It is important to note that any
specifically emotive language was not used here. The congressman who promises
to keep the focus of the election on the issues and not the people running for
office is indicative of running a clean campaign. He specifically says that he will
not campaign in a negative manner. In the other treatment, I did not want to use
the specific phrase negative or nasty campaign, as that would immediately
generate negativity from people. Instead, this other congressman is described as
wanting to point out the differences between himself and his opponent. This was
done so as not to completely bias a person’s evaluation of these politicians. This
may make it harder to tease out the differences between how these treatments
affect trust, but it was necessary in order to avoid emotional language which
might bias peoples’ evaluations.
Treatment 1: Congressman Frank Smith, in his campaign, promised to
keep the focus of the election on the issues and not the people running for
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office. He publicly promised not to run any negative campaign ads or to
attack his opponent on a personal level.
Treatment 2: Congressman Frank Smith, in his campaign, vowed to point
out the differences between himself and his opponent. He publicly
pledged to make sure that voters had all the important information on the
candidates and the issues.
Debate
The next element of process to be tested was the nature of debate a
politician engages in. Legislative bodies are given the task of making public
policy. Part of the process of making public policy involves debate among
different actors with differing ideas and values. One of the most significant
pieces of information to emerge from recent literature dealing with political
attitudes is that Americans do not like the processes that politicians use in doing
their jobs. A part of this process is democracy in action, and democracy in action
entails debate and disagreement and the need for compromise. People simply are
not fond of these aspects of the political system and do not find them necessary.
As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse put it, “Fighting is equated with an absence of
productivity” (2002, 122). Their survey results show that roughly one in four
people feel uneasy and uncomfortable with any political debate (135). Carolyn
Funk (2001), in an interesting experimental design, found that conflict within
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policy debate elicits negative reactions from people (203). Mutz and Reeves
(2005) show that civil and uncivil debate has differing affects on political trust.
Research also indicates that high levels of dissension within Congress lead to
declines in congressional approval as well (Durr, et.al. 1997). Politicians who
engage in debate which is civil and involves cordial disagreement will be trusted
more than one whose debate style is marked by negativity and heated exchange
with others.
In the first treatment on debate as process, a member of Congress was
described as participating in very friendly and civil debate. Mutz and Reeves
(2005) defined civil debate in their research as being polite, calm, waiting
patiently for the other person to answer, and paying attention to the person
speaking. The politician in the treatment will, therefore, be explained as very
civil in his relationships with all fellow members, including ones of the opposing
political parties, and that he is polite even in times of disagreement, never raising
his voice. Likewise, Mutz and Reeves say that uncivil debate is defined as
including a lack of respect, showing frustration with the opposition, interrupting
another speaker and also includes nonverbal cues like rolling of the eyes. As
such, the second treatment will describe a politician who interrupts other people
and raises his voice. The expectation is that a politician who is civil and friendly
in debate will be trusted more than a politician who is not.
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The text of these two treatments follows. These two treatments are exact
opposites of each other, utilizing the same language in opposite directions.
Treatment 1: In debating the issues, Congressman Frank Smith is usually
calm and polite. If he disagrees with his colleagues, he tries to never raise
his voice or interrupt other members.
Treatment 2: In debating the issues, Congressman Frank Smith is usually
passionate and vocal. If he disagrees with a colleague, he is not afraid to
voice his opposition even if it means raising his voice or interrupting other
members.
Policy Treatments
It has long been believed that citizens evaluate their political system
according to the outputs and performance of that system, most often
conceptualized as public policy. The thinking about policy’s effect on trust is that
citizens will evaluate the government based on what it is doing and how it is
performing. People who are pleased with the policy direction and policy outputs
of the government are expected to trust government more because it is producing
desired outputs (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; Easton 1975).
Policy entails general governmental performance as well as specific policy
outputs. Historically, there is evidence of a correlation between feelings of
political trust and perceptions of governmental performance on broad policy
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issues, even when controlling for other factors like ideology, income, and
economic satisfaction (Citrin, et.al. 1975, 19). It should be noted, however, that
evidence to the contrary has been found as well (Hibbing 1999, 48). Moreover,
scholars note that the evidence on the effect of policy on trust has been
underwhelming (Ulbig 2002).
Almost all of the scholarship which posits a relationship between policy
and trust, measures policy satisfaction by first asking people what they think the
most important problem facing the United States is and then inquiring how good
of a job the government is doing in handling that problem. That method is not
used here. Because of the experimental design, the specific policy information
can be included in the treatment, thereby making it possible to know that it is
these particular elements of policy that an individual is responding to.
Pork Barrel Spending
The first variable of policy will be pork barrel spending. Pork is the
political term used to refer to members of Congress tacking on monies to
spending bills for special projects back in their home state and district. Members
of Congress do this because they believe it enhances the chance of being reelected
and that it earns them personalized electoral support (Cain, et.al. 1987). Their
willingness to engage in pork barreling can be understood to represent the
dominance of parochial issues for members. The most often mentioned criteria in
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evaluating a member of Congress have been constituency services, including
service to the district, service to constituents, and the conditions of the district
(Parker and Davidson 1979, 56-7). It is presumed that pork monies would fall
into this array of factors because they would affect the quality of the district.
More recent evidence, however, indicates that bringing home pork to
one’s congressional district has no effect upon how people evaluate their member
of Congress (Farnsworth 2003a, 75). Farnsworth’s finding is surprising in that
members of Congress fixate upon this task, bringing monies and projects back to
their district, as they assume it assists in their reelection efforts. As Farnsworth is
quick to point out, though, this may be representative of a socially desirable
response pattern or an effect of an abstract question, rather than a specific one
which asks about responses to specific pork projects (76). Since Farnsworth’s
work seems to stand alone in arguing that bringing home pork does not affect
constituents and their subsequent evaluations, it stands to reason that the common
understanding in political science literature is that it does matter.
Interestingly enough, previous research reveals that 85% of Americans
believe that members of Congress should pay more attention to the interests of the
entire nation rather than just their districts (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 64).
As such, politicians who pay more attention to national issues than local issues
should be trusted more because it is what people claim they desire. We can
measure how politicians prioritize national interests and localized interests in
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regards to how they spend the federal government’s money. The concept of pork
barrel spending is a very specific indication of this. Bringing home specific pork
monies and projects implies a focus on one’s constituency back home, a local
focus.
It is assumed, then, that if citizens want legislators to focus on national
affairs rather than parochial ones, that this requires a rejection of pork barreling.
It is therefore expected that a politician who rejects pork barrel monies for their
particular districts will be trusted more than a politician who does not.
The text of these treatments follows. Although I use the word “pork”
here, it is worth noting that the word “pork” was not utilized in any of the
treatments. It definitely has a negative political connotation, so its usage was
avoided altogether. Although the specific element here is either taking or
rejecting pork barrel monies, the justification for this decision further sets apart
these two politicians. The first congressman turns away this money because the
federal government is spending more money than it has and that it is in the best
interests of the nation to stop these sorts of projects. The second congressman
acknowledges that the government is spending more money than it has but that
his state needs this money and other states are receiving money for projects like
this. I initially wanted to include deficit spending as its own treatment under the
policy framework, but found conflicting evidence as to its effect on public
opinion. Its inclusion within this treatment allows me to explore the idea of
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deficit spending in conjunction with pork barrel spending. Although these two
ideas of pork barrel spending and deficit spending cannot necessarily be isolated
here, it will be worthy of note to see how they both are interpreted by people. As
an aside, the amount of money described in these treatments (1.2 million dollars)
was not chosen with any specific theoretical reason, as the amount in question is
not a fundamental aspect being investigated. This amount would assuredly seem
large enough to the everyday American.
Treatment 1: Congressman Brian Douglas recently turned down 1.2
million dollars of a recent bill dealing with highway transportation that
was set aside for his state. Congressman Douglas justified this decision
based on the fact that the federal government is spending more money
than it has and that it is in the best interests of the nation to stop these
projects.
Treatment 2: Congressman Brian Douglas recently accepted the 1.2
million dollars awarded to his state in a highway transportation bill.
Congressman Douglas explained that although the federal government is
spending more money than it has, this money is needed by his state very
much and that all other states are benefiting from projects like this.
National versus Local Focus
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This specific variable in the pretest was worded “whether or not he
focuses attention of the good of the entire country over the good for particular
places”. It was highly correlated with the policy factor, and I felt that it would
answer a very relevant question in politics. Should members of Congress focus
on their geographic constituency or the nation as a whole? More specifically,
does the decision about which focus a politician takes influence the resulting trust
that people have in him? We already know that people evaluate Congress and its
members by different standards (Parker and Davidson 1979). It may be that while
Congress is expected to guard the national good, individual members are expected
to guard the good of a district and/or state. Either way, how this variable
performs will indicate how important an issue this really is and if it has any effect
on trust in government.
The specific text of these treatments follows. Similar to the previous work
discussed above, if citizens tend to think that Congress should pay attention to the
entire nation, rather than single districts, then the expectation is that people would
trust a politician who claims to represent the national interest more than a
politician who represents his specific district and constituency.
Treatment 1: Congressman Brian Douglas often turns down money from
the federal government for his district. He considers himself a
representative for the national interest, rather than just his district, and
feels that the money could be better put to use for the good of the nation.
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Treatment 2: Congressman Brian Douglas never turns away money or
attention from the federal government for his district. He first considers
himself a representative of his specific district and his constituents and
feels that federal monies are put to very good use there.
Analysis
In order to find out if the treatments had any effect on political trust, the
means of the trust score following each treatment can be compared. This might
normally be done with a series of means tests. Repeated applications of a test to
the same data, however, increase the likelihood of committing a Type I error,
which is the type of error associated with making a decision based on the data
from the sample (Rea and Parker 2005, 145). Repeating applications of means
tests or t-tests involves all error factors being compounded in one’s data set,
making it much more likely to reject hypotheses when one should not. Because
of this, multiple comparisons are usually performed with ANOVA models to
control the level of significance, thereby maintaining the traditional error rate for
an experiment (Elliott and Woodward 2007, 154).
First, there will be three ANOVA models, one for each people, process,
and policy treatments. A major advantage in using analysis of variance
(ANOVA) is that more than two means can be compared (Cohen and Lea 2004,
97). This is helpful here as each category has four treatments within it. Although
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there are no hypothesized relationships between each of the four treatments within
each category of people, process, and policy, I believe that how the four
treatments compare with each other in their effect on trust may prove to be
interesting.
Because it is of import to analyze the differing effect of each of the two
treatments in a pair, the pairs will then be analyzed as independent samples t-tests.
These tests will be run as follow-ups to the ANOVA models. This results in six
different analyses being conducted.
The Dependent Variable
These specific treatments described above will represent independent
variables in the proceeding analysis. In order to ascertain the effect of the
treatments on political trust, I measured an individual’s trust in the specific
politician presented in each treatment. This shall serve as the dependent variable
in the proceeding analysis. This measure of trust is borrowed from Cook and
Gronke (2005). The Cook and Gronke trust variable asks respondents to place
themselves on a scale from 0 - 10 regarding their level of trust in government to
do the right thing, where 0 indicates very strong distrust of government, 10 means
strong trust in government to do the right thing, and 5 indicates neither trust, nor
distrust (787).
151
Why use the Cook and Gronke measure of trust? As these scholars have
pointed out, a potential conflict in measuring political trust is in the interpretation
of trust survey responses. More specifically, does a lack of trust signify cynicism
or skepticism or outright and active distrust? Cook and Gronke (2005) argue that
the current survey measures appear to truncate the full diversity of responses to
questions regarding trust, making a person appear either trustful or distrustful.
These scholars have developed their own measure of political trust which
indicates that healthy skepticism is more the norm than are either absolute trust or
distrust.
The only change that I made to this dependent variable was to change the
item of reference from the government to the specific politician presented in the
treatment. The dependent variable here reads: On a scale from zero to ten, where
ten means very strong trust in this politician to do what is right, zero means very
strong distrust in this politician, and five means that you neither trust nor distrust
this politician, where would you place yourself?
Examining the descriptive statistics for this variable, it appears that there
is a large portion of the sample that did not answer these questions, either with a
don’t know or refused to answer but continued with the call. The valid sample
sizes of people answering this primary dependent variable after the treatments are
lower than the full sample size of 600. Following the people treatments, we have
N = 443, following the process treatments N = 440, and following the policy
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treatments N = 438. This presents evidence of a problem identified in
experimental research as “experimental exit” where respondents are free to leave
any question selectively, which potentially excludes them from the experiment
(Sniderman and Grob 1996, 394). Sniderman and Grob say that this raises
potentially critical risks of self-selection effects. Because the sample sizes are
still relatively large, this should not be a problem for the proceeding analysis. In
the end, this is a liability for experimental research and one must carefully
proceed.
ANOVA Analysis
In order to ascertain the effect of each of these treatments, I conducted one
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). This was done in order to find if there are
differences in mean trust scores due to the treatments received within each
category of people, process, and policy. One way analysis of variance is used to
test the null hypothesis that several independent population means are equal, in
this case that would mean that the treatments resulted in no statistically significant
differences in trust. Whereas before I tested the differences in mean trust scores
following each treatment in pairs, this test will determine if the differences in
means are statistically significant among all four treatments.
In order to use this analysis of variance procedure, the observations (trust
scores) must be independent and random samples from normal populations with
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equal variances. The first assumption of independent samples is met here as
participants were randomly split into groups. Although assignment to treatment
groups was completely randomized, the amount of people in each treatment is not
exactly equal. The amount of people for each treatment ranges from a high of 176
to a low of 130, making these groups roughly equivalent. The second assumption
of normality means that the measurement variable of trust is normally distributed
within each group. A look at the histograms for these dependent variables of
interest (one following each treatment) shows that the shape approximates a bell
curve. This indicates normality. The third assumption is that within each group
there are equal variances. To consider equal variances, I examined the descriptive
statistics for each group. The standard deviations of each group, remembering
that the variance is the square of the standard deviation, appear to be roughly
equal. All three assumptions of ANOVA, therefore, are met here.
The first part of an ANOVA determines if there is an overall difference
among the groups tested. This will result in a significant F test (Rea and Parker
2005, 214). A significant F test means that you can reject the null hypothesis that
all the group means are equal. This only means that all the groups are not the
same, not that they all differ from each other (Cohen and Lea 2004, 107).
When there are more than two groups being compared, further analysis is
required. These are referred to as post-hoc tests. One of the most widely used
post-hoc tests is called Tukey’s HSD and is recommended when comparing more
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than three groups of equivalent sizes (Cohen and Lea 2004, 117). This is the
post-hoc test that shall be utilized here, unless otherwise noted. This test will
specify the statistically significant differences among the groups.
An F test can be statistically significant even when there is little difference
among the sample means, especially if the sample sizes are large (Cohen and Lea
2004, 106). As such, in addition to this test of significance it is helpful to provide
an estimate of effect size. This is called eta squared, expressed as η2. This
represents the total variation explained by the grouping of the independent
variables and ranges from 0 to 1. This measure is akin to the R-squared statistic
in a regression model in that it explains how much of the variance can be
explained by this grouping of independent variables and can be interpreted
similarly (Cramer 2003, 152).
People Treatments
First, a one-way ANOVA was performed to test the hypothesis that the
average trust scores following people treatments were equal. The average trust
scores were found to be different across the people treatments, F(3, 439) = 2.866,
p = .036, η2 = .02. A significant F test indicates that an overall differences among
groups exists (Rea and Parker 2005, 214). Multiple comparisons were then
performed using the Tukey method. No relationships among the four treatments
were significant at the p < .05 level. The mean trust score of the constituents’
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feelings treatment was almost statistically significant (p > .05) and higher than the
personal feelings treatment. This was the relationship that was posited between




The next ANOVA model analyzed the difference in mean trust scores
according to the four process treatment exposed to. There was no significant
differences between these means, F(3, 436) = 1.378, p = .249, η2 = 01. The null
hypothesis that there is no difference among the mean trust scores according to
the process treatment cannot be rejected. Although the means show that the
treatments which were hypothesized to cause higher average trust scores actually
did, none of these relationships were statistically significant in performing




The final ANOVA model analyzed the difference in mean trust scores
according to the policy treatment exposed to. The average trust scores were found
to be different across the policy treatments, F(3, 434) = 14.414, p = .000, η2 = .09.
Multiple comparisons were then performed using the Tukey method and the
following relationships emerged. The results indicated that there was a
statistically significant difference between two groups of variables here. The
average trust scores are significantly higher for the people who got the reject pork
treatment or the national interest treatment versus the other grouping of take pork
treatment and local interest treatment. The average trust score for the reject pork
treatment (M = 6.11) was almost two full points higher than the take pork
treatment (M = 4.42), on a scale from 0 to 10. These subsets are exactly as
hypothesized, with rejecting pork and national focus affecting trust positively and
taking pork and local focus resulting in lower average trust scores.
(Table 4.4 Here)
ANOVA Summary
The results of the ANOVA analysis are interesting in that policy
treatments had extremely statistically significant differences between them (p <
.000). There were also significant differences among the people treatments. With
such interesting findings resulting from the people and policy treatments, it is
157
somewhat of a disappointment that the process treatments did not have any
significant effect on trust.
Overall, the mean levels of trust for the politicians described in these 12
treatments hovered around the mode of 5, which represents neither trust nor
distrust. Although there were some components of people, process, and policy
which resulted in higher mean levels of trust, none resulted in a mean trust score
that was very extreme. The eta squared measures of each ANOVA model are all
very small (η2 = .02, .01, .09). This measure is akin to the R-squared statistic in a
regression model in that it explains how much of the variance can be explained by
this grouping of independent variables (Cramer 2003, 152). As such, it seems that
although the qualities of people, process, and policy tested here have the
capability to influence trust on the margins, they do not do so in a wholesale kind
of way.
Next, I consider people, process, and policy treatments, in turn. The
people treatments did not have a great effect on political trust. Although the
overall ANOVA model for the people treatments indicated that the average trust
scores were different, upon further analysis no relationships were found to be
significant. The mean trust scores following the treatment where a congressman
had no previous electoral experience were higher than the mean trust of a
congressman who did have previous electoral experience although this difference
was not statistically significant. This was the only finding which contradicted
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expectations. Perhaps the notion of competence in a congressperson is not
thought of as originating with previous office, although other literature,
specifically that dealing with quality political candidates, would disagree with
such as idea. It may also be that although a political novice lacks competence, he
would be trusted more than an “experienced” legislator. There has been previous
evidence that citizens think that Congress has a corrupting influence on people
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 63). If this is how people perceive of Congress
then a member with no experience beforehand might be trusted more than an
incumbent.
Nothing significant emerged from the model on process treatments. The
mean trust scores were higher for congressmen that engaged in friendly debate
and promised not to run a negative campaign, although these differences in mean
trust scores were not statistically significant. Perhaps the factors that these
process treatments tested were not ones that would engender any differences in
trust. This does not mean, however, that process does not matter in relation to
political trust. Other prominent scholars have found that process concerns do
affect satisfaction with government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001, 2002).
Ultimately, other characteristics of process may be found to have a greater effect
on political trust. Moreover, more sharply worded process treatments which
utilized emotive language might elicit more significant findings.
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The average trust scores of the policy treatments divided very nicely into
two statistically significant, distinct subsets, the mean trust scores of rejecting
pork (M = 6.11) and having a national focus (M = 5.91) hanging together with
higher mean trust scores, and the taking pork (M = 4.42) and local interest (M =
4.95) treatments forming the other subset, with lower mean trust scores. This
finding is as expected. It provides strong evidence in support of other work which
has found that Americans want congresspersons to focus on national interests
rather than parochial ones.
In the policy treatments, the explanation behind either accepting or
rejecting pork was premised upon the idea of deficit spending. Although this idea
of deficit spending cannot be isolated from the simple concept of either taking or
rejecting pork, it is interesting that these treatments appeared to have a pretty
significant effect on trust. Would the treatments have had the same effect on trust
if they included no reference to the rationale behind either taking or rejecting
pork? The findings here make this an excellent question for future research.
The fact that a politician who considers himself a representative of the
national good rather than just his district influences political trust, and in this case,
appears to increase trust in that politician, is truly interesting as well. This has
very contemporary relevance because following the recent hurricane disasters in
the Gulf Coast the concern has been whether or not the federal government has
the money to help rebuild New Orleans in particular. Pet pork projects have
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recently received lots of attention for the monies that they take away from a
national disaster of this magnitude, such as the "bridge to nowhere" in Alaska
which was initially funded to the tune of 223 million dollars and then defunded
amid increasing national scrutiny. The results here indicate that a congressman
with a national focus rather than a local focus does engender higher levels of
political trust. Additionally, a congressman who rejects pork engenders higher
levels of trust than one that does not. Congresspersons no doubt walk a fine line
between being faithful ombudsmen and bringing money back home, on the one
hand, and being guardians of the national good, on the other. That these decisions
may affect the political trust prescribed to members of Congress, as the evidence
here indicates, might make these decisions easier.
Difference of Means Tests
In order to determine if the treatments affected political trust, I will
compare the mean scores of trust following each treatment with its pair. (A visual
comparison of means trust scores following each treatment is contained in the
Figure 4.1 of the Appendix.) This shall be done with independent groups t-tests.
The independent group’s t-test is used to compare two means of a population
based on independent samples from two groups (Elliott and Woodward 2007, 47).
This test is intended for measuring a dependent variable on a quantitative scale
when a study has randomly assigned participants into one of two experimental
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treatments, in order to test if the independent variables (here, the treatments) have
any effect upon the dependent variable (trust) (Cohen and Lea 2004, 49). The
dependent variable here being the trust score asked about following each
treatment and the independent variables are the treatments received.
The treatments are conceived of as pairs because each concept has two
treatments that represent it and the goal is to ascertain if these treatments affect
levels of political trust. The first people quality tested is that of competence as
measured through previous electoral experience. One treatment has a politician
with no previous office holding experience and the other served as a state
legislator before being elected to Congress. The second people quality tested was
whose opinions a politician uses in taking positions on issues. One treatment has
a politician who takes positions based upon his own personal feelings and the
other takes positions based upon how his constituents feel. Next are the process
treatments. The first process treatment deals with the nature of the campaign a
politician has run. In the first treatment, a politician promises not to run any
negative campaigns or to attack his opponent on a personal level. In the second
treatment, a politician vows to point out all the important differences between
himself and his opponent. The second process treatment deals with the nature of
debate that a congressman engages in. In the first treatment, a politician always
engages in civil and friendly debate. In the second treatment, a politician’s
behavior in debate is not so civil. Finally, there are the policy treatments. The
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first policy factor tested is the idea of pork. The first treatment portrays a
congressman who refuses to take pork for his district, while the second treatment
portrays a congressman who does accept pork. The other policy factor tested is
the idea of where a congressman places his focus. The first treatment portrays a
congressman who considers himself a representative for the national interest,
rather than just his district, and the second treatment portrays a congressman who
considers himself a representative of his specific district.
As such, the treatments are in pairs as they represent two facets of one
particular quality being tested for their affect on political trust. In order to
determine if the treatments have the hypothesized effect on trust, the means of the
trust score following each factor being tested can be compared of in pairs. An
independent samples t-test was performed to test the hypothesis that the resulting
means of trust scores for each pair of treatments were equal. First, the results of
the Levene’s test for equality of variances will be reported. If the variances are
not significantly different than one another, then it is protocol is to report the
pooled-variance t-test results. If the variances are significantly different than one
another, the protocol is to report the separate-variance t-test results. This shall be
reported for each independent samples t-test which will be performed. In addition
to the results of the t-test, the means of the two samples will also be reported
(Cohen and Lea 2004, 59).
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This analysis allows me to determine if each of these treatments had the
hypothesized effect on trust. Moreover, this analysis will enable me to determine
if the difference in trust as a result of the treatments received are significantly
different. Figure 4.1 in the Appendix summarizes these mean trust scores after
each treatment.
People Treatments
The first pair is a people quality, that of competence. Competence here
was measured as previous electoral experience, so one politician had it and the
other did not. The Levene’s test for equality of variances showed that the
variances of these two samples were not significantly different, and so the pooled-
variance t-test was utilized. The mean trust score following the previous office
treatment was 4.93 (SD = 1.85). The mean trust score following no previous
office treatment was 5.33 (SD = 2.02). The politician with no previous office
holding experience tends to be trusted more than the one who has held previous
office. The means between these two treatments, however, are not significantly
different, t(226) = -1.58, p > .10.
The originally hypothesized relationship was that politicians with
experience would be trusted more than those with none. This finding does not
support that. The mean trust score following the no previous office treatment was
higher than that following the previous office treatment, but this difference was
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not statistically significant. This, in fact, is the only finding that runs contrary to
the expectations of these people, process, and policy treatments. It may be,
however, that a politician with prior experience represents a “career politician”,
and Americans do not generally love the notion of a career politician. In this way,
experience may have a negative connotation, which would cause it to have an
adverse effect on trust in a politician.
The second people quality was that of whose opinions most affect a
politician’s position taking. The first treatment presented a congressman who
uses his own personal feelings, whereas the second congressman uses his
constituents’ feelings. The Levene’s test for equality of variances indicated that
these two sample’s variances were statistically different from one another, so the
separate-variances t-test will be reported. The mean trust score following the
personal feelings treatment was 4.67 (SD = 2.41) and the mean trust score after
the constituents’ feelings treatment was 5.35 (SD = 1.89). As hypothesized, the
politician who uses his constituents’ opinions in taking positions on issues is
trusted more than the politician who uses his own personal feelings. These means
are significantly different from each other, t(207) = -2.31, p < .05. Because p <
.05, we can safely assume that these two means are not equal.
Process Treatments
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Then, the process treatments were tested. The first of these treatments
represented a politician promising to conduct a clean campaign. The second one
described a congressman who vowed to point out the important differences
between himself and his opponent. The Levene’s test for equality of variances
indicated that these two samples had significantly different variances, and thus the
separate-variance t-test will be reported. The mean trust score following the clean
campaign treatment (M = 5.66, SD = 2.28) was not significantly different than the
mean trust score following the not clean campaign treatment (M = 5.30, SD =
1.96)), t(210) = 1.22, p > .10. As expected, there is a higher mean trust for the
politician that promises a clean campaign, but the relationship between the trust
scores following each of these treatments is not significantly different. These
treatments may not have sufficiently described a dirty versus a clean campaign.
The second process quality tested was the nature of debate a congressman
engages in. The first treatment presented a congressman who engages in civil
debate, while the second treatment here describes a congressman who is not quite
as civil in debate. The Levene’s test for equality of variances showed that these
two samples were not significantly different than one another, so the pooled-
variances t-test will be reported. The mean trust score following the civil debate
treatment (M = 5.72, SD = 2.09) was not significantly different than the mean
trust score after the not civil debate treatment (M = 5.24, SD = 2.28), t(223) =
1.63, p > .05. Although trust appears higher in regards to a congressperson who
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engages in civil debate, there is no statistical significance in the differences in
means as a result of these two treatments.
Policy Treatments
Next, let’s consider the effect of the policy treatments. The first of these
tests the notion of bringing pork home to the district. The first treatment
represents a congressman who turns away pork, and the second one describes a
congressman who accepted the pork. The Levene’s test for equality of variances
indicates that the variances of these two samples are significantly different from
each other, so the separate-variance t-test results are reported. The mean trust
score following the reject pork treatment (M = 6.11, SD = 2.47)) was significantly
different than the mean trust score after the accept pork treatment (M = 4.42, SD =
1.92), t(213) = 5.86, p < .001. The politician who turns away pork project and
monies for his district has, on average, higher trust. The average trust for a
politician who rejects pork is significantly different than the average trust of the
politician who accepts it. This supports the hypothesis. In fact, the mean trust on
the reject pork treatment is the highest of all twelve of the mean trust scores. The
reject pork treatment resulted in the highest mean trust score.
The second policy characteristic tested was having a national versus a
local focus. The first of these treatments describes a congressman who considers
himself a representative for the national interest and the second treatment is a
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congressman who considers himself a representative of his specific district. The
Levene’s test for equality of variances shows that the variances in these two
samples were not significantly different and so the pooled-variance t-test results
will be reported. The mean trust score following the national interest treatment
(M = 5.91, SD = 2.26) was significantly different than the mean trust score
following the local interest treatment (M = 4.95, SD = 2.40), t(199) = 2.94, p <
.01. On average, the politician who works for the national good is trusted more
than one who claims to be a representative for his local district, and this
difference is statistically significant. This, also, is as hypothesized.
Difference of Means Summary
It should be pointed out that all of the mean trust scores hover around a 5,
which represents neither trust nor distrust. This measure was designed to get at a
full variety of responses to the trust question and has revealed in Cook and
Gronke’s research that skepticism is much more the norm than outright distrust.
This nation-wide, random sample shows the same tendency. The average trust
scores across these twelve treatments ranges from a low of 4.42 to a high of 6.11.
Analyzed in pairs, the analysis shows that the differences in means
between the treatments were statistically significant in three of the six pairs. The
differences in mean trust scores were significant for the whose opinion treatments,
the pork treatments, and the focus treatments. For whose opinion , this means that
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a politician who uses his constituents’ feelings in taking positions on issues results
in a significantly higher mean level of trust versus the politician who uses his own
personal feelings. A politician who rejects pork project money for his district also
engenders a significantly higher mean level of trust as compared to the politician
who accepts said monies and projects. Finally, a politician who focuses on the
national good results in a significantly higher level of mean trust as compared to
the politician who focuses his attention on his local district.
As a whole, both policy components tested resulted in statistically
significant differences in mean trust scores across treatments. One of the people
factors tested resulted in statistically significant findings between treatments pairs,
and neither of the two process factors tested achieved any significance. Here, in
addition to the regression analyses presented in Chapter Three, ideas of policy
have the greatest effect upon political trust.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions about Political Trust
The initial questions posed here were: What explains why some
individuals trust the federal government and others do not? How do people arrive
at the decision to trust? In the end, I agree with and my evidence supports the
supposition that “political support is in large degree a measure of government
performance” (Owen and Dennis 2001, 211). Attitudinal variables such as trust,
support, satisfaction, and legitimacy are interrelated and often considered
interchangeable, so if political support is a measure of government performance,
then trust might be as well. What are the specific elements of government
performance, then, that contribute to the evaluation of trust in government? I am
positing that perceptions of people, process, and policy make up components of
the government and its performance that citizens then evaluate. These evaluations
of the people in government, the process of government, and the policy produced
by government then influence political trust.
I hypothesized that aspects of the political system itself, specifically the
people who serve in office, the process of government, and the resulting policy,
would influence political trust. These three aspects have all been offered up as
explanations of trust by other scholars and other literature but have never really
been tested together for their effect on trust. As a whole, the results of my
analysis provide evidence that perceptions of the people, process, and policy of
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government do affect people’s trust in government. This will be discussed in
more detail below.
Clarifying Trust
In this chapter, whenever I talk about trust as a dependent variable, it will
be referring to Trust, the first question of the NES trust battery. The simple trust
question “How much do you trust the government in Washington to do what is
right?” is the closest thing we have to a universal measure of political trust. It is
also a single trust question unaffected by any other possible antecedents of trust,
which is a criticism that has been leveled at the Trust Scale measure.
A correlation measure between Trust and Trust Scale showed a positive
and statistically significant correlation of r = .81, n = 550, p < .01 (two tailed).
Obviously, both of these dependent variables are measuring the same concept or
such a strong correlation between the two would not be present. They do perform
differently however. My analysis has also indicated that Trust is more difficult to
explain than the Trust Scale. The differences in the R-squared statistics of all of
the regression models that were run indicate that all of the explanatory variables
analyzed here, including people, process, and policy, are able to explain less of
the variation in Trust as compared to the Trust Scale, with its four questions.
While conceptually similar, Trust and Trust Scale perform differently.
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Because the single question of trust is a universally acceptable measure of
trust in government and because it measures simple trust without including any
other variables which may be antecedents of trust (such as the Trust Scale), I
intend to conclude my analysis of the performance of perceptions of people,
process, and policy in their ability to explain trust in government with this
measure of trust.
Where Does the Evidence Come From?
My methodology enabled me to inquire about and measure trust in two
different ways. I employed a survey experiment to investigate whether
perceptions of people, process, and policy do influence trust in government and
how people, process, and policy worked in relation to each other. In a
methodological sense, this research design has much strength. Empirically, it has
the combined power of a randomized experiment together with a large and
representative national sample survey. This multi-method approach melds
together a method often used in the study of political trust, the survey, with a
method not usually employed in studying trust, the experiment. Very few studies
of political trust using experimental methods have been employed, so my
contributions are unique in this sense (Levi and Stoker 2000, 501). Furthermore,
experiments offer the strongest support for causal inferences to be made
(McDermott 2002, 38). Moreover, this melding together of survey and
172
experiment provides “distinctive external validity advantages of the representative
public opinion survey with the decisive internal validity strengths of a fully
randomized, multifaceted experiment” (Sniderman and Grob 1996, 378).
In the national survey that was conducted, participants were asked to
respond to various statements that ascertained their sentiments towards the
qualities of the people in office, the processes, and the policies. These variables
indicate the degree to which an individual is satisfied with the people in office,
the process of government and politics, and the general performance and policy.
Multivariate models were then applied to test these perceptions of people,
process, and policy upon political trust. This analysis of trust focuses on trust in
government on the general level.
For the experimental portion of the study, a national sample of randomly
selected Americans was exposed to treatments that emphasized different elements
of people, process, and policy. Each respondent was read three separate
descriptions of a politician, one about personal qualities, one about process
factors, and one focusing on policy. One specific attribute of people, process, and
policy was presented within each treatment, and people were randomly assigned
into these groups. The responding levels of political trust following these
treatments were then compared in order to measure the effect of qualities of
people, process, and policy. The experimental portion of this research design
enabled me to test which specific attributes of people, process, and policy most
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influence trust, either in the positive or negative direction. The magnitude of the
effect of each of the three indicators of trust was then compared to each other in
bivariate statistical models. This analysis of trust focuses on specific trust in an
individual politician.
This survey experiment thus provided two avenues to conceptualize and
measure political trust as a function of people, process, and policy. The survey
questions asked about people, process, and policy in a very broad way. The
experiment enabled me to posit and test specific attributes of people, process, and
policy. For example, a survey question asked people to respond to the statement
“Politicians in the U.S. deserve respect”. What criteria a person may use to
answer that question is unknown to us. In formulating experimental treatments,
though, one of the people attributes tested was competence. Competence was
measured as previous electoral experience and a pair of treatments were put
together which tested that specific attribute of a people quality. Arguably,
electoral experience may not be the exact same thing as competence, but that is
how it was operationalized here. More importantly, because of the experimental
design and random assignment into treatments, I could ensure that the specific
attributes of the treatments affected political trust. Survey questions asked
participants to consider people, process, and policy on a global level, while the
experimental design tested more specific attributes of people, process, and policy.
One supportive conclusion about the dual methodology is that the two
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methods used resulted in a convergence of evidence and findings. The survey and
the experiment both revealed that perceptions of policy, whether conceptualized
as general statements about policy outcomes or specific policy attributes or
behaviors such as taking or rejecting pork, had the greatest effect on political
trust.
The State of Political Trust in 2006-2007
The current state of trust in the United States government can be
ascertained by looking at the distribution of trust in this nationwide, randomly
selected sample. To do so, the Trust measure will be used and the reasons for this
were detailed above. This measure of trust is the primary question in the NES
trust battery which has been employed as a valid measure of trust in the federal
government since the 1950s. This question traditionally has three response
categories: just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time. I altered
the response categories to include five: always, most of the time, some of the
time, rarely, and never. These response categories were adopted from the work of
Gershtenson and Plane (2006). These scholars argue that the difference between
the three response options is unclear, especially the distinction between just about
always and most of the time. They suggest the use of “always” as a response
option because it is more absolute. Moreover, offering respondents more
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response choices should make for finer distinctions. The response option of
“never” is also offered, which it is not in the standard NES trust battery.
The distribution of trust across this sample with these response options
approximates a normal curve. At one extreme, 5% of the sample chose “never” (n
= 28). About 19% of the sample responded that they “rarely” trust the
government (n = 115). The majority of the sample here says that they trust the
government “some of the time”, which is the answer squarely in the middle
between extremes (n = 335, 56%). Next, about 20% of the sample says they trust
government “most of the time” (n = 116). Only two people (n = 2) claimed that
they “always” trusted the government which accounts for less than 1% of the
sample. The low number of people who chose either of the two extreme options
is not at all surprising, given their absoluteness.
The distribution of trust across this sample shows that people are not
completely without trust. Around 24% of the sample here responded that they
rarely or never trust the government to do what is right. The response option of
rarely still implies that these people may occasionally trust, just not as much as
the people who chose some of the time. The rest of the sample, over 70% of it,
had some trust in government, whether it is only some of the time, most of the
time, or always. Although the literature has bemoaned the sad state of political
trust in the United States, these numbers indicate that political trust is not cause
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for concern. Most people surveyed here trust government at least some of the
time, and that is good news.
Political Trust is Political
What explains political trust? Individual characteristics such as age, race,
gender, education, and so forth, although long posited as affecting trust, have
actually been found to have little predictive power. My data confirms this as well.
Newton and Norris (1999) assert that political trust is randomly distributed among
people with different individual characteristics such as education, income,
religion, age, or gender (62). As such, these types of variables should not have
any predictive power over political trust. Government performance, these authors
argue, affects all individuals, and this is what sets it apart as an explanation of
political trust. Likewise, evaluations of governmental performance should then
affect trust in government. Political trust is inherently political. Margaret Levi
and Laura Stoker, in a review piece on political trust, assert “Whether citizens
express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection of their political lives, not their
personalities nor even their social characteristics” (2000, 481).
The most recent literature in this subject indicates that political evaluations
of government performance are strong predictors of political trust. Hetherington
(1998) concludes that the political evaluations of government effectiveness and
overall economic evaluations influence trust (799-800). Citrin and Luks conclude
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that the components of trust in government are largely political (2001, 24). They
argue that congressional approval is the most robust predictor of trust in the
federal government. Congressional approval performed very well in the analysis
here as well, meaning that it was highly predictive of trust. Likewise, Owen and
Dennis (2001) find that several different political evaluations affect trust. The
political evaluations that they find influence political trust are perceived
governmental power and the personal relevance of government to a citizen (221).
Moreover, ideas like fairness, efficiency, having the right priorities, and having a
positive perception of the state of the nation also influence trust (221). Most
recently, Keele (2007) summarizes that political trust is a reflection of
government performance as well. He says that individuals evaluate the
performance of the president, Congress, and the economy and adjust their trust in
government according to these factors (241).
In James A. Stimson’s most recent work on public opinion (2004), he
posits that political trust represents “generalized satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the state of things” (154). The “state of things”, according to Stimson,
includes the very ideas of government performance already mentioned. He says
that the national economy is the best gauge of performance (153) and shows that
consumer sentiment matches up with trust quite nicely (156). Moreover, he
shows that the two indicators of trust in government and Congressional approval
track together through time (153-54). Stimson, a well-respected scholar in the
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public opinion field, makes a convincing case that trust correlates with
satisfaction with government (the president and Congress) and economic
performance.
Government performance, then, has most recently and effectively been
operationalized as Congressional approval, presidential approval, and overall
economic performance. All three of these variables have been examined
separately and sometimes together as predictors of trust and none of the three has
been found to explain very much of the variation in trust in government. Taken
together, however, these are seen as powerful indicators of government
performance which have the power to predict trust in government.
These three variables (presidential approval, congressional approval, and
economic performance) were also included in my regression models which tested
all potential explanations of political trust, including demographics and control
variables. In these models, these three variables had mixed success in predicting
trust. The economic variable that I used asked people how they were getting
along financially these days, which is not exactly the same way that overall
economic performance has been measured previously, but it is the closest
representation of that idea that was included in my instrument. Presidential and
congressional approvals were measured the same way in my survey instrument as
they are elsewhere.
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In a full regression model including all possible explanations of political
trust, the financial condition variable achieves statistical significance in only one
version of the model which tests only socioeconomic and demographic variables.
Upon adding in other variables, the significance of financial condition disappears.
Congressional approval is a significant predictor of trust in all of the regression
models it was included in. Presidential approval, however, was not.
If these three variables, Congressional approval, presidential approval, and
overall economic performance, have often been put forth as the government
performance variables which influence trust, then it should be safe to assume they
would be stronger predictors of trust than they have proven to be in my data set
here. In order to check the strength of Congressional approval, presidential
approval, and economic performance as explanations of trust, I ran another
regression model with Trust as the dependent variable and these three
aforementioned variables as the independent variables.
In a second model, I added my scaled variables of people and policy as
independent variables. I included people and policy because these variables
performed successfully in the regression models of Chapter Three, and I left out
process variables not only because the process scale did not perform very well as
a scale but also because the one process variable used in these earlier regression
models was not significant in predicting the dependent variable Trust.
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(Table 5.1 Here)
The first model with the typical government performance variables,
financial condition, Congressional approval and presidential approval, has an R-
squared of .12, meaning that these three variables explain 12% of the variation in
Trust. Presidential and congressional approvals both have positive and
statistically significant relationships with Trust. Those who approve of the
performance of Congress and the President are likely to have more trust in the
government to do what is right.
The addition of the people and policy variables in the second regression
model results in a significantly higher R-squared of .33, as evidenced by the F
change statistic. Congressional approval maintains its significance, but neither
presidential approval nor financial condition is significant. Both the people scale
and the policy scale are highly significant and in the hypothesized direction.
This cross sectional evidence suggests that these typical government
performance variables did not predict political trust as well as has been previously
argued. The first regression model indicates that financial condition, presidential
approval, and congressional approval explain 12% of the variation in Trust. The
addition of the people and policy scales greatly increases the explanatory power
of the model. The R-squared statistic for this second model is almost triple the
first and the difference between the two is significant. This implies that
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perceptions of the people in government and the policy of government are more
predictive of trust in government than congressional approval, presidential
approval and economic performance. The performance of the coefficients in the
regression model also confirms this. In comparing the betas of these variables,
the people scale (β = .270) and the policy scale (β = .316) are much larger than the
beta for congressional approval (β = .091).
I am arguing that political trust is explained in large part by political
evaluations of government performance, much like these other scholars. My
conceptualization of political evaluations of government performance, however, is
considerably different. I argue that the public reacts to the actors on the political
stage (politicians) who conduct politics (the process) and produce policy (policy).
These are the three determinants, people, process, and policy, which I have put
forth and tested here. The regression analysis just presented indicates that the
ideas of people and policy, as I have conceptualized them, are stronger predictors
of political trust than even the vetted typical government performance variables.
The performance of perceptions of people, process, and policy in predicting trust
will be reviewed separately below.
Perceptions of Process Matter the Least
Process is the latest addition to the ways people evaluate government and
politics. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue, when evaluating
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government, people’s dissatisfaction is related to perceptions of how government
does its job, not what it does (34-5). So process should matter. As long as the
process is fair, Americans feel better about government, and this then affects
political trust (Owen and Dennis 2001, 220-21; Farnsworth 2003a, 73). Although
the previous evidence on this point is strong, I do not find much evidence to
support this argument. Process, as I have conceptualized of it here, has the
weakest effect on trust of all three of the primary independent variables of
interest.
The survey portion of the instrument tested three political statements
dealing with perceptions of process. These included 1. Most politicians do a lot
of talking by they do little to solve the really important issues facing the country,
2. The political process is fair and open, and 3. Fighting between political parties
in Washington prevents our elected officials from getting anything done. Overall,
responses to process statements showed more extreme variation than responses to
people or policy statements. There were far fewer individuals who chose the
neither agree nor disagree option on the questions of process than the questions
concerning people and policy. The mode response about politicians doing a lot of
talking but little to solve problems is a 5, meaning strongly agree. The mode
response to the political process being fair and open is a 2, meaning the most
often occurring response was to disagree. The mode response to fighting between
political parties prevents anything from getting done was also a 5, indicating
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people strongly agree with this idea. These results indicate that people did not
feel very positively towards two specific processes of politics or that the political
system is open and fair. Obviously, people seemed to think that politicians do lots
of talking but take little action and that there is lots of fighting going on between
the two major political parties.
In all regression models, process variables were generally the weakest
predictors of political trust, as compared to perceptions of people and policy, and
were often not even statistically significant. In formulating the process scale, I
found that the reliability of said scale was very poor and discontinued its usage
immediately. This revealed that the three survey statements that I tested as ideas
of process did not appear to be measuring the same concept at all (α = .37). This
limited the confidence that I had in process to explain much of political trust.
This shortcoming, however, lies completely with the researcher and the way in
which process was operationalized. This may help explain the uneven
performance of process in helping understand trust.
The effects of the process experimental treatments were also negligible
and not significant. The process attributes tested were campaigning and debate.
As expected, there was a higher mean trust for the politician that promised not to
run a negative campaign versus the politician that did not, but the difference
between the trust scores following each of these treatments was not statistically
significant. Although mean trust appeared higher in regards to a congressperson
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who engages in civil debate as compared to one who engaged in uncivil debate,
there was no statistical significance in the differences in means as a result of these
two treatments. Although a comparison of all four process treatments showed
that the treatments which were hypothesized to cause higher average trust scores
actually did, none of these differences were statistically significant.
The one consistently significant process variable (“lots of talking”)
performed differently depending upon the dependent variable being investigated.
This variable was a significant predictor of Trust Scale but it was not in the model
with Trust as the dependent variable. Ideas of process may not be important for
simple trust in federal government to do the right thing, but when it comes to the
multifaceted idea of trust in Trust Scale, it does play a significant role. This
makes sense in that the Trust Scale dependent variable contains four separate
questions that get at the trustworthiness, honesty, wastefulness, and
responsiveness of the federal government. Process might matter more when
asking people to consider all four of these ideas. An important point to come out
of this study is that the ability to explain trust very much depends upon the
measure of trust a scholar is using.
It may also be that Americans already feel so inherently negative about the
political process that there was nothing new to be found here. As mentioned,
responses to the process survey items did not indicate that people have a great
deal of confidence in the political process. Perhaps the citizenry expects
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politicians to run negative campaigns and to engage in uncivil debate. If that is
the case, then variables like clean campaigning and civil debate might not have
had any measurable effect on political trust simply because people do not believe
that the political process really happens like that in reality.
Perceptions of People Matter
Consistent across all analyses performed, the components of people
influenced trust. In comparison, the effect of people qualities on trust was second
only to that of policy. How people perceive of the people in political office
should influence trust in government. The data here support this idea.
The survey portion of the instrument tested three political statements
dealing with perceptions of people. These were 1. Politicians generally have good
intentions, 2. I have a great deal of confidence in the men and women in this
country that either hold or are running for public office, and 3. Politicians in the
U.S. deserve respect. These statements were intentionally very general and
intended to measure how people perceived of the people qualities of elected
officials. As a whole, on matters related to the people serving in political office,
this sample had a somewhat positive impression of politicians. On average, they
were most likely to think that politicians do have good intentions but they did not
have a great deal of confidence in them. A majority of those surveyed did think
that politicians deserve respect.
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In almost every regression model, all three of these people variables were
statistically significant in predicting trust and in the hypothesized directions. This
means that the more likely a person is to think that politicians have “good
intentions”, politicians deserve “respect”, and that they have a great deal of
“confidence in politicians”, the greater her trust will be.
As far as the experimental treatments were concerned, the two people
qualities tested were competence as measured through previous elective office
and whose opinions a politician uses in taking positions on issues. The difference
in means between a politician who had no previous office and the politician who
did was not in line with the hypothesized relationship. The politician with no
experience was trusted more than the one who did, although the difference
between the means of these two treatments was not statistically significant. As
hypothesized, the politician who uses his constituents’ opinions in taking
positions on issues was trusted more than the politician who used his own
personal feelings and the difference in these means was statistically significant.
The responses to the generalized survey statements reveal that the more
positive that people evaluated the people in politics, the higher their trust in
government was. Those who think that politicians deserve respect, that
politicians have good intentions, and have confidence in politicians had higher
political trust. What are the people qualities, then, that are deserving of trust?
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The reactions to the experimental treatments show that electoral
experience may not inspire trust, as the politician with no previous experience
resulted in a higher mean level of trust. Although this difference was not
statistically significant, this is an interesting finding. Perhaps competence is not
established through previous office holding experience. Or it may be that citizens
do not interpret political experience as worthy of increased trust. It may be,
however, that a politician with prior experience represents a “career politician”,
and Americans do not generally love the notion of a career politician. In this way,
experience may have a negative connotation, which would cause it to have an
adverse effect on trust in a politician. Political science literature reveals that
Americans distrust career politicians. The strong show of support for term limits
for Congress indicates this to be true. In a 1998 survey, 68% of people supported
term limits for Congress (Hibbing and Thiess-Morse 2002, 90).
The reaction to whose opinions a politician considers in taking positions
on issues did matter in regards to political trust. The politician who used his
constituents’ opinions engendered a higher mean level of trust than the politician
who used his own personal feelings, and this difference in means was statistically
significant. This finding was as expected as previous research indicates that
people like legislators to take on the delegate role.
Perceptions of the people in office, as conceptualized and measured here,
do affect trust in government. General satisfaction with the people in office
188
should increase trust. Competence, at least that as measured through previous
elective experience, does not have any significant effect on political trust. Whose
opinions a politician takes into account when deciding what positions to take on
issues does matter in that the politician who serves as a delegate, listening to his
constituents, is trusted more than the politician who serves as a trustee, following
his own opinions.
Perceptions of Policy Matter the Most
Policy, as I have conceptualized of it here, consistently had the greatest
effect upon political trust of these three primary independent variables. Although
the previous empirical evidence regarding policy’s effect on satisfaction with or
trust in government is mixed, the empirical evidence here is quite clear. In the
regression models that come from the survey data, policy ideas had the greatest
effect on trust. In the analysis of the experimental portion of this research, policy
had the greatest effect on trust. Both methods of investigation yielded the same
results, that policy variables, as conceptualized here, had the greatest impact on
trust. This convergence between survey and experimental findings should lend
confidence to both.
The three policy statements that participants were asked to respond to
presented very general ideas of policy outcomes of the government. These were:
1. I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced
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lately, 2. All in all, the government does a good job of running its programs, and
3. Things in this country are generally headed in the right direction. These
statements did not require participants to make assessments of any specific
governmental policy, just to assess their general ideas about the policies
produced, the government’s running of programs, and the general direction of the
nation. As a whole, the numbers show that this sample of people was generally
not pleased with the state of things. With each of these three policy statements,
majorities of the sample disagreed with any positive sentiment. It can be safely
said that this sample of people does not generally seem happy with these broad
elements of policy.
In regression models, all three of these policy statements were statistically
significant in explaining trust. The more positively one felt about all three of
these policy components, satisfaction with public policy, how the government
runs its programs, and the direction of the state of the nation, the higher that
person’s trust was. These three statements all continued to have positive and
significant relationships with trust even when considered in conjunction with the
other variables of people and process.
Perhaps these sentiments about policy, derived on a more global level,
more adequately reflect how everyday citizens evaluate policy outcomes by the
government. I have conceptualized that perceptions of policy will concentrate on
the outputs of government and politicians; exactly what is being done that can be
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measured and felt without requiring intensive knowledge on the part of citizens.
The political science literature has found that everyday citizens are not capable of
evaluating government according to policy because the knowledge demands are
too great. Perhaps this is an artifact of the fact that policy satisfaction is most
often measured by asking a citizen what they feel the most pressing policy
concern is and then asking them how the government is doing on that policy
issue. Citizens may not be quite capable of articulating a pertinent and up to date
policy concern and then assessing what the government is currently doing to
address said problem, but according to my findings here, how they feel about
general policy outcomes has the capacity to affect trust. Since trust is an affective
evaluation, which people use subjective criteria to judge, this indicates that a
person’s general impression of what is going on in government and politics is a
subjective piece of the criteria that can affect trust in government.
These evaluations of broad sentiments about policy outcomes in the
country do not indicate what a person is specifically thinking about when
answering these questions. We cannot know for sure what government program a
person is thinking about when they evaluate how the government is running its
programs. Are they thinking about Social Security, the military, or something
else? Although we do not know that specific information, it may be enough to
know that when citizens amass information, they are able to take definite opinions
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on general policy concerns and that these evaluations, in turn, affect political
trust.
The results from the experimental portion of my research, however, tested
very specific elements of policy, so we can be very sure what it is that citizens are
reacting to. The two factors of policy that were tested were either taking or
rejecting pork monies for the district and having a national focus versus a local
focus on the question of representation. In my factor analysis prior to putting my
survey instrument into the field, these two variables loaded highly with the policy
factor, as I have conceptualized of it here. I also felt that they would provide
interesting insight. Indeed, they did. The rejecting pork and national
representational focus treatments caused higher mean levels of trust than the
accepting pork and local representational focus treatments, and these relationships
were statistically significant. According to these experimental results, it appears
that citizens find these two policy behaviors, rejecting pork and having a national
representational focus, worthy of more trust than the other policy behaviors of
taking pork and local representational focus. These results support the original
hypothesized relationships. Even when compared to all other of the twelve
people, process, and policy treatments, these two policy treatments stood out in
their effect on trust. The mean trust levels for the reject pork (M = 6.11) and
national focus (M = 5.91) treatments were the highest two mean trust scores out of
all twelve treatments.
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These results indicate that policy, as conceptualized and measured here,
absolutely affects trust in government. Broad, global policy sentiments
influenced trust, and specific ideas of policy, pork and nature of representational
focus, affected resulting political trust. Most importantly, when given specific
policy information, respondents were able to process the information enough so
that it affected subsequent trust evaluations. These results were exactly as
hypothesized, with rejecting pork and national focus affecting trust positively and
taking pork and local focus resulting in lower average trust scores.
Relevance of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research
People
The characteristics of people that I tested with the experimental design
were competence, as measured through previous political experience, and whose
opinions a politician uses in taking positions on issues. These are factors which
are easy to include in experimental treatments because they are presented in
binary fashion. A politician either has previous elective experience or he does
not. A politician either uses his own personal opinions or those of his
constituents. In reality, of course, there are many gradations of these variables;
they are not always so dichotomous in the real world of politics.
Does it matter whether or not a politician takes on a delegate or trustee
role of representation? The treatments about whose opinions a politician uses test
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these ideas. Reactions to the experimental treatments indicates that it does matter
and that people generally trust politicians who take on the delegate role more. At
the end of the day, however, political scientists know that most legislators take on
either role when it suits them, what has come to be called a politico. Future
research might include this idea in experimental treatments in order to ascertain if
this politico role has any discernible influence on political trust. Citizens appear
to have contradictory expectations of their members of Congress because they
want them to take a delegate role but also have a national focus, as was revealed
in the study of policy variables.
Of the three primary independent variables that I have sought to test here,
perceptions of people presents a great challenge for future researchers. As far as
the perceptions of people in office, we know that the morality of a politician does
matter for political trust (Levi and Stoker 2000). What does that mean though?
What makes one moral and another amoral? These are the types of questions that
remain unanswered. The problem is in identifying a way to test morality. How
do we, as political scientists, identify and test the subtleties of morality? Honesty,
for instance, is an often mentioned characteristic in voters’ evaluations of political
candidates, and yet we still do not have a way to test honesty. Describing one
politician as honest and another as not will no doubt influence trust in that
politician, but that gets us nowhere because we would expect that a politician
called dishonest would not be trusted very much at all, no matter what. It would
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be more helpful to know what makes a politician honest or dishonest. How do
citizens come to judge honesty, and how does that then affect political trust?
These are continuing challenges for those who are interested in measuring the
influence of people on trust in government and political trust.
At the end of the day, this is why experimental research is tough to
conduct with respect to the topic of trust. In order to make sure that people are
responding to the treatments, they need to be different and not overly biased. But
how, then, does the researcher tease out the differences between no elective
experience, some elective experience, and a great deal of it when it comes to
trust? Because my research indicates that an experimental design can be effective
in identifying factors of people, process, and policy that have an effect on trust,
scholars must continue to develop ways to test these subtle nuances of people
characteristics.
Process
The perceptions of process tested here had the least effect on measures of
trust. This was the case in both parts of the methodology. Responses to process
statements in the survey were not strong in explaining trust. The process
treatments in the experimental part did not cause any statistically significant
differences in trust. Other scholars have reported that process variables do affect
satisfaction with government, but my data do not support these previous findings.
195
Perhaps there are other ways to operationalize process that would influence
political trust. I felt strongly that I had created accurate measures of process, but
apparently that is not the case here. Perhaps perceptions of process do matter, but
in comparison to those of people and policy, they appear minor.
Although the expected relationships emerged between the process
treatments and trust, they were not of great consequence. The mean level of trust
was higher for the politician who engages in civil debate which is quiet and calm
versus one who is passionate and vocal, as was expected. Similarly, a politician
who promises to run a clean campaign and not run negative ads is trusted more
than a politician who vows to point out the differences between him and his
opponent. Perhaps these factors did not result in significant differences in mean
trust scores because the differences between pairs of treatments were not stark
enough. I did not want to use emotive language because I felt that it would bias
the way the treatments would be evaluated. Furthermore, it might be the case that
these particular parts of process are not ones that shape trust in government and
politicians. Future research might continue to find and test other elements of
process that are capable of influencing trust.
Policy
My conceptualization of policy was different than almost all other
scholarship. Policy entails general government performance and when measured
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in this way, it had a substantial effect on trust in government. Future research
might consider this when deciding how to measure policy and its effect on people.
The experimental portion of my research allowed me to test two specific
attributes of policy, pork and the focus of representation, both of which had
significant effects on trust in an individual politician. Although these two
attributes are more specific ideas of policy, this suggests that when given the
relevant policy information, people are capable of interpreting it because it causes
differences in trust which are responsive to the policy information. People are not
stupid and obviously the sample of people studied here thinks that policy factors
like these matter.
These findings represent important considerations for politicians and
future politicians. Members of Congress are evaluated by the manner in which
they prioritize national versus local concerns and this includes whether or not they
bring home money to the district. Congressmen who pass up pork projects and
consider themselves representatives of the national interest are trusted much more
than those who do not and these differences are statistically significant. Bringing
home pork and representing one’s local district are hallmarks of representation in
Congress. The data show that these are not policy behaviors that engender trust.
Will they continue? Almost undoubtedly. Members of Congress know that elites
and monied interests within their districts want pork so they must satisfy these
constituents even if some other constituents, namely voters, are pulling in the
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opposite direction. Politicians who are paying attention to the political science
literature would be wise to note this finding.
Furthermore, although not taking special project monies elicited more trust
in a member of Congress, this may change when the nature of whom that
congressperson is changes. As the literature points out, people evaluate Congress
and its members by different standards (Parker and Davidson 1979). It may be
that while Congress is expected to guard the national good, individual members
are expected to guard the good of a district and/or state. It is one thing to trust
that politician more when it is a hypothetical politician. How would people feel
about their member of Congress turning down important monies for their state or
district? Would they trust a congressperson that made a sacrifice like this on their
behalf? The evidence here indicated that people trust a congressperson more
when he does this, but this research design did not put people in the position of
judging their own member of Congress, thus the variable of self-interest was not
included. Future research may be able to tease out these differences.
As far as future research is concerned, we must not give up on the ability
of the citizenry to evaluate policy and governmental performance writ large. As
such, policy is still a warranted inclusion in the study of trust in government, as
long as it is conceptualized in a way that makes citizens capable of evaluating it.
Experimental Research and Political Trust
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Future experimental research can test different attributes of people,
process, and policy for their effect on political trust. My work tested six concepts
of people, process, and policy, but there are so many other ways to operationalize
these same ideas, that the future is virtually limitless with this methodology. This
unique approach to studying trust, a political phenomenon studied mostly through
usage of surveys, has proven to be useful and exciting. Oftentimes, survey
research has had to include numerous variables just to ensure that a scholar is
controlling for the potential influence of other things on trust. Causation is more
clearly established in experimental research and that will provide interesting
avenues for future research. This will allow us to make far more substantive
conclusions about which variables affect political trust.
Relevance of Findings and Trust
The analysis here revealed that citizens are more likely to trust elements of
people and policy that do not exist in the real world of politics. The data
suggested that a novice politician with no elective experience, who foregoes
efforts to bring home the bacon, who focuses on high-minded national issues over
parochial local ones, and who adopts a delegate role should be trusted the most of
all politicians. In real life, we know that politicians with electoral experience are
more likely to get elected and reelected, that members of Congress will continue
to bring home the bacon as long as it furthers their careers, that members of
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Congress have to pay attention to the folks back home and the attendant local
concerns, and that no member ever takes positions on issues that are in line with
his constituents all the time.
The very characteristics that were found here to increase trust do not exist
in the reality of politics. The type of politician that would be most trusted may
represent an ideal type, but he does not represent reality. Should he? That is a
very normative question. Some scholars would argue yes, more trust is better for
the system. There is no doubt, however, that the American political system can
continue to function just like always no matter how much trust people do or do
not place in the government.
Moreover, the very characteristics identified in this research as influencing
and increasing trust are not compatible. A member of Congress who takes on a
delegate role is trusted more than one who does not, and a member of Congress
who takes a national focus over a local one is trusted more. These two things
cannot simultaneously exist. If a congressperson is supposed to listen to his
specific constituency and represent them thusly, then that same congressperson
cannot necessarily embrace national issues over local ones. As such, citizens do
not appear to have consistent expectations of their politicians.
Perhaps the most important thing learned here simply is that the
characteristics of politics and government that people tend to place trust in are not
widespread. The types of political attributes which increase trust are not ones that
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the system fosters, and vice versa. If citizens think less experienced politicians
are more worthy of trust, then why do they keep voting for the same incumbents?
The incumbency advantage looms large in elections. If citizens trust members of
Congress who abstain from bringing money back to the district, then why do
members continue to do it? They do these things because they continue to help
them get reelected. Does a politician care if constituents trust him as long as they
keep electing him to office? Politicians might like to be trusted but they probably
prioritize getting and staying in office ahead of garnering trust with constituents.
Citizens might prefer to trust their government and the people who run it but as
long as their streets are paved and their communities secure and provided for
they’ll continue to elect the same typical politicians. The onus of demanding,
developing, and maintaining trust between citizens and government lies on the
shoulders of both.
Explaining Trust
The original premise of this research was that political trust is a result of
political evaluations made in response to these three primary determinants that I
am specifying here, people, process, and policy. I believe that the data support
this premise. There is remarkable convergence of findings in these two methods.
The three elements of people, process, and policy have considerable strength in
explaining political trust in the system as a whole and in specific politicians.
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Evaluations of people, process, and policy have been found, through analysis of
originally collected data, to influence both trust in government and trust in
specific politicians. Of the three primary explanatory variables tested here, policy
had the strongest influence on political trust. Perceptions of people follow closely
behind, while the effect of process is the least powerful of the three.
I am not the first, nor the only scholar to posit that political evaluations
affect political trust. Prior to this, presidential approval, congressional approval,
and economic performance were the three most important variables of
government performance that influence how trusting a citizen is of her
government (Erber and Lau 1990; Craig 1993; Lawrence 1997; Orren 1997;
Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000; Citrin and Luks 2001). I am articulating a
different manner of conceptualizing of government performance: people, process,
and policy. When all of these variables were considered in tandem in regression
models, perceptions of people and policy performed the best in predicting trust
followed by congressional approval. It appears that generalizations about the
people and policy facets of government and politics are more predictive of trust
than congressional, presidential approval and economic performance. I feel
confident, given this evidence and the rest of the analysis presented, that the
determinants of people, process, and policy may form a broad explanatory theory




List of 29 People, Process, and Policy Variables included in Pretest
Explanation of Winnowing Process
Factor Analysis of 12 People, Process, and Policy Variables from Pretest
Final 12 Factors and Factor Loadings
On a scale from 1 to 5, 5 being very important, 4 being somewhat important, 3
being neither important nor unimportant, 2 being somewhat unimportant, and
1 being very unimportant, how important are the following qualities in deciding
whether or not you trust a politician, in this case a Member of Congress. Please
circle your responses.
Whether or not he brings his religious beliefs
to decision-making
Whether or not he has held previous political office
Whether or not he moves to Washington DC
once elected
Whether or not he is principled, standing up for
what he believes in
Whether or not he is like you
Whether or not he is married and has a family
Whether or not he has charisma
Whether or not he goes to church
Whether or not he is independently wealthy
Whether or not you believe that he is honest
Whether or not he has admitted character weaknesses
Whether or not he is in politics to represent himself
or his constituents
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Whether or not he is willing to compromise
in order to get things done
Whether or not he conducts clean campaigns,
free of mudslinging or negativity
Whether or not he is willing to work with the president
regardless of political party
Whether or not he engages in civil and friendly
debate on the issues
Whether or not he accepts campaign contributions
from special interests
Whether or not he is a “career politician”
Whether or not he represents everyday Americans
Whether or not he is supportive of his own political party
Whether or not he works to limit the influence
of special interests
Whether or not the economy is performing well
Whether or not he supports a strong and active role
for the federal government
Whether or not he supports the government
spending more money than it has
Whether or not he brings money and projects
to his district
Whether or not he focuses attention on the good of the
entire country over the good for particular places
Whether or not the government is effective in dealing
with important problems in society
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Whether or not he works to spend the government’s
money efficiently
Whether or not he supports a government that is not
inefficient or wasteful
Explanation of Winnowing Process
1. After beginning with 29 variables, I eliminated any variable which, on average,
was not ranked as somewhat or very important in deciding whether or not a
politician should be trusted. This resulted in six variables falling out of the
model.
2. With 23 variables left, I then made the choice to remove any variables which
did not correlate with any one factor at .5 or above. So if a variable factored
strongly with more than one of the factors, I discarded it. Additionally, if a
variable did not factor with any of the factors at .5 or above I discarded it.
3. Next, I considered how the remaining variables could be operationalized.
Because these variables were to be ultimately turned into experimental treatments,
I needed to be able to operationalize them as clearly and succinctly as possible. If
that were not possible for a variable, that variable got discarded.
4. The final model contains 12 variables:







Previous Office .001 .620 -.295
Principled .111 .659 -.226
Charisma .086 .576 -.183
Support Party .221 .669 -.081
Compromise .192 .086 -.642




Debate .316 .171 -.747
Special Interests .653 .109 -.124
Deficit Spending .694 -.051 -.279
Pork .696 .282 -.341
National Interest .659 .386 -.305
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization
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Final 12 Factors and Factor Loadings
People – previous office (.62), principled (.66), charisma (.58), and
support his party (.67)
Process – compromise (.64), clean campaign (.74), work with the
president (.63), and debate (.75)




Frequency Tables of the First Three Variables of People
Politicians generally have good intentions.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 44 7%
Disagree 118 20%
Neither agree nor disagree 195 33%
Agree 210 35%
Strongly agree 28 5%
N = 595
I have a great deal of confidence in the men and women in this country that
either hold or are running for public office.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 69 12%
Disagree 189 32%
Neither agree nor disagree 196 33%
Agree 120 20%
Strongly agree 17 3%
N = 591
Politicians in the U.S. deserve respect.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 58 10%
Disagree 93 16%
Neither agree nor disagree 149 25%
Agree 206 35%




Frequency Tables of the First Three Variables of Process
Most politicians do a lot of talking but they do little to solve the really
important issues facing the country.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 28 5%
Disagree 56 9%
Neither agree nor disagree 94 16%
Agree 200 34%
Strongly agree 218 37%
N = 596
The political process is fair and open.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 83 14%
Disagree 161 27%
Neither agree nor disagree 154 26%
Agree 153 26%
Strongly agree 41 7%
N = 592
Fighting between political parties in Washington prevents our elected
officials from getting anything done.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 35 6%
Disagree 62 11%
Neither agree nor disagree 59 10%
Agree 175 30%




Frequency Tables of the First Three Variables of Policy
I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced
lately.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 162 27%
Disagree 185 31%
Neither agree nor disagree 130 22%
Agree 103 17%
Strongly agree 15 3%
N = 595
All in all, the government does a good job of running its programs.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 103 17%
Disagree 211 36%
Neither agree nor disagree 166 28%
Agree 90 15%
Strongly agree 23 4%
N = 593
Things in this country are generally headed in the right direction.
Frequency Valid Percent
Strongly disagree 149 25%
Disagree 176 30%
Neither agree nor disagree 135 23%
Agree 115 19%







































# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.6
OLS Regression Models – Process Variables (lots of talking, fair and open,


































# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.7
OLS Regression Models – Policy Variables (satisfied with public policy,






































# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.8











































































# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.9
















































# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.10
OLS Regression Models with All Explanatory Variables of Trust
DV = Trust Scale





















































































































































Can trust be -.293 -.300 -.375 #
215


















People Scale .192 ***
(.039)
















# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 3.11
OLS Regression Models with All Explanatory Variables of Trust
DV = Trust

















































































































































































People Scale .077 ***
(.019)
Policy Scale .086 ***
(.020)












# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01















































































































































































































ANOVA Table – People Treatments (previous office, no previous office,
personal feelings, constituents’ feelings)








Groups 36.340 3 12.113 2.866 .036
Within




ANOVA Table – Process Treatments (clean campaign, not clean campaign,
civil debate, not civil debate)








Groups 19.419 3 6.473 1.378 .249
Within




ANOVA Table – Policy Treatments (reject pork, take pork, national interest,
local interest)








Groups 220.836 3 73.612 14.414 .000
Within




OLS Regression Model – Government Performance Factors and People and
Policy Scales
DV = Trust
Variables Model 1 – Typical
Government
Performance Variables



















People scale .081 ***
(.013)






# p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Missing values excluded listwise
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